



THE SUSPICION OF THE SUSPICION

AN INTRODUCTION TO
METAMODERN PHILOSOPHY



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Note on the edition

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As for this edition, it is the first English translation of the original Spanish text. This first translation was done mainly with the help of artificial intelligence translation tools, specifically using deepL translate software. Despite the advanced results provided by this tool, and despite the manual intervention by the author himself in order to provide a good translation, this English edition is definitely not free of translation errors. Therefore, we ask for the reader's understanding, at least with this first edition, which will likely be improved in a second edition. But for now, please consider this inconvenience as something to pay attention to if some parts of the book are incomprehensible. The definitive solution to this issue will always be to consult the original Spanish book, *La sospecha de la sospecha: Una introducción a la filosofía metamoderna*. However, we hope that this will not be necessary for most sections of the book. Finally, the format of the book complies with the Chicago style guidelines, 17th edition.

Prologue

Why write about metamodernity? What is the author's interest in this new trend? It may be useful for the reader, and for their understanding of this book, to state the reasons why this study is being carried out and the author's personal intentions. Beyond the mere impulse of curiosity and the desire to know the truth, the personal reason for this study is mainly due to historical needs. The truth is that the current state of philosophy and history is extremely boring to the author. The present times are not only decadent and tending toward extinction, but they are decadently boring. Change, in whatever direction, is desirable, even if that change means ending up with something worse. Anything is valid, as long as it breaks this overwhelming inertia.

This book was published on August 19, 2023, originally in Spanish, on the shores of the Pacific, in a small town in Ecuador called Ayampe. A tiny coastal paradise, which despite having become a refuge for the local bourgeoisie, still retains some of its pleasant spirit.

In the current chaotic state of ideas and society in general, this was the only place where enough quiet could be found to write.

Ecuador has no philosophical recognition, and probably never will. However, knowledge of the universal is clearly capable of being independent of the one-sidedness of the terrain and going beyond physical borders.

Consciousness can go beyond lines on a map. However, there are two specific borders which, despite not being physical, represent a barrier much more difficult for consciousness to cross than customs, passports, or border checkpoints.

Language and blood represent two borders that ideas cannot easily cross. Not because consciousness cannot, but because it does not want to. When an idea comes from a different linguistic origin or a different bloodline, in most cases, consciousness recognizes that object as an "intrusion" or something external that is not inherent to itself. As a result, it ends up discarding it without further analysis or any benefit whatsoever.

Therefore, the current difficult situation of ideas is something that simply cannot be resolved by means external to what philosophy itself represents. The philosophical problem is not something that can be solved by Islam or by some ideology imposed involuntarily by the media. Nor can it be solved by academia, which has already shown that it only defends the interests of capital rather than the truth. For in any of these proposals, regardless of whether these truths are beneficial or harmful to their listeners, they are assumed by them to be an intrusion in most cases. For they are perceived as something external to one's own consciousness and are automatically rejected. These ideas are blocked by the barriers that their origins represent.

Of these two barriers, language does not represent a major discord, especially when it comes to languages of common origin. Such as the Romance languages of Latin origin (Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, French, etc.) or their cousins, the Germanic languages (English, German, Swedish, Dutch, etc.). However, when attempting to convey an idea from English to Arabic, for example, or to African languages, those attempts do not have the same meaning

for the listeners as they would in a more familiar language. And vice versa, the same thing happens. But even so, there is no such thing as a huge discrepancy that would make all translations "invalid," as many postmodernists believe.

As for the resistance that these barriers represent, blood is a much more solid object than language. An idea that has a very different blood origin can hardly penetrate forcefully. Unless it is an extremely simple idea that does not require a great deal of understanding, or an ancient truth already well known to all.

However, philosophy is no longer what it used to be; it is no longer a simple idea, but rather a problematic one. It has been destroyed and rebuilt hundreds of times, almost always with different intentions. However, these changes in philosophy have always been carried out by philosophy itself and never by an agent perceived as external. These changes are therefore inherent to philosophy and, as such, accepted by consciousness as valid. In addition, it is worth mentioning that any true attempt at philosophy is always charged with a negative intentionality, which always seeks movement and never stagnation. This intentionality is certainly contrary to the stagnation represented today by postmodernism, whose ideas are now obsolete rather than revolutionary.

For these reasons, it has been convenient for this evolutionary study to resort to the continuation of philosophy, taking into account these two barriers of consciousness. It is therefore necessary to start from the teachings of the Madrid school. This is the most recent frontier of Latin philosophy in time, which means that it has no significant barriers in terms of language or blood. This is due to the author's Latin bloodline, specifically Latin-Iberian ancestry. But it is also due to the Latin ancestry of the listener, to whom this work is

addressed. Origins both in blood and in language. However, readers from other backgrounds are also welcome to read this work, especially if they come from a closely related branch, such as Latin-Italic, Latin-Romanian, Latin-French, Germanic, Slavic, Hellenic, or even Middle Eastern. However, it should be noted that this study is specifically aimed at the Latin-Iberian element.

As for the differences that may arise in terms of these origins, due to the new American lands in which the blood and language spread, these do not pose a major problem. For although there are clear differences in historical context and in the spirit of the land, these differences have become almost irrelevant in a world as interconnected and globalized as today's, where the system of production is the same and the problems are common problems.

On the other hand, we should also mention the close relationship that this new attempt at philosophy has with Hegelian philosophy. The teachings of the Madrid school largely stem from this, but so do the teachings of Heidegger, Nietzsche, Marx, and postmodernists in general. Hegel's impact is of radical importance for all philosophy that came after him, so it's silly to ignore him, as the postmodernists have tried to do. This book will show how postmodernity has not only been unable to escape Hegel, but has become the philosophy most conditioned by him. This same conditioning is something that cannot be ignored by the new metamodernity, otherwise it will perish before it. Later in the chapters, the reader will realize the importance of Hegelian philosophy for the renewal of ideas.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that the intention of this book is not to define a new trend, but rather to be a proposal for speculative philosophy. In other words, it is intended to add a commentary to the increasingly interesting metamodern conversation, in which several

authors are already participating. At the same time, it will serve as a useful introduction to the metamodern theme for readers who wish to delve deeper into it.

With that, I will conclude the prologue, but not without first thanking all those who, in one way or another, have contributed to this work.

Introduction



Figure 1¹

"Everything great is in the midst of a storm."²

In this endless ocean of uncertainty, where certainties vanish and structures crumble, we find ourselves at a crossroads in time. Postmodernity, that enigma that once dominated our thoughts and shaped our reality, is coming to an end. Its fragmented ideas and incisive

¹ Figure 1. Birds of paradise (2016) by Carl Dobsky. Narrative painting.

² Heidegger, Martin. "Der Satz vom Grund." Gesamtausgabe, vol. 9, Vittorio Klostermann, 1957, pp. 193-247.

skepticism have finally yielded to the strong waves of history, and a time of change looms intimidatingly before mankind, asking in defiant whispers: "What now?"

Postmodernity stirs its last cup of joy and intoxication before watching the curtain fall on its play. It leaves the new blood to its fate, which must now come to terms with the debt of its conclusions. The crisis is not only one of ideas, but also of history itself. What once represented good and justice now represents nothing but oppression. And what called itself "freedom" is now a chain. The children of Cronos are slowly being devoured by the beast.

One has to be realistic about that. It is really difficult to believe that there is light at the end of the tunnel. After all, do we really want that light to exist? The new blood perceives its reality and realizes that times are getting tough. And they are told, "You must fight for your life," but what is "life" anyway? How much is it worth today? How much is the life of others worth? How much is mine worth? Is this what our ancestors fought tirelessly for? Just to stay alive? Confusion abounds and the will to fight feels small.

But it's not just the will that feels small. Consciousness also feels small. Postmodern philosophy, which once represented the axis of good and fair thinking, is now crumbling into a sea of contradictions, where the only thing that prevails is mutual accusations. This current that once advocated questioning, questioning everything, distrusting everything. Whose intentions at first seemed good, full of caution, are now nothing more than an obstacle to consciousness.

The ultimate goal of postmodernism was supposedly to be free from what is called "structure." A kind of systematic conditioning that prevents consciousness from reaching the

true truth. For it was always caught up in preconception, conditioning, bias, and therefore error.

This "structure" is described by postmodernists with a wide range of categories. However, of all of these, language is perhaps the most predominant when it comes to postmodern conditioning. Whatever this structure may be, it is perceived by postmodernity as the great oppressor, full of all kinds of evil connotations. To the point of likening it to the matrix itself³. "Everyone is wrong, everyone is in the matrix," exclaim postmodernists. "Greek thinkers are in the matrix, medieval thinkers are in the matrix, modern thinkers are in the matrix, existentialists are in the matrix, everyone is in the matrix! Everyone except me!"

The legacy of postmodernism has diminished everything around it; everything it touches, it diminishes.⁴. "That's not true, we only expose the truth," claims postmodernism. Exclaiming that its intentions were always those of justice. Those of correctly recounting the truth, putting it to the test through suspicion. "Suspect everything," claims postmodernity. Suspect the intentions of those who speak, suspect the intentions of those who remain silent, suspect this book and its author, suspect those who fight, but never, ever suspect those who bow their heads. They do not need suspicion.

Postmodernity, in its eagerness to escape the evil structure, has become the structure itself. The branch that advocated escaping bias has ended up taking the place of bias itself. The philosophy of "non-domination" and "non-intervention," the supposed fragmentary freedom, has become what it once renounced. Now, postmodernity is the matrix. This

³ A concept similar to that of the postmodern structure, which appears in the famous 1999 action and science fiction film written and directed by the Wachowski sisters.

⁴ The last man, the one who belittles everything, is a concept in Nietzschean philosophy. He symbolizes the antithesis of the superman and therefore finds his essence in decadence.

problem is not new; in fact, throughout the history of thought, it occurs frequently. One believes one has achieved freedom by escaping some oppressive structure, only to end up falling into another structure that still holds one prisoner.

This makes it impossible to achieve the freedom that is supposedly attained by escaping, by eliminating the matrix, by eliminating bias. For when one leaves a bias, the element that allows this exit automatically becomes the new dominant bias, conditioning reality until it is eventually replaced by some other "liberator of consciousness." All of this, which is now evident, inevitably raises a question. Is "escaping" really what will bring freedom?

The matrix operates in a strange way. The desire to escape seems only to strengthen the chains of the oppressed, rather than defeat them. When an individual tries to escape society and flee to the countryside, for example, to find the "anarchist freedom of nature," what they really end up finding is that nature is generally even less free than the society they are trying to escape. The law of nature in fact brings with it a set of extremely rigid rules that are much more difficult to break than the "artificial" laws of society. The ruthless law of natural selection only brings back memories of the past, recognizing how difficult life was in that environment, and even more difficult when one tries to escape the matrix by means of fragmentation, as separate individuals facing the wilderness alone.

Escaping the matrix is no longer perceived as a valid idea in today's consciousness. Especially when it comes to new blood. The postmodern idea of "freedom," the idea of freedom to escape, is nothing more than an obsolete idea. The same is true of the ridiculous idea of freedom of choice that postmodernity also proposed. Where one is free, but only free

to choose between two options imposed by the same structure. For it is now evident that a message of freedom is always twisted when it comes from a position of power, and even more so when that position of power rejects fundamental change and promotes the stagnation of the status quo. "You can be free, but only within these parameters." Like the prisoner who is free to walk around his cell.

The postmodern, upon hearing this discourse, will inevitably feel the desire to be suspicious of it. Isn't this book also biased? What is the intention of this discourse? Such an accusation will not be necessary, for shortly, as we progress through the chapters, the intentions of this new philosophy and all its previous biases will become clear. Although it can be said in advance that the intentions of this discourse could well be considered obscene by the postmodern, and could well be perceived as noble by the metamodern.

However, before we get to that topic, it is first necessary to address the most immediate and urgent issue. This issue is much more relevant than any other current philosophical problem. Certainly, there are other topics, such as Heidegger's incomplete "being" or the philosophies of language, which are very appealing. However, there is something that current philosophy must necessarily adhere to before taking any other step in any other direction.

The subject of gnoseology (theory of knowledge) is urgent. It is impossible to propose even the most banal of ideas until the question of knowledge has been resolved. This is due to the challenge that postmodernity has posed to philosophy, which must be addressed. Postmodern theory of knowledge is more of an anti-theory of knowledge. It is basically

dedicated to invalidating any other knowledge left and right, labeling it as biased and "suspicious."

In view of this problem, which makes creation impossible, it is necessary to propose a rejection of these theories. It seems that the time has finally come for the much-needed "suspicion of suspicion." The negation of negation. The exposure of "the great postmodern lie" is something that must be done before anything else that philosophy proposes. For as long as the problem of knowledge proposed by postmodernity remains unresolved, we cannot even speak of metamodern philosophy, as some figures have attempted to do. By trying to ignore this idea, they do nothing more than continue to propose questions that are not really different, but are still of the same nature as the postmodern proposals that everyone already knows. By not addressing the foundation, this postmodern theory of anti-knowledge does not allow for progress. It is thus an anchor to the past.

History has reached such a point of chaos that thinking is becoming necessary once again. As Hegel once said, "times when philosophy is needed are generally not times of order." Such times usually require a complete restructuring of the way man perceives his world. Or at least this is true as far as Western philosophy is concerned. In fact, one of the primary intentions of this study is to propose a continuity to the situation of ideas, because, to tell the truth, the current situation has become really boring. Decadently boring...

However, this is not such a simple task. Philosophy, like history, is no longer innocent. It has mutated hundreds of times, destroying the foundations of previous truths to build new truths on top of them. This process is almost always painful. How can one wish to build when so many have already perished in destruction? How can we talk about well-being

when we have witnessed the brutal level of violence of which man is capable? How can we talk about knowledge and freedom when every time a truth is declared, it becomes the new tyranny of thought? And how can we love knowledge when it lasts only as long as the blink of an eye?

Consciousness is depressed. It has been tested by contradiction and error, once again. Error, the specter of error, reappears and wreaks havoc. Eroding confidence in truth. There have been too many attempts, and the errors have been even more numerous than the attempts. What's more, it seems that from now on, the only thing that can happen is another error, which will then be followed by another error.

However, despite the depression of consciousness, this does not seem to stop the will. The will desires error, so if error is the only option, then error is what is desired. Another mistake, what does it matter... it seems that error is simply inevitable and part of the process of knowing. Even when one does not know.

That is the metamodern feeling, at least in its initial manifestations. That of walking in a vacuum, toward a horizon that is perpetually receding. Walking on a frozen sea, with nothing to hold on to, nothing to cling to, in the void... simply walking... to avoid freezing.



Figure 2⁵

Could someone walking aimlessly toward an empty horizon ever get anywhere? Probably not... It is difficult to meditate on the horizon, and it is also difficult to meditate on the emptiness of the desert. Is it the horizon that postmodern philosophy should meditate on? The horizon is very far away... it is too empty... it generates too much mistrust... Should we then meditate on the desert in which we walk? There is not much to think about there either...

On an empty horizon, where all you do is walk towards it, aimlessly, to avoid freezing, to avoid being run over; what can you reflect on? Another wrong answer would be to say that in reality, there is no time to reflect, that you have to walk fast, or else you will freeze. The answer is wrong, because anyway, where are you going? If you walk aimlessly, without a goal, then you actually have all the time in the world. What better time to meditate?

⁵ Figure 2. Nummer acht - everything is going to be alright (2007) Guido van der Werve.
<https://youtu.be/OUq2nN6V6xU>

In fact, that is exactly the time to meditate, when you find yourself lost. Meditation in motion. The moment for action comes only after meditation.

But meditate on what? It can't be on the horizon, or on the desert I'm walking in, so what to meditate on? There is something interesting to meditate on. And that is to meditate on the subject itself. Can the subject meditate on itself, on why it is doing what it is doing, on why it is still walking aimlessly? In an empty desert, where one walks toward an even emptier horizon, the only thing one can meditate on is walking. Is the reason the subject walks just to avoid freezing? Or is there something else?

Metamodern meditation must be directed precisely at what is available at hand, at what is in front of it. One should not dream of the distant horizon, but rather solve the most immediate problem first. That is to recognize how one is moving forward and, above all, why one is moving forward. For while the method is relevant, the method is often subjugated to the will.

Once the problem of method and intentionality has been solved, only then can metamodernity emerge from this sea of contradictions and uncertainties. That solution is nothing more than a half-measure. It is only a small lantern that metamodernity lights, fearfully and tentatively, in order to generate some clarity. A small lantern, whose sole purpose is to help light a bigger light later. First the small, the simple, and the immediate; then the complex and the distant. And these things must be done in order, without haste. For, as the reader will realize later, it was largely haste that generated all these problems that now hammer reality.

That is precisely the aim of this book. To light a flashlight, a small flashlight, which will then serve to light a larger light. As befits the historical era in which it is written, the language and blood from which it comes. This book can be considered specifically as an introduction to the metamodern. For at the same time as it denies the postmodern, it gives life to the metamodern. In negation.

However, the metamodern should not be considered a purely destructive movement. In fact, it is quite the opposite. The metamodern desire to build is so great that it is forced to destroy the destroyer. And to do so, it must confront the heart of what defines postmodernity: its very structure.

The structure of codes that holds consciousness prisoner in Alcatraz. The impenetrable matrix that has hypnotized the world. The evil Cronos who chews on his children minutes after they are born. Or the cruel Kali, who shows off her necklace of severed heads before destroying the universe. This structure is certainly impossible to ignore.

Postmodernity, for a long time, believed it had escaped the structure, thus being the first truly "unbiased" philosophy. However, from now on, it will become clear throughout this study how postmodernity not only never left that structure, but is in fact probably the most biased school of thought of all time. And this statement becomes evident the moment one identifies what the structure really is.

History is, and always has been, the structure. That substantial movement, which is full of errors and contradictions, which represent nothing on their own. But if, like the eagle, one takes a privileged view of them, they can be perceived as a whole, and one can finally

understand the valley and the mountain as part of the same element. Changing this history of nature, it becomes an ever-enslaving structure, but at the same time ever-renewed. History conditions the subject, but it is also conditioned by the very subject that creates it.

This story is always enslaving, because the true heart of the story seems to belong to something much more fundamental than "power relations." That something is something that goes even beyond the human species itself, and it is something that cannot be escaped as long as one lives in this reality. No matter how much our beloved state authorities have invested enormous amounts of money to make that idea forgotten, instincts simply do not forget what blood means. Blood is the historical container of all previous moments and of all the truths of those previous moments. Blood, which although it has freedom today, did not have it yesterday. It can create in the present, but it can never escape the truths of the ancestors, whose blood still lives and coagulates in the now.

We must look deep into instincts and blood if we want to know the truth. This analysis must not remain superficial; the reader must not limit themselves to the scope of this study. Nor should they limit themselves to the teachings of their most recent ancestors, who in many cases represent nothing but mediocrity. They must look much deeper, much deeper. Into that fire that one day took pity on the ancients and allowed them to form their myth.

Chapter 1: Metamodern Theory of Knowledge

It was the mustachioed man who once identified vulgarity and utility as the same thing. The noble, in a certain sense, being the useless⁶. This statement is immediately erroneous when viewed from a non-philosophical perspective. But once one enters the realm of philosophy, things that previously seemed simple tend to become complicated.

Certainly, authentic philosophy has much less practical utility than its daughters, for example, which limit their object of study to something external to themselves. Such are formal logic, ethics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of nature (Greek physics). And philosophy has even less practical use when compared to its granddaughters, the sciences, such as mathematics, physics, and chemistry. However, behind this apparent uselessness of philosophy, its relevance in the formation of the "most useful" becomes evident.

Is something that gives shape to the useful useless? Perhaps what seemed useless is actually the most useful thing of all. It is useful with such force, with such energy, that its brilliance could well blind those who try to see usefulness through it. And it then turns them into skeptics, sending them back to the less elevated sciences, which shine less and allow them to see better. But this lesser brilliance does not necessarily confer vulgarity. For while a lesser brilliance symbolizes a greater distance from the sky, it also symbolizes a greater closeness to the earth. And between the sky and the earth, there can be no question of vulgarity or nobility. For it has already been historically proven that both elements require each other, to the point of having humbly submitted to each other. The truly vulgar are those

⁶ In Aphorism 225 of *The Gay Science*, entitled "Usefulness," Nietzsche identifies nobility with the least useful.

who only want to see the sky, or those who only want to see the earth. It is one-sidedness, not its usefulness, that is the true enemy of philosophy today.

In addition, if one studies the history of philosophy carefully, it has always, since its inception, been oriented toward service. Its mission seems to be to illuminate the path of the will so that the will may move. One cannot ignore the fact that it was the historical need for a higher ethic that drove the Greeks. In the same way that it was for Descartes, the historical call for independence from Christianity. Or the same volitional ideas of the mustachioed jumper, born out of a weak Germany. It is not intended here to necessarily define philosophical will as a seeker of utility. But many of its listeners, on the other hand, do seek it. For they are closer to the earth. And as much as it pains some to admit it, the listener matters. They matter as much as the speaker.

It seems, then, that what the mustachioed man really meant was not philosophy itself, but his will. For in that sense, the pieces fit together better. The will desires desire, and it does so irrationally; it does not seem to need a reason. Rather, it seems to be self-motivated. However, when it comes to the direction in which its desire should point, this becomes somewhat complicated for the will. This is where the work of consciousness comes in. Consciousness seems to be the inseparable ally of the will.

However, these two elements, will and consciousness, although they seem to be closely related, can appear to be distinct. That is, for the purposes of this book at least, they must be seen as two distinct elements. For it seems that there are always two beasts in this

reality. The first beast comes out of the sea, but the second comes out of the earth. This second beast looks like a lamb, but it speaks like a dragon.⁷

Consciousness, unlike will, and unlike religion in fact, needs a motive. Or at the very least, it needs a starting point to which it can adhere. It cannot claim to start from a strange nebula and have nowhere as its goal. Philosophy must justify itself; it cannot have the same attitude as will. It must know where it is going and where it comes from. It cannot just throw words into the void, left and right, as if it were some cheap hobby. Thought must justify itself, otherwise it is just meaningless verbiage. This is what is currently happening to postmodernists, who have ended up succumbing to this lack of foundation.

Furthermore, it is precisely this lack of foundation that separates philosophy from religion. Philosophy is capable of justifying itself and is therefore capable of calling itself a science. It has a gnoseology, a method, which is capable of explaining the reason for its object of conclusion. On the contrary, religion merely throws its object of knowledge into the air without providing an explanation. Ironically, what ultimately validates religion is philosophy itself. For it is only through its experience of the reality of the world (empiricism) that consciousness is able to accept religion as true. It manages to see a consistency between what it sees and what religion has revealed to it. This is the only way in which man can consider a religion to be true. Obviously, believers never have complete certainty about these revelations. Furthermore, not all believers were present when these divine messages were revealed. Nor were they present when miracles were performed. However, they accept what has been revealed as true, thanks to the consistency of the message with the reality that appears to them. The same is true of any other type of religion, such as New Age, for

⁷ Revelation 13:1-18.

example. But even so, this victory of religion is actually very limited. For in addition to the vagueness of its concepts and the extreme generality of its knowledge, it is also limited. For for every consistent message, there are thousands of others that are not, and that never gain popularity.

It is not my intention here to throw religion into the pit of obscenity. For in this complicated reality full of questions, one can never be truly certain that what one is doing is right. One does not really know whether religion is right or wrong, but there is one thing that is known for sure. Religion does not have a gnoseology; philosophy does. In this sense, philosophy is different from religion. It is more like a dragon than a lamb. It is capable of developing itself in a complex but clear way. It uses not only ontology, but also epistemology in its exposition. The epistemological element seems to be the missing piece in recent philosophy, which aims to resemble religion more than science. Philosophy needs to start from a method. At the very least, it needs a clear starting point.

But what is this basis then? Throughout time, this basis has had different interpretations. In the early days of philosophy, this basis was not even taken into account. A philosophy without a clear basis is better than a philosophy that is not. But even so, it is better with a basis. Descartes first saw this error in the Greeks and set out to provide a principle from which to start his knowledge, in the Cartesian subject.⁸ This correction was taken to its highest level by Hegel, who took the concept as the very basis. Since then, that foundation has taken other directions and wandered from one place to another, to the point where we are now. That is, total confusion.⁹

⁸ Descartes invented "the method." The philosophical system that proposes the thinking self as the basis from which all knowledge must start. This method would later be called idealism.

⁹ Currently, this basis is not only absent from philosophical knowledge, but philosophical knowledge itself is considered impossible. This is the premise of postmodern philosophy.

It is perfectly possible to recycle a theory from the past to develop the knowledge of the present. But it does not seem right. It feels empty, spiritless. This is not characteristic of philosophy, which has always had a different attitude. "Always in motion," demands consciousness. In that sense, perhaps the most appropriate thing is not to forcefully copy theories from the distant past. Rather, we should take them into account, but also take into account those from the more recent past, and of course, those from the present, because it is in the latter... where creation occurs... The intention to move forward leads us to consider the importance of historical context in philosophy. This context is closely related to the teachings of the Madrid school, which is by far the most decent option available among the proto-postmoderns. This option is important because of the close relationship between the historical context and the structure that Ortega called "circumstantialism."

The basis of this new philosophy

Postmodernists emphasize the fact that this structure basically holds everyone prisoner. Incapable of even attaining knowledge. For all truths are tainted by the structure. This evil structure is exalted to the point of resembling the matrix itself¹⁰. No matter how hard one tries to seek the truth, it always remains trapped within an impenetrable matrix—all philosophy is invalid, postmodernists claim. Everyone is in the matrix.

The postmodernists were right. The bias exists, but this blessed structure can be understood much better when viewed from Ortega's perspective. Circumstantialism is very

¹⁰ This concept is similar to that of the postmodern structure, which appears in the famous 1999 action and science fiction film written and directed by the Wachowski sisters.

close to what historical context is. It not only reflects a situation, but also a mission. And the will loves missions, because they allow it to desire better. But before delving into this renewed circumstantialism, it is worth noting that this circumstantialism, this bias, was certainly not foreign to postmodernists. They too were inside the same matrix they complained so much about. Of course! Whether they knew it or didn't want to admit it is another matter.

In this, we can clearly see the great worm in the postmodern apple. By wanting to invalidate all subsequent knowledge, they end up invalidating themselves in the process. For the truth that affirms that there is no truth, thanks to the logical principle of non-contradiction, must also affirm itself as a lie, shooting itself in the foot! But... this consequence, which seems so definitive, is not accepted by postmodernity. Postmodernity believes it is outside the matrix. It even wants to place itself above logic! But guess what? They succeeded... Despite this huge contradictory hole, postmodernity lived, and lived strongly. Why?

This is not the first time that this type of criticism has been levelled at postmodernity. It has been done many times before, but always without a conclusive result. Why? The answer lies in the postmodern historical context. Its circumstantialism, its will, is what allowed it to live. This will seems to be the true driving force of history. It does not obey logic, blood, structure, or even God. It obeys only consciousness, and consciousness loves only will.

This statement about postmodernity will be explored further as we progress through the chapters. It is somewhat complex, but it fits perfectly because postmodernity was able to

survive. How is it that a body of knowledge so contradictory in itself can prevail in this way? That is the truly interesting question, much more interesting than postmodern theories themselves.

The postmodern matrix exists, it is true. But what could have made postmodernity believe that they were outside of it? The next philosophical paradigm, which comes after postmodernity, must understand that it will not be able to escape this blissful matrix either. Postmodernists believed that simply becoming aware of it would automatically free them from it. But the chains are still there... And these chains seem to tighten the more they are forced. This obsession with escaping the matrix sooner or later leads to a fundamental question about it. What is wrong with the matrix in the first place? What is the need to escape it?

This matrix, rather than an enemy, seems like an opportunity. Throughout this introduction, we have discussed the negative consequences of baseless thinking. It has been said ad nauseam that philosophy is not something that can float around without being grounded in anything. A solid foundation is essential for the development of philosophy. And what better foundation, what better starting point, than the matrix itself? That bias is precisely what philosophy must adhere to. Wanting to escape it is illusory. On a creative level, it is impossible not to have a prior intention regarding what is created. Creation is an act of intentionality itself. Therefore, it is feasible to start from a bias in order to create. For that seems to be the position that bias naturally seeks.

The famous matrix is therefore the ideal starting point from which to begin creating new rational knowledge. Knowledge with a foundation, since this is provided precisely by the

circumstantialism from which we start. Taking full account, then, of the emotional intentionality that precedes that bias. In this way, the infamous matrix ceases to be an enemy and becomes the perfect platform from which to proceed. It does not matter how big, ruthless, or intelligent this evil matrix is. In fact, it is better that it is big, ruthless, and intelligent. For its strength is used against it.

The reason why this new theory is convenient lies in the nature of bias and its deployment. Bias and intentionality precede each other. Bias represents the cold circumstantial matrix. And intentionality represents the earthly feeling that comes from this circumstantial matrix. In other words, it is the feeling one has about the matrix. Therefore, this feeling that continues with the deployment is not something independent or foreign to the matrix, but rather the evolution that is generated from the matrix. In other words, it is a feeling about the circumstantial matrix. It is not something indifferent to bias, but rather its renewed continuation. Evolution which nullifies it, marking the end of its being, but at the same time contains it, since it keeps its emotional truth still present. Just as the son still keeps the blood of his father present even after he dies. So bias and intention are not independent elements; rather, they are determined by each other in their unfolding.

And thanks to that emotional intention, the creation of something new can occur. For after the circumstantial matrix, and after the earthly feeling that is formed about it, a third element emerges, which is quite interesting on a philosophical level. This third element is what really allows philosophy to exist in the first place. We are talking about knowledge. The third element is knowledge. And this knowledge cannot exist unless the two previous elements are already present. For knowledge, in its simplest definition, is nothing more than the relationship between a knowing subject and a known object.

But this definition of knowledge, which seems so simple, actually requires something prior to it, right? It requires a "subject" and an "object." And that is precisely where the duality between the circumstantial matrix and emotional intention comes in. Both are necessary for knowledge to occur. This would be a third, transcendent element that contains both within itself. This knowledge, in turn, is capable of explaining both its father, the matrix, and its mother, the feeling. But it also proposes new things, since this third element is creation. It is not only repetition, but creation.

But as already stated, this creation cannot find its being (existence) without prior intentionality. And that prior intentionality cannot find its being without a circumstantial matrix. Therefore, in logical order, the matrix becomes necessary for the creation of knowledge. These three elements are also explained in detail by Saint Thomas Aquinas. This is mentioned in case you want to delve deeper into it, which we will not do in this introduction. Although it is worth clarifying that Saint Thomas does not refer to the matrix as a matrix, but as a "subject." And he does not refer to intentionality as intentionality, but as "the subject within the object." And creation, not as creation, but as "the subject within the object, which is within the subject." ¹¹

But all of this naturally raises a question: Does the circumstantial matrix also come from something? Or is it something that has always been there? This matrix, of course, did not come from nothing. It is also the effect of some cause. And its creator, in more fundamental terms, is the previous matrix. Which creates it, but which would also later be nullified by the new, renewed matrix. This evolutionary succession advances in the same way

¹¹ Aquinas, Thomas. *Summa Theologica*. Ed. Thomas Gilby. 6 vols. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1964-1975.

that feeling evolves from the matrix. That is, nullifying the previous elements, but also containing them.

So, this process is a kind of cycle. First, there is a matrix, which then evolves into a sentimental intention. And this feeling then evolves into knowledge, which contains both. But in turn, this knowledge now represents a renewed matrix. Which in turn generates another feeling, and so on, shaping the cycle that is called history. At first glance, this cycle may seem dialectical. But before calling it dialectical, in the Hegelian sense, we must take into account that it would have to have a specific order in terms of affirmation, negation, and sublation¹². This order is doubtful today from a historical perspective, but the possibility cannot be completely ruled out.

¹³It has been said that the matrix is not something that exists on its own. It is not pure reason floating somewhere sacred. Nor is it something that remains immobile in paradise. Rather, it is the historical result of the previous matrix. So they follow one another, from matrix to matrix, from circumstance to circumstance, successively. But what about the first matrix, the original one? That question is as valid as it is complex. Knowledge about the first matrix is not something that falls within the scope of the philosophy presented in this book. For knowledge of the matrix itself is something that could already be called metaphysics. This goes far beyond the objectives of this book. Furthermore, there may always be the possibility that there is no such thing as the original matrix, but rather an eternal cycle with no beginning and no end. That is a much more complex issue.

¹² Hegel uses the German word *Aufheben*, symbolizing a kind of negation of negation, but it would also end up being a third reconciling and at the same time transcendent moment. This definition is quite difficult to understand in Hegel.

¹³ A mainly Kantian concept that refers to a structure transcendental to reality, which possesses all truths as pre-established rules.

But whatever the case may be, this book does not seek to engage in metaphysics, but rather to point to the matrix of the present, in order to use it as a basis. In other words, it does not want to start from a matrix in itself, but from a matrix for itself. From a matrix that has already been transformed by history and is much closer to today. For it is only in the present that creation takes place. And this creation becomes strictly necessary for the purposes of this book. Unfortunately, there is no one else talking about this subject in these terms yet.

It is precisely because of this need to stick to the present that we seek to limit ourselves above all to the circumstances closest to us. And these circumstances, which are those of the present, are no longer an original matrix, but a transformed matrix. Therefore, the knowledge that will be gained from it is no longer a concept, but a context.

This is where the word that has been used previously comes in, and will be used much more from now on. But before using it, it is worth giving a brief definition of it. The word context comes from the Latin *contexere*. Its deepest roots of meaning are found in "interweaving." So when we talk about context, we are talking about the very interweaving of history. Assuming that everything arises from the first matrix. This story begins to be woven from this first matrix (the concept) until it reaches the second matrix (the context); this context interweaves the first fabric with the second fabric. But there is a problem with this context. It is not totally independent from the previous matrix. For this new context to exist, it has to "fit" with the last pieces of the first fabric. Therefore, this time separator, represented by the context, is effectively conditioned by the previous fabric; and it has to "condition" or "accommodate" itself to past reality. It then becomes part of the transformed experience. The context is therefore determined. But not only that, in addition to being determined, it is also a determinant. Since, in turn, it also represents the transformation that determines the next

fabric. This new context gives way to the fabric of emotion and knowledge. These elements are creative and therefore transform the reality of historical fabrics. Thanks to this, context is not only repetitive but also creative, thanks to intentionality and knowledge. Therefore, this context becomes the determined and determining separator that weaves the fabrics of history¹⁴.

As already mentioned, Ortega's circumstantialism is quite close to this question. This is especially true when viewed from the need for a prior historical context for a philosophy that one wishes to create. "I am myself and my circumstances, and if I do not save them, I do not save myself."¹⁵ This conception of circumstantialism in Ortega clearly reflects the importance of the historical context in which the philosopher finds himself. Context is always key to understanding his philosophy. However, history has never been easy to understand, especially when one simply studies its immediacy. The Madrid school, with Julián Marías, is also quite forceful on this last point. Marías gives a brief explanation in his book, *La historia de la filosofía* (The History of Philosophy), of how history should be studied.

PHILOSOPHY AND ITS HISTORY.—The relationship between philosophy and its history does not coincide with that of science, for example. In the latter case, they are two different things: science, on the one hand, and on the other, what science was, that is, its history. They are independent, and science can be known, cultivated, and exist apart from the history of what it has been. Science is constructed on the basis of an object and the knowledge that is possessed about it at a given moment. In philosophy, the problem is philosophy itself; moreover, this problem arises in each case according to the historical and personal situation in which the philosopher finds himself, and this situation is, in turn, largely determined by the philosophical tradition in which he is placed: the entire philosophical past is already included in every act of philosophizing; thirdly, the philosopher must question the totality of the philosophical problem, and therefore philosophy itself, from its very roots: he cannot start from an existing state of affairs and accept it, but must start from the beginning and, at the same time, from the historical situation in which he finds himself. In other words, philosophy must be posed and realized in its entirety in each philosopher, but not in

¹⁴ Context. The environment in which a statement or action occurs and which influences its meaning. (Ferrater Mora, *Philosophical Dictionary*, 2001, p. 190.)

¹⁵ Ortega y Gasset, José. "Meditations on Quixote." Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1914.

just any way, but in each one in an irreplaceable way: as imposed by all previous philosophy. Therefore, the entire history of philosophy is embedded in all philosophizing, and without this it is neither intelligible nor, above all, could it exist. At the same time, philosophy has no more reality than that which it historically achieves in each philosopher.

There is, therefore, an inseparable connection between philosophy and the history of philosophy. Philosophy is historical, and its history belongs essentially to it. On the other hand, the history of philosophy is not merely scholarly information about the opinions of philosophers, but is the true exposition of the real content of philosophy. It is, therefore, strictly speaking, philosophy. Philosophy is not exhausted in any of its systems, but consists in the effective history of all of them. And, in turn, none can exist alone, but needs and involves all the previous ones; and even more: each system only achieves the fullness of its reality, of its truth, outside itself, in those that will succeed it. All philosophizing starts from the totality of the past and projects itself into the future, setting in motion the history of philosophy. This is, in a nutshell, what is meant when it is said that philosophy is historical.¹⁶

From the perspective of the Madrid school, philosophy becomes an inseparable element of its history. This theory is quite close to Hegel's, in fact. However, in Hegel, the historical problem reaches greater depths. For the Madrid school, the history of philosophy is seen simply as a convergence of the history of ideas; but in Hegel, philosophy is seen as a convergence of the totality of history. That is, it also takes into account the more "material" aspects of history, such as the system of production, the political order, and other significant events. Furthermore, a sense of dynamic unfolding is given at a much higher level. The idea that thinks itself, unfolding and becoming self-aware over time. Passing from negation to negation, from rupture to rupture, slowly advancing towards absolute knowledge.

Marías' converging theories can be guiding in terms of historical context. However, he largely limits himself to the history of philosophy as solely the history of ideas. In almost all of his work, the historical context is forgotten in its entirety. It completely lacks the necessary integration of the economic, political, technological, and social changes that history brings with it. These aspects must also be taken into account in order to understand the historical

¹⁶ Marías, Julián. "Philosophy and Its History." Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1970. 11-12.

unfolding in its entirety. In this regard, the Madrid school seems to want to look only toward the sky. But it forgets the earth.

Hegelian theories of substance can be very enlightening, especially in the presence of this complex dualism between heaven and earth in which we now find ourselves. After all that consciousness has seen, it is utter folly to want to completely ignore the importance of material circumstances in the development of the history of philosophy. This is not to argue for absolute materialism, but at the very least, these elements must be taken into account. Hegel hits the nail on the head in this regard, giving substance a much fuller meaning.

This story in Hegel does indeed have an influence on man, as Ortega claimed in circumstantialism; but at the same time, man also has an influence on history, thanks to his will to transform. And in turn, man's will is also affected by history, which he himself changes. So both man and history are elements that are created at the same time. Both are part of the same substance, which Hegel calls spirit.

This symbiosis is similar to that of the two beasts. For in the same way that consciousness guides the will, it is also guided by it. For consciousness is capable of reflecting on itself in view of the results that the will achieves. And when the will wins, consciousness also feels like a winner. When the will loses, consciousness also feels like a loser. So much so that it is capable of tearing a man in half, as it did in Heidegger.¹⁷

This phenomenon not only seems to repeat itself, but also seems to be the very engine of history. This book does not seek to create a whole defined gnoseological system based on

¹⁷ Referring to the phenomenon of the two distinct stages of the philosopher Martin Heidegger. It discusses an early Heidegger, before the defeat of the Third Reich, and a later Heidegger, after the defeat.

this mixture of theories. It simply seeks to start a debate. And to highlight in this debate the fact that history cannot in any way be so brutally separated from philosophy, as some postmodern exponents have done in their eagerness to stay alive...

The historical context of philosophy must at least be taken into account before reflecting on ideas. For it is only from knowledge of this context that the nature of the behavior of the philosophical will can be clearly seen. This same principle can be used not only to understand earlier philosophy, but also later philosophy. By closely following the experience of its predecessors, it is able to understand what it must adhere to. But unlike its predecessors, it is now fully aware of this adherence, and uses it as an opportunity, rather than as a simplistic rejection typical of the resentful. In this way, it denies and surpasses its predecessors.

The turning points, the foundation of the foundation.

The historical context also goes hand in hand with Hegel's theory of the concept. The concept that evolves as time goes by. The concept that is formed throughout a previous movement culminates in a unity and develops again in a subsequent movement. And this culmination is "its truth," which is not destroyed, but only transformed. These "ruins" of the previous movement, so to speak, are precisely the material with which the next building is constructed, which will also one day become ruins. But these ruins, these truths, are still present in their substance. Their lies have already been destroyed, but their truths still endure. So it is the concept that prevails over time. But as has already been said, even if this enduring

truth is conceptual, it is no longer a concept, but a context. For it generates a determination regarding its subsequent movement. It is the interweaving that separates the historical fabrics.

But if we delve even deeper into Hegel, we can find that this movement of history is not simply random. Rather, it brings with it a logical-dialectical order implicit in its movement. Order, which is viewed today with great skepticism. And perhaps there are good reasons for this. For the philosophy of the will sometimes seems to impose itself on this supposed dialectical order. That desire that is always lacking something, that science of scarcity, seems to be more valid at the level of historical movement than order. Although the dialectical possibility cannot be entirely denied either. But regardless of whether history has an order or not, there is one thing about it that definitely cannot be denied.

History advances in stages, phases that can be easily distinguished from one another. And what separates these stages are events that are precise and relevant enough to be called "points." These separators are something that can be called turning points for now. And it is precisely within these turning points that the interesting aspects of historical truth occur. These points are interesting because they appear not only at the overall level of history, but also at the level of the fragmented history of the individual. When you find yourself at these points, you feel a strange emotion. It is as if time has stopped for a moment and then resumed its course. It is as if the very gravity of the event has caused relative time to stop.

To give some examples that refer to these turning points, we can add the following. In ancient history, the Persian Wars were of crucial importance for the independent development of Greece. Turning points, such as the Battle of Marathon and later the Battle of Thermopylae, marked a before and after in Greece. This demonstrated the need for a united

Greek will, which ultimately overcame the friction between two worlds considered to be opposites, namely Athens and Sparta. This union is essential for a strong will. And it is only a strong will that can give rise to civilization.

Another closer example is the birth of Jesus, which would later divide the measurement of time and give rise to Christianity. This, in turn, would mark the beginning of the end of the harmful Roman Empire and usher in the reign of Christianity in the prosperous Middle Ages.

We can also mention the great famine of 1315 as the turning point that marked the beginning of the decline of Christianity and paved the way for the Renaissance. Some time later, another turning point, the invention of the printing press, would mark the beginning of the Renaissance proper. Added to this was the discovery of the Americas, which would evolve into the Renaissance and tip the balance in favor of the bourgeoisie, who would appropriate the riches of the Americas, thus ushering in the modern era. Capital began to play a major role at this point, and we could begin to talk about the beginning of capitalism. But this capitalism, in turn, has its own turning points, which separate its own revolutions. The commercial revolution began with the discovery of America and gained momentum with its subsequent conquest. This growing dominance of the bourgeoisie reached its definitive peak with the French Revolution, specifically with the beheading of Louis XVI. This represents another turning point, which marks the beginning of what we might call the beginning of states and the total domination of the bourgeoisie. In turn, there would be other turning points later on, with the industrial revolution, which began with the creation of Watson's steam engine, which in turn would have its own revolutions and turning points within it.

And these turning points are not limited to changes in the production system. They also appear in social events, such as the literacy of Europe, made possible by the invention of the printing press. The first revelation of the prophet Muhammad, which marked the beginning of Islam. Or the first space conquest, begun by Russia with Yuri Gagarin.

In view of all these turning points, it is clear that all these historical events took time to materialize and develop. However, if you look closely, they clearly have events, or decisive points, at which something is realized, and at which that something gives way to something new. Just like a desire of the will, which is concretely satisfied, and which immediately gives way to a new desire. Regardless of whether this desire is a negation or an affirmation.

One might perhaps think of all these turning points as an inevitable fragmentation. That they are nothing more than a series of infinite events. Which do not appear as defined separators of major historical stages, but also appear as sub-separators within those same stages. And those sub-stages, in turn, also have their own turning points. And on top of that, within these sub-stages, there are individuals living their lives. Individuals who have their own turning points in their lives. This leads to an infinite fragmentation of points, thus removing their historical relevance.

This infinity of points is absolutely true. There are certainly countless turning points in history. However, there is one factor that differentiates them from each other. You would not think that the turning point represented by your daily nap is as important as the turning point of the discovery of America. These points are all important, but that does not mean that they do not have a hierarchy among themselves. Of all these points, there is one that stands above all others and conditions them. That point is precisely where the greatest amount of

authentic will has been deposited. And that same point that rose above the others can only be removed from its throne by something with the same magnitude of will. Otherwise, the negation of that point always becomes incomplete.

These turning points are the same as what the historical context would represent. The points are not only a conclusion of the past, but also a determinant of the future. They are the fabric that separates being from becoming. It is precisely from this context that we can understand the turbulent changes of the times we are living in. With regard to these points of historical context, several elements can be investigated. First, we can investigate the course of the previous movement that led to that point in the context. Second, we can investigate the point in the context itself. And third, we can investigate the reaction of the subsequent movement from that point in the context. This unfolding, which may seem simple, actually involves great complexity that cannot be resolved in this book.

A complete understanding of this unfolding is too complex a task. Despite this, there is something that can be done about it. Identifying the elements that compose it is a much simpler task than explaining their nature. We will not attempt to justify the fundamental reason for the unfolding of the eras, but simply to say, "There it is." Point them out, highlight the existence of these elements. But also, know how to differentiate one element from another. This is not an extremely complicated task, but it is one that must be done. And it must be done at the beginning, above all, as a basis for knowledge. This pointing out of the existence of elements is the most basic form of knowledge. Sensible consciousness, which identifies and then separates elements in perception.

But is there a contradiction here? It has been said before that the historical context (the turning points) is the basis to which philosophy must adhere. And now it has been said that "being" is the basis of knowledge. The answer lies in the fact that these are two issues which, at least for the purposes of this book, must be seen as distinct. The historical context is only a structural basis, one might even say "substantial." It subsequently evolves into an emotional intention. However, feeling alone is not something that can be called "knowledge." Knowledge only begins when this dual relationship between the knowing subject and the known object occurs, as has already been made clear above.

So, even though it is no longer the context, it is still present within the intentionality that arises from it. This intentionality is a feeling about the context, meaning that it contains it. Then, through self-reflection, intentionality creates knowledge. And it is only after this "creation" that knowledge begins; not before. Perhaps the analogy of a fetus in the womb is adequate to explain this. The emotional charge, which symbolizes the mother progressively nourishing the fetus during its formation, is something that precedes the birth of the child itself. But the moment that child is born, that nourishment is no longer there. And what now is, is precisely birth, as a new truth. That does not mean that this previous nourishment is not important, but it cannot be called the beginning of birth, only its previous nourishment. For when one is, the other is no longer.

Knowledge only begins when this relationship between intentionality and context occurs. When this occurs, it gives rise to a third element, which is knowledge itself. But this knowledge also has its own process within it. It begins with a specific element, which is being. So the context of the matrix is not the beginning of knowledge, but simply the step that initiates its previous nourishment. And what initiates real knowledge is actually being.

It is essential to understand being as the basis of knowledge. For how can a dog, which only sees in black and white, claim to know the color red without ever knowing of its existence? Or how could man know more types of light, besides visible light, if he does not even know of their existence? Now, new types of light are known to man (gamma rays, X-rays, ultraviolet rays, etc.), but only because they were first identified through science and specialized devices. In other words, these new types of light are only known after their existence (being) has first been discovered. So, first you have to know the being of something, and then you can know anything else about that something. And that being may be a being tainted by experience, but that does not mean that it ceases to be a being.

This recognition of the being of something is the most basic form of consciousness. It is called "sensible consciousness." The primary use of sensible consciousness that identifies being comes largely from Hegelian theories. Therefore, a brief digression is in order to clarify this. The reason why Hegel is used so much as a foundation here is because of the nature of the current historical context. In such a chaotic, confusing environment, where it is difficult to predict even a couple of years ahead, where all previous truths seem to be collapsing, the recommendation in such cases is always to go back to basics. Stop trying to experiment blindly and settle on familiar ground. This already has sufficient recognition to be called at least valid and¹⁸. Furthermore, it seems clear that identifying being as the primary method of knowledge is not unique to Hegel, but to many other philosophies.

¹⁸ Along with Plato and Descartes, Hegel is one of the most influential philosophers of all time. After him, no other philosopher has been able to ignore him, even when seeking to criticize him. But in one way or another, his theories have served as the basis for many other philosophies. Furthermore, due to his proximity to the philosophy of history, it seems appropriate to take Hegel as one of the main foundations for this study.

Therefore, due to the need to start from a substantial basis, which in this case would be the historical context, and with the subsequent intention of achieving only sensible knowledge, the most appropriate thing to do is to identify the being of these contexts between historical periods. In other words, what will be sought throughout this study is to point out the elements that make up the most recent historical development.

Identifying these points of historical context allows us to understand the basis of the point itself. But it also allows us to understand the basis of the subsequent reaction that emanates from those contexts. This applies not only to historical elements of the past, but also to those of the future. And the past, present, and future are all necessary in order to speak of valid historical knowledge. For while the present is urgent, understanding the past is even more urgent, because without it, the present cannot be understood. If for some reason one wanted to avoid this, this past truth would not allow the new truth to develop. The previous context would continue to have the greatest will, preventing the new will from emerging. It would hold it captive like an anchor in the past, turning it into its perpetual slave. Dragging chains...

In addition to identifying points of historical context, it is also necessary to correctly identify the reactions that arise from them. These reactions, both on an emotional and intellectual level, are precisely where the transformative creation of history takes place. Therefore, at least as far as this study is concerned, these reactions will be studied in the same way as the development of consciousness-will.

And in this regard, will in all its forms is something that could not be ignored in this research. For today, it seems unnecessary to say that the presence of this will is more than

evident in history. Where everything still seems to be influenced by the inauthentic will of a few who mistakenly believe they represent it. This appears before us with such clarity that to deny the will in history is today foolishness. For we have reached the point where philosophy itself seems to be held captive by an academy that is incapable of governing itself. Instead, it ends up being dominated by political interests external to academic development. There are undoubtedly many academics today who, rather than supporting this question, simply feel their hands are tied. But regardless of their good or bad intentions, the authentic will of philosophy cannot be stopped simply because academia does not feel like moving. Philosophy was born without it, and it can certainly die without it. Authentic will always prevails.

When we speak of will, and authentic will, we are obviously understanding reality mainly from the point of view of Nietzschean and Hegelian philosophy. Although Hegel tends to refer to this will as "desire." But in any case, both Nietzschean will and Hegelian desire attempt to represent that same instinctive force that leads any being to take action as soon as something happens. That instinct is always focused on wanting something. And it is precisely this "wanting something" that leads it to take action. This taking action seems to be directly related to historical movement. Probably more closely related than the dialectical order. Therefore, due to the perspective that the current historical context provides us, it is necessary for the purposes of this study to try to understand history from the point of view of the desiring will.

So, in conclusion, the aim of this book is to clarify the air. To clear up some of this fog of confusion and clearly identify the challenges that these changes demand. And the tools that will be used for this are inherent in the consciousness of the new blood. First, there will

be a strong emphasis on the historical context of the new blood as a starting point for the renewed philosophy. This will be done with only a basic understanding in mind, which consists of simply pointing out the historical turning points and the subsequent reactions to them. In addition, these reactions will be studied in the same way that consciousness-will is studied. However, the possibility of a dialectical order will not be completely ruled out.

As for the points of historical context, this study will focus on two specific points, which are of greatest relevance to the purposes of this book. It is somewhat ineffective to limit oneself to only these two historical points; however, given the immediacy of the problem, it is more appropriate to focus more on the latter.

The first point of context is the beginning of postmodernity. Despite being shrouded in a smokescreen, which at times even seems intentional, it ends up revealing itself in the last gasps of moribund postmodernity. Its entire life passes before our eyes, revealing its truth.

The second point of context is the end of postmodernity, but also the beginning of a new era. This is already being called "metamodernity" by some. Although there are some criticisms of this name, for the sake of clarity, we will refer to it as such from now on.

In addition to precisely identifying both historical contexts, we will also seek to identify the respective reactions that unfold from each point. This will help us clarify the behaviors of the will of each paradigm, and also explore the behavior of the will itself.

To conclude this introduction, there is one last thing to clarify. As you can already imagine, the analysis of the second reaction, the reaction of metamodernity, raises some

problems. We are no longer talking about a simple analysis of the past, but about a prediction about the future. Because of this, this study will be carried out with extreme caution, taking into account only the most general points. The future cannot be predicted with certainty, but we can have a more or less clear idea of the challenges it holds. This is thanks to both the patterns of previous reactions and the feelings that metamodernity is already expressing today. We cannot yet provide answers to the problems of metamodernity, but we can begin to ask the right questions.

Literary review of metamodernity

It was only a little over a decade ago that people began to talk about "metamodernity" proper. And it is still so diffuse that much of today's philosophy does not even have it on its radar. This new paradigm began solely as a cultural movement. That is, it began as a purely emotional intention. It has timidly but persistently made its presence felt in artistic expressions. And because of this cultural persistence, it is beginning to be seen not just as a passing feeling, but as a more or less authentic change in the way the world is perceived.

On a purely emotional level, there can be no talk of real knowledge. However, the persistence of this metamodern feeling eventually causes it to manifest itself more clearly, which in turn leads to the first attempts at metamodern knowledge. However, both the

knowledge and the feelings that will be discussed in this literary review are not actually specific to metamodernity as such. Rather, they are in fact part of a reality that predates true metamodernity.

In other words, the feeling we are going to discuss here is actually still characteristic of postmodernity. This opinion is not shared by the authors we are going to analyze now, so it is worth clarifying this before analyzing them. They consider that metamodernity "already is," but as we will see below, this metamodernity is not yet, but wants to become. Like a mother who begins to nourish her fetus in advance, for its subsequent birth. This feeling we are going to talk about is actually postmodern; but because postmodernity feels so moribund, this feeling tends to be oriented more toward the future than toward the present. This attitude is present in the attempts of some authors, mainly English-speaking, which will be discussed shortly. For now, it is best to begin by analyzing the mere feeling. In other words, we will now explore very briefly proto-metamodernity as a cultural movement alone.

In *Notes on Metamodernity*, Vermeulen and Van den Akker discuss how this new proto-metamodern trend has gradually emerged in all dimensions of art. They provide a quote from a renowned critic that, after being translated from the original English, serves as a useful guide:

The prominent American art critic Jerry Saltz has also observed the emergence of another type of sensibility that oscillates between beliefs, assumptions, and attitudes: I am noticing a new approach to artistic creation in recent museum and gallery exhibitions. It flashed into focus at the New Museum's 'Younger Than Jesus' last year, and I'm also taking a look around the Whitney Biennial, and I'm seeing it blossom and bear fruit in 'Greater New York,' the twice-a-decade extravaganza of emerging local talent. It's an attitude that says, "I know the art I'm making may seem silly, even stupid, or that it could have been done before, but that doesn't mean it's not serious." Knowing what art is for themselves, without fear or shame, these young artists can not only see the distinction between seriousness and detachment as artificial; they

understand that they can be ironic and sincere at the same time, and they are making art from this complex, composite state of mind, which Emerson called "alienated majesty."¹⁹

In view of this attitude, the proto-metamodern sentiment reflects above all a certain experimentation, which does not yet seem to have a fully defined structure. But the proposal, nevertheless, is present.

But there is a part of that feeling that can already be perceived more conceptually. This feeling brings with it the proposal of an implicit attempt at negation, but it is a negation that in turn also seeks to overcome what has been proposed previously. The new expressions end up taking directions that can no longer be explained from the point of view of postmodernity. For while postmodern art was characterized by an absence of grand narratives, or a total absence of narrative, proto-metamodern art seeks a kind of mixture of opposites, in which there is still a primitive desire to integrate both the fragmentary and the total. Vermeulen and Van den Akker attempt to clarify this idea with the following conclusions in their research:

The sensibility through which the arts seek to express themselves has led us precisely to these three proposals: a deliberate being outside of time, an intentional being out of place, and the claim that this desired timelessness and displacement are actually possible, even if they are not. If the modern expresses itself through a utopian syntax, and the postmodern expresses itself through a dystopian parataxis, the metamodern, it seems, exposes itself through a-topical Metaxis.²⁰

Thus, if the modern suggests a temporal order, and the postmodern implies a spatial disorder, then the metamodern must be understood as a space-time that is neither orderly nor disorderly. Metamodernism displaces the parameters of the present with those of a future presence that has no future, and displaces the limits of our place with

¹⁹ Saltz, Jerry. "Notes on Metamodernity." *The New York Times*, March 25, 2012. Web. March 25, 2012.

²⁰ Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van den Akker. "Notes on metamodernity," *Journal of Aesthetics & Culture*, 2:1, 5677 (2010), pp. 12

those of a surreal place that has no place. For in fact, this is the "destiny" of metamodern women and men: to pursue a horizon that is forever receding.²¹

Taking this into account, it can be determined first of all that this sentiment, in addition to seeking experimentation, also wishes to express a clear intention of confusion regarding this experimentation. It explicitly reflects the great nebula of contradiction that surrounds current reality. In addition, this sentimental expression also reflects a strange phenomenon. It reflects a desire to break free from the chains that imprison it, but it feels that even if it wants to break free, it is not possible. For the chains do not yield, and still trap it in the past. That feeling is still trapped, then, in that desire to "try to escape the matrix," which is characteristic of postmodernity. That question is still alive in that feeling. Although it is now much more contradictory.

The second thing this feeling wants to express is even more interesting. It wants to convey that it aspires to some kind of reconciliation of opposites. A reconciliation between the totalizing and the fragmentary. In many cases, this is attempted through a kind of irony. This term is not only used by proto-metamoderns as something purely aesthetic, but is sometimes even used as a conceptual foundation. This is questionable, but it is something that happens.

In addition, there is another important point to emphasize about this proto-metamodern sentiment. In many of its manifestations, not all, but in many, this assimilation of opposites attempts to manifest itself as a kind of reconciliation of opposites, but one that attempts to satisfy both. In this way, it attempts to reconcile lifelong enemies and find a middle ground. This attitude reflects lukewarmness more than anything else.

²¹ Vermeulen and Van Den Akker. "Notes on metamodernity," 5677.

This middle ground is not the true nature of a dialectic that seeks to overcome. Nor is it a fundamentally creative attitude. It is rather an attempt at assimilation that seeks alternatives to overcoming. But it ends, it seems, in a certain stagnation that cannot move forward. Not because it does not want to move forward, but because the feeling alone cannot find the tools necessary to do so.

This is largely due to the absence of a necessary "other," which represents the strong historical turning point that is missing. This prevents us from even talking about a new paradigm. As we have already stated, a historical stage is not, nor ceases to be, until the new context takes the throne from the previous context. And that throne can only be taken away by having the same magnitude of will behind it. Therefore, we are talking about a very strong point in the context, which has not yet occurred.

However, what has happened is a smaller turning point. It was unable to remove the big one from its throne, but it did begin to cast doubt on it. This smaller turning point is represented by the economic crisis of 2008, which, together with the sentiment that this crisis caused, gave rise to the first proto-metamodern manifestations that are now being analyzed. However, the 2008 crisis did not take long to recover and continue on the same path as always. This continuation of the trend is why it is not considered the definitive point that concludes an era. Therefore, these proto-metamodern theories are, in reality, still incomplete. This is reflected in the timidity of their proposals. Nevertheless, they are useful for understanding the challenges of true metamodernity, even if they are incomplete.

Having clarified that metamodernity is not yet "is," and that what "is" is proto-metamodernity, we can now explore the philosophical attempts that have been made with regard to this proto-metamodernity. The origin of proto-metamodernity in philosophical literature seems to have its deepest roots in the most recent sociological philosophies. Despite being criticized by some, these philosophies are capable of seeing a simple reality, which is more than enough inspiration to develop a complex philosophy based on them. Examples of sociological philosophies such as those of Gilles Lipovetsky, Byung-Chul Han, and Alan Kirby are exponents of a knowledge that, while not entirely alien to postmodernism, does have negative connotations towards it.

Terms such as Gilles' "hypermodern," Kirby's "digimodernity," and Chul-Han's concepts, which have no defined name but are close to Bauman's "liquid modernity," are all attempts to represent that distinct nuance that is beginning to appear in reality. These representations are often made by these philosophers with a clear intention of pessimism and rejection. It cannot be said that they are genuine attempts at denial, but the emotional intention is present. It is not yet at the level of a developed concept, but the emotional aspect is there.

After the analytical philosophers, the first attempts at denial proper began. They wanted, with greater force, to give a concept to this proto-metamodernity. Before getting into this, it should be clarified that these first attempts have been made exclusively in English. This is due to the proximity of English to the heart of current academic philosophy, which seems to be found today in American academia, which in turn is based on French academia from a few decades ago. People such as Hanzi Freinacht, Robin van den Akker, Timotheus Vermeulen, and Jason Ananda seem to be the most influential. However, these most recent

attempts at philosophical development, although well-intentioned, can be misleading due to their lack of foundation.

These new attempts seek to develop proto-metamodernity. But they do so based on such a vague concept of it that, in many cases, what ends up being done is starting from a mere feeling rather than a theory of knowledge proper. In this sense, Hanzi's books, for example, seek to propose a new political paradigm without even defining what metamodernity means in the first place, or where it even begins. Wanting to propose a whole new political perspective seems somewhat hasty given the situation in which this incomplete proto-metamodernity finds itself. Especially considering that politics is always linked to ideology. Ideology, which in turn comes from philosophy. Therefore, those theories do not seem to be grounded at all. It would be more appropriate to call them "political speculation" rather than political theory. In addition, it is also worth mentioning how highly arrogant Hanzi's books sometimes are. They end up almost bordering on narcissism. But then again, what could one expect from a philosopher who was financed by the bourgeoisie to take refuge in the Alps, far away from anything different...

But returning to the problem of proto-metamodernity. All the foggy obscurity surrounding its concepts is precisely created by the lack of a strong point of reference, which has not yet been established. For 2008 was undoubtedly a catastrophic event, which at first did indeed seem to be that definitive turning point. But then, it didn't take long to recover and return to the same situation as before. Therefore, it can be said that all these proto-metamodern manifestations, rather than a definitive change, are more of a kind of "escape" or "fracture." This cannot give birth to metamodernity in all its fullness, but it can offer a valid orientation towards it.

And the orientation it provides, at least at first glance, is that of a timid attempt at reconciliation. But this timidity only appears after the crisis has been resolved. As for the feeling regarding the crisis itself, at the height of its despair, it could well be quite different from that timid lukewarmness. Those flashes of hatred that occur during moments of "escape" could well indicate that metamodernity is not necessarily a warm embrace that seeks to reconcile lifelong enemies. Sometimes it appears more like a kind of "fuck you" or an obscene gesture with the fingers. Cultural expressions in cinema and video games, such as *Breaking Bad*, *Fight Club*, and *Grand Theft Auto V*, are examples that, despite their apparent vulgarity, are actually accurate manifestations of the most turbulent aspects of metamodern sentiment. There are also less turbulent, and perhaps even more profound, cultural manifestations, such as the films *HER* and *Interstellar*.

These manifestations may indicate that beneath this apparent timidity there is an even stronger feeling than what can be seen at first glance. This feeling was only temporarily appeased by the fleeting nature of the 2008 crisis. This feeling, then, has a persistence and potential such that it can safely be considered a proto-feeling of something greater than itself. And that something greater that would follow could well be a new era. These are the first glimmers of what would become authentic metamodernity.

Chapter 2: Finding the postmodern context [context]

History has always been a complex element to analyze, and even more so to predict. For it is inevitably linked to an even greater problem, which is time. And time, in addition to being difficult to understand, is something that also instills an indescribable terror. That dark reality, which at times resembles a fearsome black hole, which one can enter but cannot leave. Or perhaps it resembles a new dimension, at the heart of which is a colossal clock that gleefully counts down the seconds before the destruction of the universe. Or perhaps it can manifest itself as Kali, the first beast, the Hindu deity, who proudly waves the decapitated heads on her necklace before her act of total destruction.

As dark as time may seem, it is inextricably linked to human reality. Therefore, wanting to position oneself as its enemy will only accentuate its domination over philosophy. In this sense, postmodern theories of "escaping the matrix" or "wanting to escape time" are a fatal mistake that will only make the situation worse. On the contrary, the new metamodern philosophy does not want to escape time; it wants to become one with it. It fully accepts the historical circumstances in which it finds itself and responds as best it can to the challenges that destiny has in store for it.

Therefore, it is useful for the study to carry out a historical analysis. And this analysis, as already mentioned, must begin by identifying the first turning point. The first point that marks the beginning of postmodernity and the end of the previous era (the contemporary era). However, in order to identify this point of context correctly, it is also necessary to identify the historical development that led to it. Only by knowing its past is it possible to understand the point of context itself much more clearly.

As for this historical development, as already mentioned in the introduction, consciousness and will, both together, seem to be the real determinants of it. For this development is not only repetition, but also creation. Therefore, its study requires a necessary integration of history. But history from the perspective of will-consciousness, rather than from a methodical order. Integration, which does not necessarily have to be alien to reason.

When we speak of will, the beginnings of its journey are not usually as important as its endings. After all, the will must take the first step as its possibilities allow. And in the vast majority of cases, in fact, the will lacks sufficient preparation for this. And usually this first step is taken with great clumsiness. In fact, on many occasions, the will is afraid to take this first step; but since it is the will, it takes the first step with fear. Its desire is greater than its fear, and it dares to take action without yet being sure. This naturally leads to error, but it is a necessary error from which skill usually proceeds. As for the starting point, this is not as important for the will as it is for consciousness.

For consciousness, unlike the first beast, reality appears in the opposite way. Beginnings become very important for its further development, and conversely, endings appear as a conclusive phenomenon, which could not have been otherwise, and which could be seen coming from long ago. The end is simply the convergence of all previous development. Unlike the will, the beginning is not seen as a leap of faith, but as an important determinant. Or at least it is perceived by consciousness in this way.

And with regard to all this, it is worth clarifying that when we say "consciousness" or "will," we are not referring to a specific person or a particular group. "Consciousness" does

not refer specifically to philosophers, nor does "will" refer to the people. Rather, these two elements are seen above all as forces independent of any individual being. In other words, consciousness is not the consciousness of one person or another, but consciousness in its entirety. The same is true of will. These two elements, in their most universal and authentic senses, seem to be the most promising candidates for explaining the movement of history. At least at the level required by this study.

However, as already stated in the introduction, this point of view is not shared by postmodernity, which denies both consciousness and will, assuming that structure is the only thing that has relevance in historical development. This, to make a comment, is similar to what charlatans do when they defend astrology as absolute. They assume that it is the order imposed by the stars that shapes reality and deny everything else. This ridiculousness is also similar to Kant's pure reason, which establishes a series of immutable rules that deny the world and strip the reality in which we live in the present of all meaning.

Taking into account the positions so different from postmodernism that will be presented here, it is necessary, before beginning with the chapters of this book, to make an important statement. Due to the historical context in which this exposition is written, it may be considered part of the new metamodern consciousness. Therefore, due to the desire to differentiate ourselves from the previous, less transparent philosophy, we have chosen to make the positions of this new philosophy very clear. This new philosophy, which is written here, is completely biased, from its very core. Therefore, it has the full intention of denying postmodernity at its foundation. It will therefore seek to measure postmodernity with the same yardstick with which it has measured itself.

The reasons why the metamodern context demands such a negative stance will become clear as we progress through the chapters. However, at least in terms of intent, it is worth mentioning the trend that this stance will follow. Once the intentions of the metamodern context have been clarified, we can now begin with the inception and development of what could properly be called knowledge.

So, to begin the search for this first point of context, it is necessary to analyze the historical development that led to that point. In addition, it is also necessary to mention that the identification of this point of context is not something that is agreed upon in philosophy. In other words, postmodernists have not yet decided on the historical point that initiated them. Postmodernity completely lacks historical awareness. Therefore, it is the job of metamodernity to reflect on this from scratch.

It is therefore appropriate to first briefly reflect on the alternatives. Several candidates have been proposed throughout the development of postmodernity. Some claim that it began with the fall of the Berlin Wall, which marked the defeat of Marxism as a whole. Others claim that it began with the student unrest of 1968, which was a manifestation of structuralist consciousness. Others comment that it began with the start of the Cold War in the 1950s. Others even claim that it began at the very beginning of the 20th century, around 1914, with the start of the First World War, which ended the previous era as we knew it.

All this disparity ends up generating more confusion than certainty. Throughout almost all of its history, postmodernity has had this starting point shrouded in a fog of ambiguity. A fog that sometimes seems to be self-imposed by postmodernity itself, which does not dare to reveal its truth. But in one way or another, the final clarification of this

starting point is extremely important for understanding postmodernity. Without correctly identifying this point, it is not only impossible to understand it, but it is also impossible to carry out the subsequent negation that metamodernity wishes to make of it. At least not in fundamental terms.

Despite all the ambiguity involved, this initial point of context ultimately reveals itself at the very end of postmodernity. It is as if the will were already preparing to change sides. Or as if the entire life of postmodernity were passing before its eyes on its deathbed, revealing its authentic truth at the end of its life.

This particular point is, in fact, a conversation that has been avoided in many ways. In the same way that conversation about World War II is often avoided. For this war, which was extremely relevant in subsequent historical developments, has been forgotten on a philosophical level. Taking philosophy alone, the subject of Auschwitz. Auschwitz here, Auschwitz there, Auschwitz everywhere. That war deserves to be analyzed in its entirety, and not just in the fragment that postmodern will desired.

The starting point of postmodernism [sub-context]

This war is the key to finding this nebulous turning point. No matter how much we try to leave the postmodern beginning in fragmentation, it becomes unitary, evident, and clear as water as we approach the postmodern end. Postmodernity has a specific beginning: September 2, 1945. It is the moment when Japan formally signs its unconditional surrender,

faced with the imminent threat of extinction by the most destructive force known to man at that time. It is the nuclear bomb, the context from which postmodernity emerges.

And one might think of that... "but it wasn't the bomb, it was the surrender." Or it wasn't the surrender, it was the bomb. And besides, it wasn't just one bomb, it was two bombs! How can you talk about one point? This point of context, which may appear as three separate points, is actually the container of all three in a single element.

This point, which seems to begin with the first bomb in Hiroshima, actually has its origins in World War II. It is all the violence of war that ends up converging all its energy in the first bomb. A bomb that is only reaffirmed by the second bomb in Nagasaki. However, both the first and second bombs come from the same type of power in which all the violence of war converges. And in turn, this nuclear power, which contains both bombs within itself, concludes in the feeling of terror in the face of nuclear extinction. But that terror is not something independent of the bombs; rather, it is their evolution. Nor are those bombs independent of war; they are its conclusive evolution. These two points, both the first bomb and the second, ultimately shape the final conclusion. This conclusion is the terror of nuclear extinction, which manifests itself in Japan's formal surrender, which contains within itself all the other elements together.

Although at first glance these elements may appear to be three separate points, upon closer inspection, they clearly represent a central idea that encompasses all of the points. The most fundamental of all these points is "the fear of nuclear extinction as a result of the violence of war." This represents the conceptual unity, which could be called the definitive

point of context. This fear does not only hold the Japanese captive, but also the winning sides, as we will see later.

You can imagine how someone must feel, being accustomed to conventional warfare, and then waking up one morning in Hiroshima to find themselves in that situation. Imagine that you are that person, and that one day you wake up in your bed in the basement of your house, look at your wristwatch to see if you are late for work, and begin to notice something strange. The second hand starts to slow down, and the more it moves, the slower it seems to go... until it finally stops. You are surprised by a flash of light coming down the stairs, followed by a strong jolt that forces you out of your basement, only to be met with an indescribable scene. Your lifelong neighbor is now completely incinerated, in the same position in which he was previously watering the plants on his porch. This makes you react, and you start looking for your children, who used to play on the sidewalk every morning; you find them, only to realize that they are now nothing more than a stain on the street. Disoriented, you try to enter your house to make sure you are still in your bed and that this is just a nightmare, but you realize that half of your house is gone, and that half of your dog is also gone, due to the shockwave. Even more bewildered, you decide to climb to a high place to understand what is happening, and you end up finding the apocalyptic scene of your hometown, reduced to an unrecognizable pile of smoking rubble. All this destruction happens in less than 30 seconds. After pinching yourself and realizing that you are not in a dream, the real terror of it all begins.

The world, even with all that the war had meant, was not prepared for such a level of destruction in such a short time. Terror grips not only the Japanese, but also the Americans themselves, who, even on the winning side, see the imminent total extinction that this new

type of power is capable of causing. They know that this weapon will soon be copied, and even if it is not copied, it is always possible that it will be used irresponsibly by the same country. In fact, there were many Americans who considered the nuclear attack on Japan itself to be irresponsible and unnecessary.

This terror only increased when, immediately after the end of World War II, a new type of war began. The two remaining powers forgot their false pact, which was only maintained by fear of a common enemy, and immediately remembered their own conflict. The two powers quickly nuclearized and began to compete for world domination. Although no longer in a hot war, but a cold one.

All this terror in the face of nuclear power, this fear of total extinction, is precisely the historical context from which postmodernity emerges. And this naturally determines its attachment to life, which would later become even clearer in its subsequent reaction. But that is something that will be explained later.

What does this historical point mean? [sub-context]

For now, we can draw a preliminary conclusion from all this. By stating that the terror of nuclear extinction as a result of the violence of war is precisely the postmodern historical context, in all its precision. For, in addition to the uniqueness of the event, it is clearly relevant on a historical level. And not only on a historical level for the countries involved, but on a universal historical level involving the entire globe. This change is not limited to the military sphere, but ends up affecting all other spheres as well, including technological,

political, legal, social, and even philosophical changes. This brought the entire movement of previous history to a drastic conclusion and laid the foundation for subsequent history. This was so significant that it can certainly be called "a turning point in history."

This thesis, which may seem somewhat hasty, must be supported with caution. Only then can this turning point be correctly identified without falling into the error of rushing to conclusions. In order to understand this point of context, which marks the beginning of postmodernism, it is also necessary to analyze the previous movement that led to this point of context. In this way, it will be much clearer to analyze both the point of context itself and the subsequent reaction that postmodernism will have on it. Only by knowing the past can the present be clarified.

What does the end of war symbolize in its most philosophical aspects? War began as a confrontation of wills. All these wills clearly found their conceptual roots in modernity and the contemporary era. It seems even unnecessary to affirm the close relationship between Hegel and Marxism, and the even closer relationship between Marxism and communism. Similarly, the capitalist mercantilism of the bourgeoisie stems from pragmatism, empiricism, and some even claim that its deepest roots lie in the absolutism of the self, which Descartes generated, giving rise to the bourgeoisie. These two elements, capitalism and Marxism, clash in the heart of Europe, giving rise to a third element. Fascism, which in turn also stems largely from existentialist philosophies, which also find their origin in Hegelian totality. The variants of fascism in Italy, Japan, and Germany would be based on the totality of life and the Nietzschean will. With a Heideggerian touch in the German version.²²

²² Political positions are often based on philosophical positions. These philosophers are, in a sense, theoretical precursors of the later political practices that would be based on their ideas.

In this way, the Second World War can be understood as a clash of the great narratives of modernity. On the one hand, capitalism, with its Christian conservatism, the idea of prosperity brought about by capitalist mercantilism, and supposed individual freedom as the way forward. On the other hand, the supremacy of the masses over the individual, the absoluteness of matter, the value of the nation, and the triumph of will and life. All these grand narratives collide with each other like three enormous masses. As if they were three adult brontosauri²³, determined to destroy each other. And whose confrontation, in the end, seems to have no meaning other than violence itself.

This clash between grand narratives leaves in its wake a massive river of blood and destruction, capable of terrifying even the combative European man. It reaches the point of intoxicating the entire continent with such violence that everyone begs for peace, on all sides, all except one... But regardless, war is terrible for everyone, and it only ends with the nuclear bomb. The most destructive force known to man. That is the straw that breaks the camel's back, and the apocalypse ensues. We are no longer faced with victory or defeat, but with total extermination. War has surpassed itself, and that has led to its final conclusion.

The postmodern consciousness remembers this very well, even if it does not like to admit it. The terror of the imminent annihilation of the entire planet was precisely what shaped the reaction of its instinctive will. Witnessing how grand narratives are capable not only of destroying each other, but also of tempting to destroy the entire planet in the process, is something that cannot be erased from the postmodern memory. From the perspective of postmodernity, all this happens because of the desire for the absolute that modern ideas

²³ One of the largest and heaviest land dinosaurs on record. Easily identifiable by its long neck, similar to that of a giraffe.

possessed within themselves. This in turn reflects their absolutist origins, which can be found in Hegel.

Chapter 3: The postmodern reaction, the protection of life [context]

Terror is a strange thing,
 something that cannot be seen or touched.
 It is a feeling in the stomach,
 a feeling of fear and apprehension.

Terror can come from many things,
 From a noise in the night,
 From a figure in the shadows,
 Or from an idea we cannot understand.

When terror visits us,
 It can paralyze us,
 It can make us run,
 Or turn us to stone.

But terror is not all-powerful,
 It is not invincible.
 We can face terror,
 We can overcome it,
 And we can emerge victorious.²⁴

World War II ends, the curtain falls on its play, and now the postmodern will must grapple with the debt of its conclusion. At first, there is only feeling, a feeling of deep terror. This feeling is much greater than the feeling of peace. The historical context that ushered in the new era is too great to be forgotten. This visceral feeling is such that no time is wasted, and the desire to move quickly from feeling to concept is strong. People want to leave that horrible feeling behind.

Then came the Nuremberg trials and the Tokyo trials to come to terms with all this. In them, an attempt was made to digest everything that the war was, and a wise effort was made not to find culprits again, as had been done in the First World War. The blame certainly lies with everyone. All Aryan blood is to blame; that is the final conclusion of these trials.

²⁴ Poe, Edgar Allan. "The Terror." In *Tales of the Strange and Wonderful*, edited by James Southall Wilson, 13-18. New York: Dover Publications, 1996.

However, something interesting emerges from these trials. Like a rabbit out of a magician's hat, the subject of Auschwitz comes to light. Despite the fact that practically no one knew anything about the Holocaust during the war, or even more than a year after it ended, this story suddenly appears in history. It is true that prisoner concentration camps were fairly well known. Both those of the Axis, the Allies, and the Soviets²⁵. However, these camps were always considered prisoner camps, never extermination camps. Auschwitz then appears as something surprising. And also as something that ends up being an extremely strong reaffirmation of the terror of extinction that the nuclear bomb had already caused. This historical "event," which conveniently led to the founding of the state of Israel, was also given a kind of safety anchor. The historical event of the Holocaust is protected by a legal shield. A series of laws are created, which practically prohibit historical revisionism on this event in all European countries involved. It is the only historical event to date that cannot be revised due to legal impediments. Curious...

But this question regarding Auschwitz is something that requires a very long answer and brings its own difficulties. Furthermore, it is a question that is not really relevant to the philosophical task that this book sets out to accomplish. For the event of Auschwitz is nothing more than the reaffirmation of a concept that already existed in the nuclear bomb, and which really represents nothing more than the same thing. It is the same fear of extinction resulting from war. Sometimes people want to portray this event as extremely relevant, because although the Japanese had surrendered, the case of the Italians, and especially the Germans, was different. However, in the end, it is practically the same fear of extinction,

²⁵ The Allies had concentration camps in various areas of their respective territories, perhaps the most notable being Manzanar in California and Commonwealth in Ireland. The Soviets also had their own version of concentration camps called Gulags in Siberia, which are well known and often considered worse than the concentration camps of the Third Reich.

which is simply reaffirmed. Therefore, it is pointless for this study to focus too much on this subject.

So for now, we can assume that Auschwitz happened just as postmodern historians have always told us. The postmodern will then begins to transform its sentiment into a concept. The trials conclude in Nuremberg in 1946, and those in Tokyo will conclude in 1948. With their own version of Auschwitz, in the Nanking massacre. Which China would later use as a diplomatic weapon. Although that narrative actually had much more relevance in the East than in the West.

All this sentiment from which postmodernity stems finally concludes in what would be the concept of postmodernity itself. Here, knowledge is finally created, which would later become a new sub-point of context. This knowledge arises from the sentimental intentionality that the context had already produced, and through the duality of both, ends up generating knowledge about it. This sub-context should not be seen as a change of era, but as a change of stage within that era. And at first it does not appear as one point, but as three points. The creation of the UN, the creation of human rights, and the Geneva Conventions. Does this triad remind you of anything?

The first postmodern knowledge [sub-context]

The same triad of brutality that begins postmodernity seems to evolve into a new triad. And just as in that first triad, what appears as a concept is actually one thing. In the same way, in this second triad, these three moments actually converge into a single

conceptual unit. This is "the protection of life at all costs," the primordial concept from which postmodern consciousness proceeds.

Here we are no longer talking about a feeling, but rather a feeling that has quickly evolved, emerged from its limbo, and become a concept through knowledge. This is the first emanation of postmodern knowledge, which finds its genesis in these three events, which will be analyzed below.

The first thing that is created, immediately, is the UN. Today, it has become the glorious savior of humanity. The only thing that can be said about it is that it is one of the first manifestations of what might be called fragmentary, although it ends up being somewhat contradictory in that sense. Despite containing the fragmentation of different wills within itself, its objective is to find a common and absolute agreement that contains all other wills within it, even though these wills are often opposed to each other. Furthermore, another thing that can be said about the UN is something more fundamental than its fragmentary nature, and that is related to the objectives of its creation. The UN came into being with the sole objective of preventing a third world war. In view of the imminent nuclearization of states, such a war would be apocalyptic. Therefore, the true foundation of the UN is not fragmentation, but the protection of life at all costs.

Immediately after the UN, the postmodern will set about creating a series of "rules" based on it. Human rights were first created in 1948, three years after the end of the war. These have several objectives...

Before attempting to delve into this set of rules, something important must be taken into consideration. As has been shown, the most fundamental basis of postmodern consciousness, at the level of contextual knowledge, is the protection of life at all costs. However, as has also been explained on several occasions, this knowledge is not static. Rather, it is something that evolves as history unfolds. This could be described as cumulative in many respects, as it does not forget its initial truth, but only transforms it. In the case of postmodernity, this transformation is reaffirming in almost all its manifestations, especially at this early stage of its development.

Postmodernity thus finds its initial context in the protection of life at all costs. But this context is immediately followed by its subsequent evolution. Then, life as a foundation is transformed into fragmentation as a foundation. This nullifies life, while at the same time keeping it present. Here we will proceed to explain this issue, which may seem confusing.

Postmodern consciousness, after seeing how all these great narratives clash with each other like three giant brontosaurus during war, identifies the totality that so characterized modernity as a fundamental threat to the preservation of life. So what does postmodern will do in the face of this problem? Isn't it obvious what it will do? It denies the absolute through an exaltation of the fragmentary. Fragmentation seems more benevolent towards life, as it appears to be the only thing that can prevent a third world war and subsequent nuclear extinction. Fragmentary confrontation can happen, it is true; one can get into a fight with one's neighbor from time to time, and that confrontation may even lead to serious violence. However, the fact that two neighbors fight each other is not going to trigger a nuclear war. On the contrary, the fact that two entire states fight each other can indeed lead to nuclear war. Therefore, grand narratives, which are capable of uniting the entire will of a country in battle,

are rejected. And these grand narratives are replaced by small narratives, which do not usually end in a big ball of incinerating light.

This postmodern reaction actually began as a more or less decent desire to preserve life. Throughout its history, this desire would begin to change into something much more vulgar. However, in its early stages, it began as an impulsive but also decently rational reaction. Even so, it is a somewhat mediocre reaction. The intention here is not to associate life, or the desire to live, with vulgarity, of course not. However, what else did postmodernity want? Besides staying alive? While this desire was not entirely vulgar, it was just that... a desire to live...

This desire is now seen by metamodernity as a completely instinctive act, more than anything else. Perhaps instinctive more than anything else within Schopenhauer's parameters, who defines instinct not so much as pure desire, but simply as the desire to live. Furthermore, this reaction is also seen as one made without any kind of meditation, which is evident in the speed of its conclusions. It must be remembered that this was still 1948, only three years after the bomb.

Postmodern consciousness has to act fast. It's impossible to wait for a science of knowledge to properly develop and digest these events. Time is a factor, so we resort to what we already know. In this case, the postmodern foundations are largely based on Schopenhauer but also on Nietzsche. Although the latter's concepts of will are usually discarded, leaving only those of life and relativism.

Having clarified this evolution that postmodernity makes from the premise of life to the premise of fragmentation, we can now better understand the formation of this series of "rules" that were made after the war. The UN's human rights were declared on December 10, 1948, in France. And these were created under the two fundamental premises that postmodernity had already made us aware of: life and fragmentation, in that order. These human rights, which seem to be based on questionable concepts of "equality" and "freedom," actually have their true foundation in life. This reaction is even made explicit by having a specific right for itself, the right to life. Taking this right to life, the third on the list, as if it were the convergence of the initial triad of the list of human rights. That third right is, in fact, the fundamental basis of the entire treaty: to preserve life by preventing another war like that one. All the rights included in the list do nothing more than reaffirm this fundamental basis of protecting life at all costs.

Pacifism is also an explicit term in this treaty, as it seems to be one of the essential keys to the preservation of life at that time. This is clearly evident in the first right, but also in the second. That second right, which advocates "equality," is an explicit manifestation of a desire to reject competitive hierarchies and the impositions that they inevitably bring with them. In this first sense, the second right, like the first, is a rejection of violence.

But if we delve deeper into this concept of "equality," which later begins to be qualified as "freedom," we clearly find that these are nothing more than means to an end. The end is the defense of life. This can be seen in equality rights in general, where every person is now equal to every other person. For between life and life, there can be no distinction, can there? The distinction between individuals only exists when elements beyond the mere "being alive" are taken into account. But for human rights, life is an absolute. Therefore, nothing else

matters but being alive in order to be considered exactly equal to another living being. In other words, individuals are not distinguished in quality, but only in quantity.

In addition to this, it is in these concepts of "equality" and "freedom" that the first fragmentary nuances also begin to appear. There are no longer any grand narratives, but rather each individual's opinion is valid and important. And this importance is not granted because of the genius of that opinion, but simply because it comes from a living being. Thus, life is taken as an absolute. But it also exalts the importance of life as a unit, rather than life as a whole. Therefore, individual opinion is exalted above community opinion. And this individual opinion is crucial to postmodernity, as small stories are crucial to avoiding nuclear war.

Fragmentation is therefore contained in all these rights of supposed postmodern freedom. The freedom of these rights is actually quite questionable. It is immobilizing in many ways. There is talk of a right to freedom of expression. But this is contradictory, because when everyone's voice is given importance, it results in the same thing as not giving anyone importance. For when everyone speaks at the same time, there is no longer a defined narrative, but only fragmentary noise. This concept nullifies itself. This is somewhat ironic.

This postmodern freedom in human rights is simply a manifestation of fragmentation. For rather than freedom, it is licentiousness. By giving importance to all opinions, we end up giving importance to no opinion. Here we see a total absence of hierarchy, which ultimately strips the word freedom of its true meaning. For what it ends up producing is actually immobility. And this immobility of the fragmentary, this inability to create new things, is precisely what suits the postmodern will-consciousness in its eagerness to protect life. For

any false step could trigger a third world war. The absence of movement is therefore also perceived as something harmful to life. Any kind of movement, any false step, could end life.

Postmodernity remembers very well what war was like. It was not a fragmented combat, where small agents took the initiative. No! War was a combat between states, totally centralized states, which were in turn carriers of grand narratives that always advocated a fundamental change in the system. And the third world war, if there was one, was to follow the same course. It would cause mass extinction, thanks to the nuclear power already in the hands of centralized states. Fragmentation, then, is indispensable for the preservation of peace. Even if that fragmentation represents immobility or social incompetence.

After these two premises in human rights, that of life and that of fragmentation, one can see nothing but a mere repetition of the same. Which, in addition, are also accompanied by certain combinations with the old traditional decrees that come from Roman law and elsewhere.

Geneva Conventions

But the triad is not yet complete; one more element is missing. Immediately after human rights, the first four Geneva Conventions were created in 1949. These are internationally binding and are based on the same principles as the UN. But they are stored, as a last resort, in the only nation that was not attacked during the war, and which seems to be the world's bunker par excellence: Switzerland.

These conventions no longer have diplomatic objectives, but rather political and military ones. Their aim is to prevent such a conflict from ever happening again, at least at the state level. In these first Geneva Conventions, fragmentation is no longer taken into account as much as the protection of life itself. These conventions, rather than an initial blockade, seem to be a secondary one. It is as if there were an obvious possibility that the first blockade would fail, leaving only the latter as a barrier against total annihilation. This treaty therefore implies that, in the event of war, it must end immediately with the destruction of the enemy's military forces alone. The civilian population is left aside and allowed to be protected. Here it is clear that this agreement explicitly rejects the use of weapons of mass destruction against the general population; and in fact, this is something that will be further reinforced later on in other agreements. In the event of war, it cannot reach massive levels. This is to avoid extinction by war, which goes hand in hand with the use of nuclear weapons and their possible trigger, chemical weapons.

These two treaties would then become almost the bible of the world from that moment on. These two treaties, together with their creator, the UN, ended up being the triad that shapes the most fundamental postmodern context. Which is the protection of life at any cost. From here, we can talk about the birth of postmodern knowledge. These fundamental premises, life and fragmentation, in that order, become the tablets of the sacred commandments that all subsequent postmodern developments take as their basis. As will become evident, this fundamental knowledge ends up influencing the entire historical development that postmodernity would later bring about.

But before concluding this section, it is worth making a final statement. On many occasions, attempts are made to portray both Marxist-Communist states and Muslim states as

elements totally alien to the postmodern will. It is worth emphasizing in view of this that both the Soviet Union and communist China were direct partners of the Allies, both in the creation of the UN and in the subsequent treaties that emerged from it. Similarly, Islam at the state level was also a partner in this. And this fundamental premise of life became present in virtually all states around the world. Fragmentation is something that would later take time to penetrate even the totalitarian regimes of the East. But the fundamental premise of life is immediately present in these Eastern states.

The development of postmodern knowledge [sub-context]

Terror is diminishing... It seems that all countries have united in favor of a better world. After all, the 20th century may not end the way it was thought it would. The sky looks clear and bright. Threats remain in the East, but these seem to be subdued for now, in the face of the postmodern will.

Postmodernity, then, goes from being just a feeling to becoming knowledge. This knowledge, due to the influence of its historical context, results in the convergence of the fundamental premise of protecting life at all costs and the subsequent development of this premise, which evolves into fragmentation. Based on these two fundamental premises, postmodern knowledge begins to advance toward its further development. Of course, this development is still very reaffirmative of the initial premise of life.

Now we can enter into what would be the development of postmodern philosophy proper. Which, as has already been clarified, should never be separated from its historical

context. As for the development of its philosophy, it could be said that it begins in two ways. First, it begins with Heidegger's silence. And second, with the publication of Sartre's "Existentialism is a Humanism," which is not necessarily a postmodern work, but does contain certain seeds of postmodernism.

In addition to this, there are also new postmodern trends in art. The new paradigm that French cinema introduced to the conversation with "la Nouvelle Vague" seems to be the reaffirmative evolution of the postmodern sentiment. This renewed sentiment gives an aesthetic embellishment to the fragmentary.

After this, a rather interesting fact emerges at the level of ideas. Heidegger finally breaks his silence and begins what is now known as the second Heidegger. The Heidegger who ceases to be existentialist and becomes properly postmodern. It is interesting how historical context has such power that it is capable of splitting a philosopher in two. It is as if the subject were both subject and historical substance. Heidegger's division is reflected immediately after the wall divided West Berlin from East Berlin.

After this, new postmodern manifestations emerged in academia. The first student movements began in the 1950s and 1960s. To this we can add the hippie movement in the 1960s and 1970s and the May 1968 riots in France. All these student movements would question the totality still latent in the academia of the previous era. On the contrary, they promoted fragmentary "freedom." Above all, they promoted pacifism, which is concerned with preserving life. This is especially evident in hippie pacifism. All of this gave rise to what would later become a forceful postmodern appropriation of academia.

Postmodern pacifism also manifested itself on several occasions during this period. Any attempt at war at the state level was rejected, especially when it came to the already announced Cold War. This is very clear when American soldiers return from Vietnam, having gone to sacrifice themselves for the supposed good of their nation. But they are greeted with tomatoes, insults, and other humiliations, fueled by a postmodern mindset that is not really bothered by the lack of victory, but by the threat that war posed to life.

This can also be seen at the Soviet level, with the invasion of Afghanistan. But on a much smaller scale, since postmodernism, for obvious reasons, did not have as much influence in the still totalitarian academia of the Soviet Union. These pacifist demonstrations became a constant throughout postmodernism. Americans returning from Iraq would also be poorly received and called "baby killers," especially after it was revealed that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Victory no longer seems to be important to the postmodern will.

Meanwhile, postmodern ideas also began to penetrate the East. The postmodern revolutions in some predominantly Islamic countries are evidence of this. However, the most significant penetration actually occurred in communist China. Prey to the tiny oversights that its system generated among its population, it ended up changing its economy after Mao's death. This is mentioned because of the close relationship between postmodern fragmentation and the free market economy. In the Soviet Union, Marxist ideas of totality also began to be questioned.

Structuralist postmodernity [sub-context]

But back to the topic of ideas. After the triumph of postmodernism in Western academia, structuralism reached its peak with Foucault. The publication of "The Order of Things" in 1966 represented the development of a much more forceful structuralism than the one Lévi-Strauss had begun long before. Structuralism, for now, is solely concerned with pointing out structure. It starts from the most basic form of knowledge there is, identifying its being. Structuralism then identifies the structure and gives it evil connotations, which end up skewing all possible knowledge. But especially all totalizing knowledge. It is curious that, for postmodernism, only grand narratives can be biased. Small narratives, conveniently, are far removed from bias. This is asserted despite the fact that the individual is always living within that structure and that this individual always has less chance of defending himself against it than a community could. But anyway, in the eyes of the postmodern will, the identification of this matrix is the beginning of the philosophical denial of totalitarian ideas.

Interesting comments are also added to these new structuralist manifestations. Such as Thomas Kuhn's "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions," which states that science is also at the mercy of structure. He adds that this conclusion is much more valid than that of a linear accumulation of knowledge, which traditional science has always claimed for itself.

Later on, capitalism began to represent superiority in terms of wealth creation over the Soviet Union. This became public with the United States' victory in the space race. This race began with the Soviet Union's triumph with Yuri Gagarin, but ended with the superiority of the United States. This fact further weakened the ideas of Soviet Marxism. These ideas still carry a lot of Hegelian totality with them and strengthen a postmodernity that seems to have taken the side of the winners.

And here it is worth making a necessary comment about postmodernity and capitalism. Although capitalism is a much older system and of greater historical complexity than postmodernity, one cannot help but find similarities between the two. The fragmentation that postmodernity would later promote goes hand in hand with the plurality of the free market proposed by capitalism. The same is true of the plurality of democracy, which seems to be the inseparable spouse of capital. This democracy always seems to end in plutocracy, which further reinforces capital. In this sense, capital's interest in defending postmodernity becomes almost obvious.

But postmodernity also has a great interest in capitalism. It is the only system of the 20th century that does not seem to have killed the population living within its borders on a massive scale. Added to this is the fact that it is an old and reliable system, which had already proven to be more or less competent in keeping stomachs more or less full and offering a more or less dignified life. Therefore, postmodernity sees in everything that capitalism represents its perfect companion.

Although, to tell the truth, the relationship between postmodernity and capitalism is something that requires further explanation, which cannot be given here. We will therefore limit ourselves to saying that both currents have a certain interest in each other. This means that, for now, they can be defined as allies.

This postmodernity was then strengthened by the United States' victory in the space race. Added to this was the Cuban missile crisis, which further strengthened a postmodernity that was determined to protect life at all costs. Seeing the validity of its ideas in experience,

this postmodernity reaffirms its ideas, evolving from a structuralist philosophy to a poststructuralist one.

Post-structuralist postmodernity [sub-context]

Post-structuralist ideas are based on the reaffirmation of structuralists. But they go a little further than them. They not only reaffirm the idea of the evil matrix, but also imply that this matrix goes far beyond simple governments, making it as fundamental as language itself. Added to this is the emphasis on the impossibility of knowledge. Especially totalizing knowledge, which is impossible in the face of this evil matrix. The only thing that can defeat this matrix is, surprisingly, fragmentation. It is curious, the strange and questionably logical connection that postmodernity makes by linking one thing to another. Fragmentation and the matrix do not seem to have any kind of relationship, yet magically this relationship ends up being proposed throughout postmodernity.

As for post-structure, Derrida would become the tip of the sword of this new fragmentary layer. A layer, incidentally, that does not add much to existing structuralist theories. In fact, it is simply a reaffirmation made from another angle. It is as if one wanted to put another intentional layer of supposed logic on top of an instinctive desire of the will to stay alive, in order to cover it up. It is curious to reflect on this, especially in light of recent scientific discoveries about how the human brain makes decisions. The central part of the decision-making process corresponds to the most central part of the brain, which is largely instinctive, while the secondary parts of the decision correspond to the outer part of the brain, which is the newest and mostly intellectual.

As an additional comment on this, it may be helpful to highlight the strange writing style of poststructuralists and deconstructionists. Being obscure when writing can perhaps be justified when what one is trying to say is extremely complex, abstract, or simply beyond the language in which one is trying to express it. But that is not the case in postmodernism. This intention to write in an extremely obscure manner often becomes obscene. Rather than reflecting a necessary complexity, it seems to reflect bad intentions. Complicating things to the point of making what one is trying to say unintelligible. And this, with the suspicious intention of covering up the fact that what they are really saying is banal. And not just banality, but contradictory banality in most cases. That is precisely one of the main reasons why this book has been written with such an emphasis on clarity, with the aim of differentiation.

This post-structuralism is joined by postmodern artistic movements, but these are much more developed. In 1980, pop music, specifically rock and roll, triumphed; in addition, what would later become the absolute dominance of postmodernism in Hollywood began; this was also followed by new trends in architectural deconstructivism.

Deconstructivist postmodernism [sub-context]

The absolute fragmentation towards which postmodernism is heading, although it may sound contradictory, is only slowed down by the Soviet Union. In 1991, the Soviet Union finally succumbs to the strong waves of history. The Berlin Wall fell, and postmodernism finally achieved absolute dominance. Dominance, which is quite contradictory to the ideas of fragmentation, but what is there that is not contradictory in

postmodernism? The only thing that seems to have no contradiction in itself is the obsession with life. This seems to be the constant that survives this sea of contradictions.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, postmodernity has reached its peak, which is the globalization of fragmentation. The absolute triumph of capitalism reaffirms postmodern ideas in experience. This causes poststructuralists to pass the torch to deconstructionists. The latter had already been around for some time, but they would become much more relevant after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This new philosophical subparadigm does not really add much to what the structuralists had already said, but simply takes the intentionality of their conclusions to a new level. In this new deconstructionist trend, what predominates is the total relativism of the fragmentary. Totalizing fragmentation, ironic...

Deconstruction, through the natural unfolding of its predecessors, ends up at what could be called the ultimate level of the fragmentary. At this point, it is no longer even possible to say what deconstructionism is in the first place, as this would depend on each individual's interpretation. In this regard, it is necessary to make another brief explanatory digression, as the issue of the individual is something that was certainly left unaddressed in the discussion of postmodernism.

It has been said that the second main premise of postmodernism is fragmentation. This, in turn, comes from the first premise of life. But as for this second premise, it naturally ends up concluding something. Fragmentation advocates small stories, unlike the grand narratives that represented modernity, the last of which was Marxism, which had already succumbed. This exaltation of small stories is present throughout postmodernism, under the premises of "freedom" and "equality," which have already been analyzed in human rights.

Thus, at the beginning of postmodernity, stories small enough not to generate a third world war, but large enough to give some meaning to life and a sense of belonging to the individual, began to be exalted. It could be said that structuralists begin with moderate fragmentation. This can be well illustrated by Gianni Vattimo's representations during these years.

He represents the exaltation of small narratives, starting with languages as an example. Each particular language created a different way of seeing reality for the population that spoke it. This caused a fragmentation in the perception of this reality and made it impossible to know it in its entirety. He then comments that even within these languages, there was even more fragmentation. For in each language, there were also dialects, which also fragmented the totality of that language. He points out the same thing with different social groups in terms of sexual preference, economic power, age, etc. This fragmentation of reality is something that has been happening progressively, driven by the success of postmodern ideas in the practice of history, with the triumph of the free market and democracy. This fragmentation, which began with the structuralists in their exaltation of small narratives, would be continued by the exaltation of even smaller narratives in poststructuralism, which in turn would culminate in the exaltation of even more microscopic narratives in deconstructionism. Without changing the essence of the conclusions, but simply reaffirming the intentionality of the prior will-consciousness.

Having already given the first dose of fragmentation, the poststructuralists advocate even smaller stories. And that is where the role of the individual comes in. What is the smallest story to which fragmentation can aspire? What is the most deconstructed form of consciousness there is? The individual. And this I, then, is the absolute conclusion of postmodern fragmentation. The pure individual, in whom there is no longer any influence of

otherness, in whom there is no longer any structural object that conditions him. There is no longer subject and object, there is only subject. A pure, empty, and totally solitary subject. The final triumph of fragmentation ends precisely in narcissism.

This issue of narcissism is not new, and in fact, it has been closely linked to the current production system. This system promotes individual freedom and the pursuit of individual profit as fundamental tools of its free market. This is certainly something to consider, as it is not such a far-fetched theory, given the close relationship between postmodernity and capitalism. However, it is also necessary to consider something else. This capitalism, together with its free market system, is actually something that has existed for a long time. The free market, in fact, is present even in ancient history. Since the time of the Greeks. Did you perceive narcissism in Greek society? Is capitalism the only reason for today's narcissism? The absolute fragmentation of postmodernity, which ends in the exaltation of the pure individual, often appears as a more compelling candidate for the question of today's narcissism.

It is precisely from this deconstructionism that the most narcissistic and current manifestations of postmodernity begin. The self then separates itself from otherness. But this is not an imposition of the self, nor is it a battle of the self against other selves. Rather, it is a separation. It is as if the self decides to embark on a journey to a desert island, where none of the other selves can touch it. This, in fact, is the true nature of postmodern fragmentation. The separation of fragments, but always trying not to touch each other. For if they touch, the selves could generate violence, which goes against the first premise of life. And on top of that, by touching each other, they could also generate a hierarchy, which would totalize the selves!

But this self, after taking refuge on its anti-hierarchical desert island, begins to feel ill. That is where something interesting happens. Which, in reality, would represent the beginning of the many fractures that postmodernity would experience in its final days.

The beginning of the postmodern decline [sub-context]

This ME, after retreating to its desert island, begins to feel lonely, begins to feel empty. For the natural instinct that this individual carries within leads him irremediably to want to recognize himself through otherness. So this ME sees the need to fill himself with something external to himself. But he has to fill himself without breaking the first two commandments of postmodernity. These commandments represent almost his bible of knowledge. So the self decides to attach himself to small objects that can fill him, even if only a little.

This is where the cult of the body, the cult of personality, and above all, affiliation with "communities" begins. But these communities cannot be just anything that the self desires. These communities must not, under any circumstances, represent military force or totality, or seek to establish a hierarchy over other communities. Therefore, you always end up gravitating toward minorities, and above all, harmless minorities. Precisely because they are minorities, they are already perceived as harmless. But in addition, these communities are kept as empty as possible. In other words, the ties that bind them must always be those of weak values. Values such as fear, guilt, helplessness, or any other form of resentment.²⁶

²⁶ A review of what Nietzsche represented as the weak values of resentment may be helpful in understanding this.

The self is then allowed to cover the minimum of its affiliation needs. As long as life is not threatened. This affiliation cannot, under any circumstances, manifest any kind of expansive orientation. Nor should it make up a very large population, because in that case, we could speak of a fragmentation that is closer to totality than to fragmentation. Which threatens life.

This deconstructionism is taken entirely from the media. It encourages the EGO to its highest levels, and this in turn results in its first fracture. This is where this timid affiliation of the EGO towards otherness comes from. This fracture represents the neo-Marxist movement that some today call "the new left"²⁷. This corresponds to everything that would come to be called "cultural Marxism," "wokism," and other names that have been given to that multicolored flag. However, this new left has little to do with the left. It does not oppose the fundamental elements of capitalism in any way. And it is even less opposed to questioning the two founding premises of postmodern consciousness. It is simply a false revolution, or an aesthetic revolution. It plays at revolution, but deep down, it only wants to pick up the crumbs that allow it to satisfy, even if only a little, its hunger for totality.

This latest deconstructionist stage sometimes wants to identify itself as the true beginning of postmodernity itself. But in view of all the connections that have already been made up to this point, it is now clear that it has its origins in the post-structuralists. These, in turn, come from the structuralists. These, in turn, come from the need for fragmentation to avoid another major war on a state scale. This, in turn, comes from the protection of life at all costs. And this, in turn, comes from the historical context that the nuclear bomb created.

²⁷ This term is used by various authors, sometimes with derogatory connotations, to refer to new left-wing movements. These movements are often linked to what is popularly known as cultural Marxism, woke culture, and progressive politics in general in recent decades.

This presence of life in deconstructionists is clearly seen in their appreciation for the oppressed, the weak, and those incapable of killing. This attachment to the oppressed is precisely what usually identifies Marxism. Although there are clear differences in this regard. While Marxism instilled the oppressed with the desire to take up arms, neo-Marxism instills in them the desire to cry, to complain, to feel guilty, to remain immobile. Byung-Chul Han said it well: when capitalism ends up selling the revolution, that is when the possibility of a revolution ends. Pacifism, fragmentation, and obsession with life reach their highest proportions here.

This is clearly evident in feminism itself, in all its waves. This feminism is not necessarily a revolution of an oppressed "proletariat." The issue is much deeper than that. The position of women in history is quite recognizable. She is not necessarily an oppressed element, but she does possess something fundamental. That something is, in fact, precisely what has differentiated them from men throughout history. Women are the bearers of life. And as a result, they are also less prone to violence that threatens this life. These qualities are what place them in the position that postmodernism ultimately supports. For women, despite not being a small group, end up becoming a valid community for the postmodern will. For the true intention of this will has never really been to avoid totality, but to protect life. In its obsession with life, postmodernity seeks to make women, the bearers of life, the center of the narrative.

Furthermore, this is clearly evident in feminism's emphasis on abortion. Has anyone ever wondered why feminism uses abortion as a weapon of threat? The fetus is now seen as a hostage, which serves to negotiate and gain more power. Feminists know, at least

instinctively, that postmodern men are obsessed with life. Women in general are good at figuring out what makes the cat tick. They know that deconstructionist men submit to life, and in their feminist attempt at supposed revolution, abortion then represents an object of submission. Although, to tell the truth, threatening abortion only reflects either very little gray matter on the part of feminist women or very little stomach on the part of postmodern men. But as far as the study being conducted is concerned, these phenomena are enlightening.

This obsession with life is also visible in postmodernity's obsession with making the adolescent the center of the narrative. Before the nuclear bomb, it was the adult who was the center of the story. But this position is reversed in postmodernity. Post-structuralists see the adolescent as the center, but not with a revolutionary intention towards them, but simply because their consciousness is closer to life than to death. Thanks to their youth. This is even more evident with the new deconstructionist trends, which no longer want to see the adolescent as the center, but are turning towards children. Now they want to put children at the center of the story, who are even closer to life than adolescents. Adolescents who are already old enough to discern this nonsense. It won't be long before the new protagonists of history are babies, and later the fucking zygote inside their mother's womb.

On top of this, as the icing on the cake, we have the digitalization that began in 2000. Information technology, as is clear, is simply an impartial tool. However, the postmodern will also ends up turning it into another weapon in its arsenal. In the repulsive world of social media, this fragmentation is accentuated to cosmic levels. Algorithms end up fragmenting these aesthetic communities even further. The confirmation bias present in them cuts like a knife through butter in postmodern minds. This, added to all the developments that postmodernity has been undergoing for some time now, ends up turning postmodernity's once

decent desire to protect life into a totally disgusting obsession with life. The latest postmodern manifestations in history can no longer be represented as anything other than a huge mass of narcissists obsessed with life. This is described more or less accurately by Gilles Lipovestki in "The Era of Emptiness."

The postmodern present [sub-context]

This whole journey, which begins as a more or less noble desire to preserve life on earth, ends up becoming its own demise, a sick obsession with life. The rejection of postmodern totality, which is done in defense of life, ends up invalidating itself. Both in terms of logical contradiction and in practical terms. Fragmentation can no longer sustain itself and instinctively seeks external recognition, which ends up converging in the "new left." This phenomenon is nothing more than a symptom of an already weakened postmodernity that is in clear decline.

Added to this is the decline in production that capitalism began to show in the 1970s, which became more pronounced after the fall of the Soviet Union. This began to weaken postmodern ideas of fragmentation. The 2008 crisis and other historical events began to question the validity of these theories. However, this will be explained later in the next chapter.

For now, to conclude the analysis of the postmodern reaction at its turning point, we can conclude that the fundamental postmodern concept is still present, but in a much more vulgar form than at the beginning.

Life today, like the Venezuelan bolivar, is hyperinflated. Because of human rights, even the most useless and incompetent of men now has the right to life. Those who reproduce the most today tend to be lazy and drug addicts, who generally do not work, because the state, in its unconditional protection of life, gives them and their children money, regardless of how many children they have. The Argentine case is a clear reflection of this. This is not to say that social assistance should be thrown away. Of course not. But it is also necessary to emphasize the fact that the main reason why man was able to position himself at the top of the food chain was precisely thanks to natural selection.

The new blood increasingly rejects this absolutism of life, regardless of how good or bad their material situation may be. But this is a voice that until now has not been taken into account. Life, life, life; that is all the latest postmodernists think about. Life in human rights, life in the UN, life in the rejection of totality, life in fragmentation, life in overpopulation, life in structuralists, life in post-structuralists, life in deconstructionists, life in the new left, life in the new right; life, life, life!

Where is death!

Chapter 4: The postmodern sentiment, enjoyment [context]

"What is relevant in a lie is never its content, but the intention of the liar."²⁸

No matter how much one feels a desire for independence from the world, reality always ends up making one dependent on otherness. A moderate desire for independence does not always result in something harmful; however, in the end, there is always something that keeps man tied to the earth. That "something" may well be food, the air we breathe, the water we drink, or the support of a community, but it is something that is always present. This dependence is also present in other animals. Like humans, they also depend on other beings for their sustenance. However, perhaps human dependence is even greater, as humans have much more complex needs than common animals.

Philosophy is no different. Philosophy, in its development, requires emotional nourishment that allows it to unfold. Just as a tree requires nourishment from the earth. And it is only thanks to this nourishment that it is able to grow toward the sky. Or, in the case of humans, we need the fruits of the earth to sustain our bodies. But he also needs the recognition of otherness to sustain his spirit. Philosophy, then, is nothing without its listeners. As soon as there is a change in consciousness-will, creation occurs. And creation always symbolizes a change in feeling. The nourishment that feeling represents is then directed toward another tree, inevitably withering the previous one.

As Derrida would say, before knowledge, there is always intentionality. That feeling is married to context and begins to progressively nourish the fetus until the moment of its final birth: knowledge. The newborn is not alien to this nourishment, but rather its immediate result. A result that will one day be transformed, but until that day comes, it is nothing more

²⁸ Derrida, Jacques. "La vérité en peinture." In *La vérité en peinture*, 117-205. Paris: Éditions Galilée, 1978.

than an extension of nutrition. But is this nutrition only prior? No, it is also posterior. Even after birth, the newborn still needs nutrition. It is no longer totally dependent on the mother, as any other woman could feed it. But in any case, it must be fed. Throughout its life, it must receive nutrition from the earth. Feeling is fundamental to the life of any element.

Postmodernity, in order to maintain its life, must feed itself. And its food is the feeling that emanates from its knowledge.

The preservation of life at all costs is definitely the deepest foundation of postmodern knowledge. However, history does not stop because of this fundamental knowledge that postmodernity has created. History continues, and it does so through its cycle. Context, emotional intention, knowledge-context, emotional intention, knowledge-context, emotional intention... and so on. If this cycle is reaffirmative, that is, if it only reaffirms the fundamental premise of the larger historical context, then the first context, which begins with the postmodern era, continues to dominate all subsequent contexts. For it is in this context that the greatest amount of will is deposited. And the same is true of the sentiment of that first context, which continues to dominate all subsequent sentiments. Although even in the reaffirmation of something, there are always slight touches that are added to its main premises. Perhaps not denying them entirely, but transforming them to a certain extent.

The emotional, then, that nourishment that comes from the earth. It then becomes as necessary as the knowledge that always remains in the sky. One cannot sustain itself without the other. Therefore, a change in feeling is as relevant to historical development as a change in philosophy. After all, the date does not fall far from the palm tree. These two parts of postmodernity are both equally necessary in order to understand it.

For this reason, an entire chapter has been devoted to identifying the postmodern sentiment. At first glance, it may seem pointless to talk about feelings in an exhibition that aims to be conceptual. However, in the desire to move away from vulgarity, which consists not in utility but in one-sidedness, this desire allows us to embrace a much broader conception of reality. Therefore, the integration of these earthly emotions is necessary for this study. This is especially true in late postmodernity, where emotional women seem to have the upper hand over men. But above all, it is necessary because of the contrast that will later be attempted between postmodern and metamodern sentiment.

But before beginning with the exposition of this feeling, it is worth identifying its unity. For the innumerable feelings found within postmodernity can appear fragmentary if viewed quickly. But a more penetrating look can identify that within these feelings there are also hierarchies. Just as there is a hierarchy in the points of context, there is also one in feelings. And above all this fragmented sea of postmodern feelings, there is one that imposes itself on all the others and encompasses them all. This feeling is closely related to the fundamental premise of the postmodern context, namely that life is absolute.

Enjoyment is the feeling of postmodernity. More specifically, the enjoyment of life. After all, rationality is not everything. Even after the massive conceptual attempts made by the postmodern will to protect life, it sometimes becomes difficult to defend. What is there, after all, in "life" that is so worth living? Life, no matter how attached one is to it, can sometimes be boring, empty, meaningless, or simply annoying... And it is precisely in view of this problem that enjoyment has its genesis. For life, on its own, does not seem to be a sufficient foundation; but that lack can be filled in a certain way, by squeezing life through

the enjoyment of it. Panem et circenses. "Give them bread and circuses, and they will never rebel." ²⁹

This relationship will be expressed in the following paragraphs. For now, and before anything else, it is necessary to explain what is meant by "enjoyment." The term is used here as the enjoyment of the negative. As something that is known to be wrong, but in view of not wanting something different, one tries to enjoy it almost forcefully. This definition can perhaps be better understood through psychology, a science that seems closer to earth than philosophy and can provide some clarity regarding this feeling. To this end, Jacques Lacan's conception of enjoyment seems to be the closest to what is being discussed here.

The concept of "jouissance" in Lacan's psychology refers to an experience of intense satisfaction beyond ordinary pleasure. It is a state of excess that can generate anxiety and discomfort in the individual. Jouissance is closely related to the structure of the subject and their relationship with the Other. The Other, whether a real figure or a symbolic representation, plays a role in the configuration of desire and the search for satisfaction. Jouissance goes beyond symbolic castration, which involves renouncing certain desires in accordance with cultural norms. Jouissance is associated with a dimension beyond these restrictions and can manifest itself as a disruptive force in the psyche. Furthermore, Lacan introduces the concept of the "object a," which represents a primordial lack and becomes a point of attraction for desire. The subject seeks to fill this void through different forms of jouissance, but can never achieve complete satisfaction. In summary, jouissance in Lacan's psychology is an experience of excess satisfaction that goes beyond the limits of ordinary pleasure. It is related to the structure of the subject, the relationship with the Other, symbolic castration, and the perpetual search for satisfaction through the object a.³⁰

Taking this into account, postmodern jouissance can be defined as the enjoyment of what is not wanted, as opposed to the instinctive need to attach oneself to an object. The object ends up being something different from what the will really desires, but in view of the

²⁹ This expression is commonly attributed to the Roman poet and satirist Juvenal, who lived in the 1st century and is known for his satires on the society and politics of ancient Rome. In his work "Satires," Juvenal criticized the apathy and complacency of the Roman public toward important issues, pointing out that people were more interested in obtaining food and entertainment than in actively participating in political or social issues.

³⁰ Lacan, Jacques. "The Seminar, Book 20: Encore." Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller. Verso, 2008.

terror of losing it, the will forces itself to enjoy this object. This, incidentally, is probably a similar feeling to that experienced by alcoholics and drug addicts when they consume their substances.

Perhaps the use of this tool in postmodernity can be more easily understood in the conceptual light of Aristotelian rhetoric. This is already philosophy, but as it is aesthetic philosophy, it is closer to feeling than metaphysics, for example. Aristotle sees rhetorical aesthetics as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. This phenomenon has an almost identical counterpart in postmodernity, which takes life as its end in itself, but pleasure as the means to support that end. In this regard, pleasure would then be represented in Aristotelian rhetoric as *pathos* more than anything else.

This *pathos* is one of the three rhetorical tools, along with *ethos* and *logos*, capable of generating the influence that rhetoric so aspires to. Pathos refers precisely to those emotions present in the audience that are used to tip the balance in favor of the speaker. In this sense, pathos becomes the motivation of the postmodern paradigm. Aristotle claimed that pathos, together with the other elements of rhetoric, could be used significantly by the will to determine the development of a judgment.

This pressure exerted by pathos is present throughout postmodernity. In fact, in the later stages of postmodernity, this emotional pressure seems to be the only thing that still sustains postmodernity in the end. Its rational part is now so weak that it seems to have completely ceded its space to the more irrational part of enjoyment. This phenomenon is interesting; it is as if the cycles are repeating themselves. And in the same way that knowledge is created from pure emotional intentionality, it also ends up destroying itself by

becoming pure emotional intentionality once again. Intention, which is once again floating in the air, without rationality, like the fetus resting passively in the womb.

The latest postmodern stages are evidence of that irrationality. For it is precisely the excessive enjoyment of life, which is supposed to protect it, that is ironically destroying life itself. Consumerism, which in its enjoyment ends up destroying life through its biblical amount of waste, is a postmodern irony. Sexual liberation, which sought the enjoyment of life, also ends up destroying the fidelity necessary for the motherhood of life. But the absolute irony... is that enjoyment ends up destroying enjoyment itself. This is evident in economic crises. Those who are created by an excessive desire to go into debt in order to enjoy this short life to the fullest, even without having the money to do so. This ends on the day... when all these debts accumulate so much that they end up imploding. Thus destroying what fed enjoyment, and therefore destroying enjoyment itself. The irony abounds... However, even in view of this clear tendency toward self-destruction, enjoyment does not stop. As Lacan said, enjoyment is something that goes far beyond rationality. Postmodernity, in its last breaths, has ceased to be rational at all and has surrendered itself totally to enjoyment.

And since the topic of the economic crisis has been brought up, it is worth reflecting on it briefly. Postmodern enjoyment is closely linked to the benefits provided by the production system. Although not necessarily the same thing, as mentioned above, it does represent a cornerstone of postmodernity. For how could one speak of enjoyment of life? If all you see in that life is poverty, misery, meaninglessness, humiliation, disease, heaviness, etc. But on the contrary, if you add beautiful, inexpensive clothes to that apparent

meaninglessness of life, it becomes more palatable. Isn't that so? When capitalist enjoyment ends, so does postmodern enjoyment of life.

It is no coincidence that proto-metamodernity found the first hints of its sentiment just after the economic crisis of 2008. Capitalist enjoyment ends, and postmodern enjoyment also ends; its fragile ideas have no choice but to go over the cliff. However, despite having all the makings of a total collapse, the 2008 crisis turned out to be only a partial one. The US Federal Reserve, without hesitation, jumped to the rescue. It saved the economy by printing money...

I think that all of us, at some point in our childhood, came to the innocent conclusion that the solution to world poverty was simply to print money and then give it to the poor. That way, "there would be no more poor people." Curiously, this innocent mistake that children make is exactly what the US government is doing to keep its economy afloat. After 2008, a huge amount of money was printed, which effectively restored confidence among employers and consumers, but in turn began to accumulate inflation, which would only become apparent in the following years. This hit the middle class harder than any other. This phenomenon would simply repeat itself in the economic crisis of COVID-19.

In its already sick obsession with life, postmodernity is only postponing its death. Life, life, life! It can be nothing else but life. The bull market can be nothing else but that. All these supposed salvations achieved by printing money had as their real objective simply to continue the enjoyment. These salvations were naturally followed by progressive inflation crises. These are felt more outside the United States than inside. As many economists already know, the United States is one of the world's largest exporters of inflation. All of this would

progressively and silently increase global inequality. In addition, it creates a still latent debt problem. A brutally massive debt, which would represent all the debts accumulated throughout this compulsion to enjoy over time. Today, this debt resembles the Yellowstone volcano. Deep in its calderas, it whispers deliriously, "I can't take it anymore..."

Enjoyment in postmodern art [sub-context]

But enough digressions... we must return to the pathos of enjoyment. This enjoyment has always been the pathos of postmodernity. It becomes present immediately after the first postmodern conceptual premise, which is expressed in human rights, and begins to develop from then on. And this enjoyment turns out to be a rather necessary nutritional element. In fact, it is possible that postmodernity requires this emotional nourishment even more urgently than other philosophical paradigms. This is due to the enormous contradiction that postmodern knowledge has always brought with it since its very beginnings. All the contradictions in its philosophies must, to some extent, be "counterbalanced" by enjoyment. This is where the important role of postmodern art comes in.

This phenomenon of enjoyment, from the beginning of postmodernism, becomes an inseparable element of the premise of life. This life as an absolute is not possible without enjoyment. And the enjoyment of life, in turn, is not possible without life. They are both directly related, and that phenomenon can perhaps best be expressed in postmodern art.

This postmodern art brings with it a contradiction almost as great as the contradiction of its philosophy. However, within this contradiction, one can clearly perceive life as absolute

and the enjoyment that keeps this premise on its throne. The best way to explain this phenomenon is to start with the problem of postmodern philosophy. For postmodern philosophy, knowledge is not really possible. But you can reflect on that statement for a second. If all knowledge is invalid, then why talk? If postmodern philosophy really believed in its own words, it would have remained silent, wouldn't it? Why then do they resort to words? If all knowledge is futile, why not resort to silence? They don't! Postmodernity continues to manifest itself in every way. Not only in the philosophical sense, but also in the full display of artistic sentiment. The intentionality that motivated them to express themselves is the key to understanding the postmodern sentiment.

These artistic manifestations specifically, which claim to have no narrative, actually do have a narrative. Their narrative is the enjoyment of life! The fragmentation present in postmodern art is not something that postmodernity really loves. How could you love something that is not even defined? How can one love the infinitely multiple? What was the intention? Was postmodern love supposed to be a kind of Buddhist "Metta"? Or was it a love like that of Jesus for sinners? It's ridiculous! The supposed fragmented love of postmodern sentiment is actually a unitary feeling. It is not a love of the fragmentary; fragmentation is only an excuse. The true sentiment of postmodern art is directed toward the enjoyment of life.

So then the pieces fit together. Postmodern life does not end, but rather thanks to the enjoyment of life itself. Postmodern philosophers did not remain silent because of their need to enjoy the life of philosophy and to keep it alive, even though they did not believe in it. Postmodern artists did not remain silent because of their need to enjoy the life of art and to keep art alive. No longer to say something through art, but simply to keep it alive. Abstract

art in painting is a clear example of this. Why make art if you have no desire to express anything? It is the enjoyment of life that sustains postmodern art.

Enjoyment in postmodern society [sub-context]

This enjoyment is manifested throughout postmodern social expression. Some examples of this are what Bauman called "aesthetic communities." The hippie movement, or even the more recent new age movement, are key elements in this regard. These aesthetic communities have not formed themselves with the aim of achieving a defined purpose. If you take a look at these communities, they have no "rules," so to speak. They have no defined purpose to which all their members adhere, no entry requirements, not even a defined program of activities. They are simply "community." The desire for affiliation, which the self inevitably feels, is expressed by a desire for community. And this desire for community, even though it involves otherness, is not really opposed to postmodernity. For postmodernity does not really find its basis in fragmentation, but in the enjoyment of life. Therefore, community exists, but no longer to express something through it, but simply to keep it alive. Like floating in the air, like a fetus.

Lipovetsky also commented on this in an interesting way, trying to bring it closer to narcissism than to enjoyment. Where Narcissus desires to feel affiliation with something that is in line with his own personality. Although, to tell the truth, Lipovetsky's theory is not so convincing. It seems that the feeling of enjoyment is more accurate. For it is precisely this feeling that ends up sustaining communities in the useless space in which they now find themselves.

Another manifestation of postmodern enjoyment in history is hypersexualization. And this desire is impossible to deny, given all the media pressure that exists around it. All these earthly pleasures, which try to present themselves as a "revolution" against Christian conservatism, are in fact part of postmodern pathos. Which says, "drink, get drunk, find a partner, the night is young, forget your existential problems..." Pathos then comes into play. Faced with the impossibility of desiring anything beyond life, this pathos encourages the enjoyment of elements within life itself. Sexuality is a weapon in its arsenal. And so it tilts rhetorical judgment in its favor and preserves life. But at the same time, postmodern life also preserves life from its pathos. And the life of pathos also preserves postmodern life. It is interesting how these two elements sometimes come to identify with each other. And even more interesting is that this mutual codependency leads the pathos of sexuality to a point of stagnation.

In addition to the theme of sexuality, there is also a clear representation of postmodern man's obsession with the opposite sex. Women, the bearers of life, are seen by postmodern men almost as gods. They worship and desire them with all their strength. This pathetic act, of course, causes women to lose respect for men and begin to see them as tadpoles. But that is a topic for another time. For now, it is enough to highlight the fact that there is a direct relationship between sexuality and life. There is a direct relationship between women, who are capable of reproduction, and life. There is a direct relationship between women's bodies and life.

This is perhaps reflected in the irony that arises from this hypersexualization. According to several sociological studies, despite receiving all these sexual stimuli from the

media, youth sexuality is at its lowest point in history. No one has sex anymore, largely due to the lack of understanding between men and women caused by postmodernity. This is caused precisely by the high standards that pleasure itself promotes, especially in economic terms. In addition, it is also fueled by the crisis in relationships, which the very enjoyment of life promotes. Where one threatens to destroy the other, while at the same time making them codependent on themselves in their pursuit of pleasure. The only ones who seem to have sex today are porn stars. The rest are simply spectators of the show. The codependency between enjoyment and life is precisely the trigger for their own destruction. Ironic...

And here we need to make a necessary digression. Given that the word "irony" has already been used several times, this term is considered one of the fundamental points of the metamodern concept. At least, this is how it is considered by the proto-metamoderns, who were mentioned in the introduction. This irony is used by proto-metamodernism almost as if it were a gnoseological principle (theory of knowledge). This, of course, leads to error. Irony, unless one wants to take a totally different approach to what it means as a rhetorical figure, is simply an aesthetic element. It cannot and should not be used as a method for constructing a theory of knowledge. It must simply be considered for what it really is. That is, an aesthetic result, which ends up being generated thanks to postmodern failure. So this irony, rather than a principle, is a result. It is a symptom of obvious weakness on the part of postmodernity. In that sense, this symptom can then be used as a rhetorical argument to sway judgment in favor of a necessary new paradigm. But it can only be used in this way. The final groans of a dying man cannot be used as the foundation for something new to replace him. For with regard to this dying man, it is not simply his final groans that should be taken, but everything that he was. Starting from his beginning, until his end.

This irony, viewed from a purely aesthetic point of view, constitutes nothing more than an aesthetic figure that can only be used as a rhetorical argument. What must be taken into consideration as a foundation is enjoyment. For this enjoyment does not appear only in the last groans of postmodernity, but appears from its earliest genesis to its latest decline. In terms of feelings, it is enjoyment that must be taken into consideration. Not the irony resulting from that enjoyment.

Returning then to the theme of enjoyment. In postmodern society, there is another form of enjoyment that can be felt very clearly, especially in its latest digital stage. The enjoyment of postmodern entertainment is something quite close to procrastination. It is as if it were a matter of putting the problems of consciousness aside and trying to pass the time through the enjoyment of entertainment in life. Postmodernity sees this entertainment as a fundamental part of preserving life. In postmodern logic, the only thing you have to do to preserve life is "not to damage the established order." Even the slightest change in the air, especially if it is violent, can threaten fragile life. In this sense, postmodernity is in fact much more conservative than many may believe. The enjoyment of entertainment manifests itself in many ways. Social media, of course, is a valid example. Although when it comes to social media, this enjoyment tends to be mixed with psychological addiction. So perhaps it is best to illustrate this point with another type of entertainment: music.

Before postmodernity, people owned musical instruments in their homes. However, music was reserved for specific moments, thus giving this pleasure a defined orientation. But postmodern people, on the other hand, listen to music even when they go to the bathroom. It is surprising how there are homes and workplaces where a speaker is turned on at full volume all day long. More than entertainment or enjoyment, it is as if they are trying to escape a

miserable reality through excessive enjoyment. The worst thing is that the music they play is usually by postmodern clowns such as Bad Bunny or Six Nine. Note that they are written in lowercase...

The foundation of enjoyment [sub-context]

To conclude, it is essential to point out what appears to be the ultimate manifestation of enjoyment in postmodernity. This ends up being the most fundamental of all, and the one that contains all the others. It consists of the following.

The supremacy of life as an absolute, imposed by postmodernity, consequently gives rise to an absolute denial of death. However, there is a problem with this imposition. No matter how fiercely life as an absolute is defended, this premise is always under constant threat. This absolute denial of death is in turn combated by the inevitability of death. For death is, as Heidegger first stated, the queen of possibilities. There is no scenario in which life exists without the possibility of death. No matter where life wants to escape to, or how much it is defended, death always catches up with it.

And in the face of this absolute supremacy of possibility that death has over life, life cannot bear the struggle. It flees from the struggle because it knows it will die in it, and it is afraid. So life injects drugs into its veins, drinks alcohol, inhales cocaine, injects fentanyl, so as not to have to remember the problem of death. This life wants to forget the struggle because it knows it will lose. And this loss causes it so much anguish that it prefers to forget about it. So, to avoid knowing that it is going to die, life sets out to intoxicate itself. Life

needs to confuse and overwhelm itself; only then can it forget about death and continue on its pedestal of absoluteness.

Heidegger expresses this concept, calling it a "dizziness" that life demands. This life says, "Dizzy me! I don't want to know anything about death or conflict. I like life, so stun me so I don't have to listen to death." The enjoyment of stupor is what creates this attitude of moving from one thing to another, and immediately from that thing to another. The inauthentic dasein³¹, has no desire to listen to death, so it takes refuge in the enjoyment of instant gratification. Like a daily dose of cocaine, it is the great determinant of all postmodern enjoyment. It contains all the aforementioned enjoyments within itself.³²

This attitude of numbness, if looked at closely, could well be the fundamental cause of all other manifestations of postmodern enjoyment. All this postmodern enjoyment arises precisely from the denial of death. From the fear of the struggle that life has with death, which it prefers to forget by getting drunk. This denial of death is manifested in basically all postmodern sentiment. Drugs, sexism, social media, environmental pollution, consumerism, bullshit jobs, etc. Of course, this whole attitude of bewilderment has many negative consequences. However, of all of them, perhaps the most serious is the economic and financial consequence.

Enjoyment in the economy [sub-context]

³¹ Heidegger's concept of Dasein refers to the being that questions being. Man would then be included within the limits of Dasein. However, this Dasein can have noble characteristics, as well as vulgar ones. Authentic Dasein is noble.

³² The concept of bewilderment is described by Heidegger as a fundamental part of ontocentrism. It symbolizes a crucial part of Dasein that no longer questions being, but questions entities. This concept of bewilderment can be studied in greater depth in *Being and Time*, specifically in Division I, S 18-20, and in Division II, S 44.

In its attempt to enjoy life to the fullest, postmodernity begins to indebt itself excessively. It prints more money than it produces. It takes totally irresponsible monetary measures, creates inflation, and keeps an unproductive economic system afloat. All the consequences of these bad practices are always for "tomorrow," but tomorrow is never relevant when instant gratification is the goal. Furthermore, enjoyment also dictates that life should be squeezed to the fullest regardless of the cost. In this logic, it is perfectly understandable that postmodernity indebts itself with money it does not have. For the enjoyment of that money is more important than fulfilling its debt obligations. All this so that enjoyment can continue to keep life on its pedestal as an absolute.

This enjoyment, and the general stupor, is evident throughout the postmodern economy. Today, there are thousands of companies that should be six feet under.³³ Companies that have not produced a single dollar in decades, but nevertheless exist, thanks to the systematic debt that keeps them afloat and prevents them from "dying." These companies are kept alive for the sake of preserving life. They supposedly sustain the global economy by creating new jobs. And that's where the problem gets even more complicated.

Massive debt not only keeps unproductive companies afloat, but also generates, by inertia, unproductive jobs. This is where "bullshit jobs" originate. Jobs that have no productive value and should not exist. But they do exist, thanks to the massive amounts of money that companies receive in the form of debt. All this non-productivity has catastrophic long-term consequences for the economy. But of course, postmodernity is not interested in the long term... Only in immediate gratification. And also in "keeping alive" jobs that shouldn't really be there.

³³ This phenomenon is described by financiers as "zombie companies."

In addition to all this non-production, there is also the problem of long-term debt. All this debt is a time bomb, similar to the Yellowstone volcano, which is boiling its internal cauldron. But postmodernity is not interested in this gigantic long-term debt either, because instant gratification is its priority.

The most obscene thing about this is that postmodernity, in its infinite narcissism, does not see its actions as something bad. Instead, it has fun and even takes "selfies" alongside the problems. It always tries to leave all these problems for those who come after it. It always postpones them to a perpetual tomorrow, so that others will have to deal with them. Kicking the can down the road forever, until the road finally ends, or worse, until those who have been kicking the can for a long time die. And the problem is left to those who are still alive, and those who never even got to enjoy the past prosperity. Thus, they are left with all the debt and none of the benefits.

Chapter 5: The metamodern origin [context]

The glorious French Revolution. The day the people rose up against the tyranny of the monarchy and won their freedom. The day the obsolete inertia of Christianity and a decadent tradition were defeated by reason and autonomy of action. The world is no longer simply a purgatory or a test to pass in order to move on to the next stage. With the French Revolution, it is now believed that man must create his own paradise here on earth. The individual is no longer placed behind the "divine right" of the church, kings, and feudal lords, but finally has value according to what he provides to society. But this individual autonomy is not a desire that has been achieved by chance. Rather, it is a fundamental part of what many consider to be the deepest ideal of modernity.³⁴

Freedom is probably the deepest ideal of modernity. Freedom of thought, freedom of expression, and freedom of action. The man of the French Revolution grew tired once and for all of the prison of the Christian matrix and set out to break the chains of that structure. These chains kept men bound to immobility and passivity. God provided all the answers, so there was no need to look anywhere else. This prison that Christianity had created in the Middle Ages was what motivated modernity to take such a strong stance on freedom.

However, there is a problem with the issue of freedom. As mentioned earlier, the problem with freedom is that it does not usually last long. As discussed, the problem with "leaving the matrix" is that you always end up falling into a new matrix right after leaving the previous one. The agent that allowed you to leave the initial structure is now the new oppressive agent, which has taken the position of the new conditioning structure.

³⁴ The French Revolution was the historical event that began what could be called the total political domination of the bourgeoisie. This revolt against the monarchy and feudal lords, which still lingered from the medieval era, would give rise to what we know today as the state. This revolution would later be replicated in many other countries, but the French Revolution was the first of its kind. This revolution marked the beginning of the contemporary era and the end of the modern era.

That question is just one of the issues that causes problems with the topic of freedom. In fact, there are several other issues that make that ideal extremely problematic. Not only problematic for postmodernism, but it has also been problematic for modern, existentialist, Greek, and medieval philosophies. If one reviews the meanings that the word "freedom" has had throughout history, one will realize that there are countless interpretations and concepts of it. Freedom, like good, is a concept that brings complications. And of all these attempts, modern man has been the most genuine in his search. It is an essential part of his will.

It was this constant search for freedom that led to the unfolding of modern man's will. To be free from Christianity, from kings, from the precariousness of life, from the place where one was confined. It was this search for freedom that drove him to actions such as the conquest of America. Where European man was amazed by that new continent. Those vast and beautiful landscapes, those fertile lands, those countless virgin riches, seemed to be just what man needed to achieve his freedom. He then set out to breathe that new pure air and exploit that new land. The riches and free space would finally allow him to achieve his freedom.

But having finally given way to conquest, consciousness remains dissatisfied with this supposed freedom. Consciousness realizes that this American conquest is not true freedom, and that the will still desires freedom. Consciousness then ceases to desire one thing and moves on to another. The desire for the thing changes, but the desire for the ideal remains intact.

Consciousness quickly realizes that conquest requires immense work in terms of infrastructure and land exploitation. This heavy work, which would have to start from

scratch, being in a virgin land, would only become a new pair of shackles. A new object of consciousness is then resorted to, and the attempt is made again. Now, through labor independence. Then slavery and colonies are resorted to. Labor from another bloodline may be a better candidate for achieving freedom. Now there will be much more free time, and this wild American land can be trained. This could allow for the achievement of absolute freedom. But this does not work either... Consciousness will soon realize that this idleness does not allow it to achieve freedom, but only makes it dependent on otherness. Then the slave owner ends up becoming the slave.

In addition, the slave owner also loses something even more valuable than his independence, and that is his ability to create. For he inevitably ends up ceding to the slave the creation of something as important as culture. The slave owner must now assume a culture of a different blood origin, which his consciousness considers alien to him.

Consciousness realizes that the conquest of the new continent, even through slavery, is not true freedom. And it soon realizes that escaping from the Christian prison of its continent does not represent freedom either, since this continent continues to hold it prisoner from a distance through its monarchical colonies. Modernity now sets out to find its freedom at the level of the economic order. This led to the French Revolution. It marked the beginning of what is known today as the "bourgeois state" and the beginning of the end of the monarchy with the beheading of Louis XVI. Politics was mobilized with the intention of placing man at the center of the narrative, and this also marked the beginning of what could be called the absolute domination of capitalism and the bourgeoisie.

This revolution represents the end of the monarchy and the rise of the new bourgeoisie to power. This revolution would later be repeated in every corner of the world. In America, it was felt with great force. The continent was freed from colonialism, and the American states were born. People believed that with this independence, they would finally be able to achieve the authentic freedom to which modernity aspired so much. Now the bourgeoisie had a clear path to achieving its own freedom, without the interference of Christianity.

But modernity quickly realized that this conquest of rights was not enough to achieve its freedom. For something very curious happened. Modernity, which longed for freedom, found itself totally unsatisfied when it finally achieved victory. The desire that is never satisfied feels empty once again. This "freedom" that modernity had finally believed it had achieved through the bourgeois revolutions is immediately nullified by itself. For at the same time that the bourgeoisie overthrows the established power, it becomes the new ruling power. It has not left the matrix of Christianity, but has simply replaced it with a new matrix. The bourgeoisie goes from being the liberating agent to automatically becoming the oppressive agent.

This phenomenon is clearly evident in a specific part of Hegel's philosophy. Hegel, incidentally, lived at the same time as all these bourgeois revolutions took place, and there is a part of him that reflects this behavior of the "new oppressor." For Hegel believes that he has attained absolute knowledge and, therefore, considers history to be over with his philosophy. This, of course, is seen by him as a liberating movement. But as for later philosophers, this is seen instead as an act of absolute oppression. For this statement automatically ends up nullifying any philosophy that may be developed later. All other philosophies would then

have the intention of seeking alternatives to Hegel, although they inevitably always end up departing from him in one way or another.

This absolute triumph of the bourgeoisie as the new center of history immediately causes consciousness to seek other options. At this point, philosophy begins to distance itself from academia, and what is known as existentialism begins. This also marks the beginning of what would become the contemporary era. However, this era is not entirely independent from the modern era. For the modern ideal of freedom is not lost, but only evolves. Authentic freedom does not seem to have been achieved yet, and therefore existentialism would later continue to insist on it. The ideal of existentialism is no longer so much the freedom of ideas, or freedom of expression, or a series of just rights, for that was already achieved to a certain extent with the French Revolution. Rather, the freedom that existentialism now desires is an absolute freedom from reality. In other words, freedom no longer has such "ideal" or "formal" characteristics as it did in modernity. In the contemporary era, this longing takes on much more "real" or "material" properties. What existentialism aspires to is absolute freedom. The most authentic freedom. Or the most real freedom of all, right here on earth. No longer in heaven.

The desire for freedom, then, also remains present in the contemporary era. But no longer as the search for freedom of ideas or thought, as it was in modernity. Now, with the triumph of the bourgeoisie, the doors are open to seek this freedom in the very reality of the material world. The search for absolute freedom, one that transcends all social classes and historical phenomena, is what the contemporary era aspires to. This desire for the absolute is in fact inspired in many ways by modernity, especially by Hegel.

In addition to the theme of freedom, the contemporary era is still in many ways tied to modernity. For it is the same bourgeois element that ends up being the center of the historical narrative. It is capitalism itself that is the dominant economic system. And it is the same Hegelian philosophy of the bourgeoisie that still remains an epistemological foundation that cannot be ignored by subsequent philosophies. The contemporary era, then, may be an attempt to overcome modernity; however, many of the modern premises are still present. This makes it an era with a context not very distant from modern reality.

Therefore, contemporary consciousness continues with the same search for freedom, although now in much more real and absolute terms. This new consciousness quickly realizes that the triumph of the bourgeoisie is not enough to achieve absolute freedom. In addition, another of the first things it realizes is the idleness that slavery generates in its own blood. This idleness is not only harmful to the spirit, but also counterproductive to achieving absolute freedom. It generates a new dependence on an agent other than one's own blood. Slavery then began to be abolished throughout the world, as it was not the path to absolute freedom.

But contemporary consciousness realizes once again that the abolition of slavery does not give it absolute freedom. It also realizes that this abolition does not even give freedom to the other blood that was previously enslaved. For these slaves, once freed, still have to work. And European man still has to work too, which prevents both from being "free." Contemporary consciousness is once again dissatisfied with this and proposes a new attempt.

The existentialists then change their liberating object once again. It is no longer independence from Christianity, nor slavery; now it is financial freedom that will allow

absolute freedom to be achieved. "To be so rich that one can live without working." Thus began the industrial revolution, which generated enormous economic production. And despite the great inequalities and job insecurity it created, industrialization was accepted by history thanks to its promise of early retirement and the future total automation of work.

But despite this, contemporary consciousness soon realized that this enormous economic production did not represent the authentic freedom it sought. For in many cases, it seemed to take away more freedoms than it gave. It should be remembered that at that time, people used to work ten or twelve hours a day, Sunday to Sunday, with almost no rest. The little time there is now to enjoy what has been produced, the enormous economic inequality, and the absence of immediate automation, then drives the creation of workers' rights and new socialist ideas. It is here that the search for that absolute begins, from a much more material and somewhat different perspective.

The contemporary era once again modifies its liberating object. Fullness and financial freedom are still sought. But this must now be shared by all, and not by a few bourgeois. Freedom, to be authentic freedom, must be absolute and therefore common. This is where everything known today as "the Hegelian left" gains strength. The ideas of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Marx begin to take shape. The contemporary era wants to conquer freedom on a mass level, not just for individuals. In addition, the concept of freedom now tends to split into two broad branches, which could perhaps be defined as "non-oppression" and "non-intervention."

Marxism, on the one hand, would take the concept of freedom as "non-oppression," allowing this non-oppression to impose itself on the proletariat. It is somewhat ironic that

non-oppression has as its goal the absolute dictatorship of the proletariat, and that once this victory is achieved, this new dictatorship would be free from all oppression, absolute oppression, through a kind of strange communist anarchism. The rise of the proletariat to power would inevitably lead to a kind of paradise where everyone lived happily and there were enough resources for all. Reaching the absolute, and consequently, absolute freedom.

However, in addition to the problems of Marxist freedom in relation to the new dictatorship, there is another problem, which is that the freedom of the masses seems, in turn, to nullify individual freedom. This is especially true in the practice of the communist movement, which promises economic fulfillment on a massive scale but in the short term ends up nullifying all individual freedom.

On the other hand, another type of freedom is proposed. The freedom of "non-intervention," which is anarchist in its very foundations and advocates non-control or minimal control. This current is, of course, linked to the promises of the free market, democracy, and individual freedom. It is a current that is, of course, linked to liberalism and ends up evolving into its most obscene version in today's neoliberalism. This "libertarian" current, like Marxism, also brings many complications. For the freedom granted to the individual seems at the same time to nullify the freedom that exists as a community, just as happened with Marxism, but in reverse. Moreover, the supposed freedom obtained from the "non-intervention" of democracy and the free market becomes a twisted concept. For there is really no such thing as "non-intervention"; rather, intervention simply changes actors, and it is no longer the dictatorship of the state, but now the dictatorship of the masses, both in their blind consumerist desires and in their even blinder political desire for democracy. Not to mention the dictatorship that large corporate monopolies end up exercising.

Both "non-oppression" and "non-intervention" bring great difficulties that are not resolved through dialogue and in fact end up dividing the world in two: the reds of the East and the blues of the West. But this duality does not remain as it is, as this dual contrast gives rise to a third element. The two opposing currents clash in the heart of Europe, and the fascist revolutions begin. The third element, which rejects both of the previous elements and seeks to overcome them as well. These revolutions seek to achieve freedom no longer through the individual or the masses, but through both, by means of hierarchy. They reject democracy as a liberating force and seek to find freedom by other means. Freedom is now imposed by the will to live, a will that is linked to expansion and preservation. Freedom is now creative and expansionist capacity. These theories come almost entirely from Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, and especially Nietzsche. To a lesser extent, they also come from Heidegger, in the German version of fascism. The concept of absolute fascist freedom is absolute military conquest and the expansion of blood.

However, this third element also fails to achieve absolute freedom. For expansion, war, and the morality of life ultimately lead to a totally inflexible hierarchy that does not allow for the development of freedom itself. This makes the third element extremely fragile in terms of its dependence on centralized leadership. This inflexible centralization ends up leading modern man to a military prison from which he cannot escape due to the structure of the system. Where the state is the only one who dictates who lives and who dies, being the great monopolizer of violence. This is not only manifested at the fascist level, but also at the Soviet and Allied levels. The system of compulsory conscription and the military hierarchy prevent contemporary man from deciding when to end the conflict and when to continue.

But the greatest prison of fascism is not so much the hierarchy as life itself. For life being the fundamental basis, it becomes precisely what will cause the failure of fascism and its decline in general. The nuclear bomb thus ends up being the ultimate weapon against life and the spread of blood, and ends up paralyzing fascism, at least in its final stages with Japanese imperialism. This paralysis caused by life as an absolute is the same paralysis that can be perceived today in postmodernity. Life is the main cause of the prison that is now represented by postmoderns in the structure.

All this centralization, inflexibility, and dictatorship of life ends up destroying the third fascist element. But it also ends up almost destroying the communist and capitalist elements. For we must not forget to mention the obvious drawback that the nuclear bomb would later bring to the table. All of this is seen by European man as a direct threat to life, and so he ends up renouncing this liberating object. For without life, freedom is impossible. Or at least that is the immediate conclusion reached by postmodern man.

This object of authentic freedom has once again failed, like all those before it, and has not allowed absolute freedom to be achieved. On the contrary, it has ended up immobilizing a fundamental aspect of history. Thanks to the nuclear bomb, there is now no possibility of achieving freedom by collective means. For any false step at the level of totality would end the planet in a big kaboom.

This is where postmodernity begins. This postmodernity renounces the liberating object at the collective level and promotes a fragmentary freedom. This new postmodern freedom does not focus so much on "non-oppression" but rather goes hand in hand with "non-intervention," which is manifested in its ultimate liberating object: "escaping the

matrix." This object would supposedly achieve authentic freedom, since this escape would end the oppression imposed by the structure. This structure is perceived by postmodernity as a totalizing agent that can only be overcome through fragmentation. In other words, through the individual, who seems to grow when there is no intervention. These postmodern theories of freedom are fundamentally anarchist.

Here it is worth making a clarifying aside, because until now, postmodernity has been seen by many as something separate from modernity and the contemporary era. But as has already been explained throughout this exposition, postmodernity does not deny the search for authentic freedom. Quite the contrary. Freedom remains one of the deepest foundations of postmodernity, following the same trend as the contemporary era. This, in turn, also came from the bourgeois ideal of freedom of the modern era. This authentic freedom does not seem to have been found yet, because otherwise, this object would no longer be at the center of what philosophy seeks.

The foundation of freedom is not foreign to postmodernity either. For it also seeks this absolute freedom. And in order to seek it, the first thing it does is try to preserve life above all else. For this life is necessary for postmodernity to achieve absolute freedom. But once life is secured, postmodernity then embarks on its path to liberation. It seeks to achieve absolute freedom through fragmentation. This fragmentation is the perfect candidate for it, as it allows life to be maintained while continuing the search for absolute freedom. The only difference is that now the liberating object is no longer financial freedom, the imposition of life, or the triumph of the proletariat, but rather the deconstruction of the self. This supposedly allows one to escape the blissful matrix.

Therefore, postmodernity is not a negation of modernity in its most intimate foundation, but only a negation of its proposals of totality and absolutism. However, in terms of will, postmodernity still aspires to the same thing as the contemporary era, and the same thing as modernity, but it only does so in a different way. In addition, it cannot be denied that in terms of postmodernity, bourgeois states still exist, the economic and military domination of the bourgeoisie still exists, and even more importantly, capitalism as a system of production is still the absolute winner. Therefore, perhaps all of this history—the history of modernity, the contemporary era, and postmodernity—can actually be encompassed within a much longer stage than these three. A stage whose foundation is the domination of the bourgeoisie and the search for freedom as the main ideal. Absolute freedom has not yet been found, and the task remains pending. Perhaps, in fact, this is precisely why the domination of the bourgeoisie has not yet ended, contrary to all expectations.

For postmodernity, in its attempt at liberation, is also incapable of achieving this authentic freedom. As is already evident, instead of allowing people to break free from the structure, postmodernity has ended up becoming the new structure that hammers away at human freedom. Despite this new postmodern attempt to find freedom through life and escape from the matrix, it once again fades into error. Absolute freedom slips through our fingers once again, and defeat causes a great decline in the enthusiasm of postmodern man. He begins to see this battle for authentic freedom as something unattainable, which can only lead him to error.

Postmodernity sought to find absolute freedom in its attempts to escape the matrix. In its search for freedom, it returns to life, pacifism, deconstruction, the neoliberal free market, and democracy. But it once again misses the mark, and now there are almost no options left...

Freedom, since the deepest origins of modernity, with Descartes, has been the ideal to which we have always aspired. This ideal was once young, energetic, and full of life. Today, with this latest failed attempt at postmodernity, this ideal finds itself aged. This ideal is saddened, hopeless. It is no longer the same vigorous desire that once rushed without hesitation toward its liberating object. It is now very confused. For the objects that were once possible liberators have now become the shackles that hold it prisoner. Its aspiration for freedom has been turned on its head and has now become its greatest enemy. Postmodernity lives today in a dreadful prison from which it does not know how to escape. And what is most painful is that this prison was built by postmodernity itself, in its quest for freedom.

These attempts to achieve absolute freedom have not only failed, but have ended up becoming decisive mistakes. Mistakes that keep subsequent attempts prisoner. This happens to the point of turning these former liberating objects into ideological impositions. Then the same old problem occurs. You cannot escape the matrix; instead, this matrix is simply replaced with another matrix. And the next one always seems to be more evil than the previous one.

And the problem with freedom lies precisely in the fact that from the beginning of modernity to the present day, this quest for freedom has always sought to impose itself. There has always been a desire to claim that definitive freedom has already been achieved, while at the same time denying any future attempt to achieve it again. And thus declaring "the end of history." We have heard countless times that "history is over." Descartes proposed it, claiming that his method was definitive because it was based on an "indubitable" truth. Hegel said it when he claimed that history had ended with his philosophy. Communism said it, claiming

that history had ended with the dictatorship of the proletariat and that from then on we would enter a paradise without hierarchies. Fukuyama said it when he claimed that history had ended with the triumph of capitalism after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Even the postmodernists said it, stating that "freedom only exists outside the structure, but one can only leave the structure through freedom." No one wants... it seems... to accept death in its entirety.

Everything that is born is born to be broken. Breakage is the constant of reality. No matter how great the effort to keep something alive, death always wins in the end. So what is it that consciousness wants so much to avoid, putting an end to history? Eternal life? Messianic materialism? The Jewish paradise? Is eternal life true freedom?

Life, in the final stages of postmodernity, seems to prevail over the desire for freedom. History has reached such a point that life itself is becoming an obstacle to this desire. Postmodern man, in his twilight years, is beginning to desire being alive more than being free. This represents a betrayal of blood and an obvious historical decline. We have finally reached a historical crossroads, where man must choose between life and freedom.

The ultimate essence of life is that of a prison. A prison that repeats itself over and over again, always in the same way. It is the wheel of samsara, the eternal return, the hamster wheel, the rat race. Life is a prison, and this, in the final moments of postmodernity, becomes evident. Philosophy today finds itself trapped in life. It wants to live forever, tied to its ridiculous idea of escaping the matrix, which is not working. Since the time of the Greeks, philosophy has been great for one reason only. It is what it is precisely because it is capable of constantly renewing itself. That is what keeps it in that superior position with respect to the

other sciences. For of all the sciences, it is philosophy that has died the most times. It dies, is reborn, then dies again.

Everyone's time comes. And just as the postmoderns' time came, so too will the time come for this new metamodern philosophy presented in this book. In time, it too will be questioned, denied, and eventually replaced by another philosophy. In fact, it is likely that it will be questioned and replaced, even by the author himself. But in any case, by the simple fact of being born, this philosophy already has a departure date. In the end, death always prevails over life. And this is good... for it is only through death that man finds his true freedom.

Freedom would not then be outside the matrix, but within it. It is precisely death that allows us to move from an obsolete matrix to a more evolved one. Movement is not possible without death, and it is only in movement that true freedom is found. This is the moment when all conditioning is abandoned and new conditioning takes its place, like a renewed breeze of freedom.

Just like the simple individual who seems to find his truth when he dies. For when he dies, his truth is not represented by his last moments, nor by his most notable moments. Rather, his truth is represented by the totality of everything that his life was. Life, which passes completely before his eyes, condenses into a unity, and it is this unity that is his truth. A truth that seems to be discovered only at death. Without death, there can be no truth. And it is possibly that truth that will give way to a new life in the hereafter. But now as a life conditioned by renewed biases.

The same thing that happens to the individual seems to happen to the collective in history. It ends at a specific point, and all the energy of the past is concentrated at that point, time stops for a second, at the point of context, and moves on to the next historical structure that will condition future reality. But this historical evolution can never take place without freedom. Therefore, we cannot talk about freedom today while continuing to insist on a monopoly on violence.

The moment of metamodern death will come one day. But until that day comes, this new philosophy finds its being by replacing the now obsolete postmodernity. This new philosophy, which can be called, for the sake of didactic convenience, "metamodernity," is responsible for taking up the torch once again and continuing on the path of time. Metamodernity would then become the evolution of its predecessor.

Metamodern pre-knowledge [sub-context]

The economic crisis of 2008 hits hard. The already diminished postmodernity feels the impact directly. However, postmodern ideas are saved from imminent death for a second. The US Federal Reserve prints an extreme amount of money to "save" the economy. The heart of postmodernity, after CPR and a couple of electric shocks, starts beating again. Postmodernity is saved from collapse and begins what would be its final period of life. However, despite this recovery, postmodernity's limp is already evident. Its end becomes apparent, and consciousness begins to change sides.

From that momentary fracture in 2008, what would become proto-metamodernity emerged. This created a pre-knowledge that, while not entirely characteristic of authentic metamodernity, is not entirely foreign to it either. It lies halfway between both worlds and is at least worth considering as a key element of study. Once this has been considered, it can be integrated with the most recent manifestations of today's proto-metamodernity. Thus, through both, a more or less accurate pre-metamodern knowledge is created.

There are several characteristics that define this pre-metamodern knowledge. One of these characteristics is confusion and extreme pessimism. Contrary to what is sometimes said about metamodernity, it is not "optimistic" about reality. Nor is it "pessimistic" in the same way that postmodernity was. Nor is it a lukewarm middle ground between the two. Rather, it can be explained as extreme pessimism in the face of reality. The pessimism is so extreme that it ends up becoming optimism. It is as if, in the face of inevitable death, the subject stops worrying so much and starts laughing out loud. As if the tragedy were so tragic that it ends up becoming comedy. Or as if death were just something that comes to rescue man from his suffering. And even though man has no idea where this death will take him, anywhere is better than here...

There are other characteristics of this proto-metamodern knowledge. One of the most important is the attempt to resolve the confusing duality in which historical reality finds itself. In fact, it is precisely from this duality that the word "metamodernity" arises. The "meta" comes from the Platonic metaxis (*μεταξύ*, *metaxy*).³⁵ This word, metaxis, refers to being in the middle of opposites. To being between both, but not simply as a point in the

³⁵ The word finds its origins and most of its meaning in Plato. Specifically, in his dialogue "Phaedrus." However, thanks to its ambiguity, this word has led to different interpretations over time.

middle, but also as part of both at the same time. In other words, not necessarily being in the middle of both, but being in a position that encompasses both elements.

Furthermore, this Platonic metaxis is also represented as an intermediate between being and becoming. Something similar to the Hegelian concept, or to the context that weaves history together. And as with these elements, metaxis becomes somewhat complicated to explain. For it turns out to be, in many ways, the "synthesis," so to speak, of some kind of dialectic. It also seems to have a close relationship with Hegelian *Aufheben* (the third reconciling moment), and with all types of dialectics in general, apart from Hegelian dialectics. However, as you may already have noticed, this metaxis is such an ambiguous, unclear term that it only generates more questions than answers.

And it is precisely for this reason that the word metaxis seems to be the right one to name metamodernity. For it is so open, so ambiguous, that it perfectly represents the state in which metamodernity finds itself. For this nature of the third moment, of the synthesis of dialectic, would not so much be the foundation already given to metamodernity, but rather one of its central questions. This question has not yet been answered, as it seems that this is precisely the mission of metamodernity: to answer that question. For this reason, the word metaxis fits like a glove. It is so ambiguous that it serves perfectly as an initial name.

There is also another reason why this word is preferable. And why it is preferable to the word irony. The word irony, for example, is used by proto-metamoderns as if it were a gnoseological method. The use given to irony here is that of a kind of play between two apparently opposite elements. It consists of oscillating between one and the other, that is, playing with one first, then moving on and playing with the other. This is more or less how

the word irony is used in proto-metamodernity. However, this raises several problems, which ultimately position metaxis as a more appropriate concept than irony.

There are several reasons for this. First, the word irony has such a vast hermeneutic meaning that it is almost impossible to understand. This word has had various meanings throughout history, often being considered merely a figure of speech.³⁶ In other words, it is a purely aesthetic concept. This vastness of meanings and its clear tendency towards aesthetics greatly complicates the use of this word in philosophy. This is especially true when attempting to construct an entire gnoseological system based on it.

Secondly, as already mentioned, the word irony represents a kind of play between opposites. And this play is just that, a play. In other words, when it plays with one element, it forgets the other. And when it focuses on the other element, it forgets the previous one. Therefore, it ends up becoming totally one-sided knowledge that focuses only on the "I" of the elements. No matter how much memory one has of previous knowledge, this one-sidedness of knowledge of opposites is certainly the genesis of error. As has already been stated, one-sidedness is the true enemy of philosophy.

Contrary to irony, the word metaxis is much more appropriate. For it is, rather than a one-sided playfulness, it reflects an attitude that contains both opposites within itself. Or that is capable of assimilating both at the same time. It could perhaps be said that, rather than a game, it is a state of observation. This can only occur when one has a higher vantage point than the situation of the opposites. In the same way that an eagle, thanks to its elevated

³⁶ This problem is clearly evident when reviewing the definition of irony as a philosophical term. See the definition in Ferrater Mora's dictionary for a better understanding of this issue.

vantage point, is able to distinguish both the valley and the mountain as two parts of the same element.

This metaxis, in fact, becomes extremely important for metamodernity. For it is present in almost all of its challenges. The great duality of metamodern reality forces it to clarify this idea of metaxis. This could be interpreted by some as dialectic, but due to the ambiguity of the situation, the use of the word metaxis is preferred. The great duality is present in almost all metamodern questions. The duality between modern totality and postmodern fragmentation. The duality between rich and poor, between earth and sky, between will and consciousness, between being and not being. But above all, there is a duality to which authentic metamodernity must adhere above all else. The duality between life and death must be at the center of the discussion if we truly wish to overcome postmodernity. Otherwise, it will keep metamodernity eternally anchored to the past.

So, in addition to a proto-metamodern feeling of "tragicomedy," so to speak, and alongside the ambiguous concepts of metaxis, we can already begin to sense what authentic metamodernity is. For although these ideas come from a proto-metamodernity, they are explicit enough to give a good idea of what authentic metamodernity will be. In addition to this tragicomedy and metaxis, there is another final element that is fundamental to understanding the metamodern context.

This other element is that of metamodernity as a negation of negation. As the reader can already imagine, this idea comes largely from philosophers who believe in Hegel's dialectical theories. In Hegelian dialectics, this third moment is a negation of the previous negation. And this third moment, rather than a reconciling object, is in fact an absolute

negation for Hegel. In other words, it is a negation of the negation. So, first we have an affirmation, then a negation, and then a negation of the negation (sublation, *Aufheben*) as the third element. But this negation of the negation is actually a negation of the affirmation and the previous negation. In other words, it is a negation of both, but it is also an overcoming of both.

Hegelian dialectical concepts are quite complex, and many claim that they are even obscure. The aim here is not to clarify what dialectics means to Hegel, nor what that third moment really means in its entirety. But one thing that is clear about this third moment is that it is a negation of the previous negation. For this reason, metamodernity is seen as a possible third moment between modernity (affirmation) and postmodernity (negation of affirmation). And this third element must negate postmodernity (negation of negation) in order to continue with the dialectical order. Or at least this is how it is seen by those who believe in the Hegelian dialectical order of history.

But not everyone believes in this dialectical order, do they? This order brings with it several problems. Even if it were to become real, the pieces might not yet be in order. As we have already stated here, postmodernity is not necessarily a negation of modernity, as it only denies its ideas of totality. But at the same time, it continues to preserve even more fundamental ideas of modernity and the contemporary era. Such as freedom, life, and the capitalist system of production itself. Furthermore, it could also be argued that modernity is not necessarily an "affirmation." Was it not a negation when Louis XVI was beheaded? It is all very confusing.

Metamodernity cannot simply stick to these rigid ideas of dialectical order at the historical level to ground all its principles. An intervention of creativity is necessary to bring fresh ideas to the table. Only consciousness is capable of knowing in depth what the next step should be. So that the will can take this next step. The historical unfolding of will and consciousness once again seem to prevail over this dialectical order.

The possibility of a dialectical order is not ruled out, should clarity be found on the issue. But the analysis of the attitude that metamodernity should now take will be studied primarily as a study of the unfolding of will and consciousness in history. Therefore, in order to determine what stance the new metamodernity should take, we must not limit ourselves to the dialectical order, but also take into account the more chaotic aspects of history. Consciousness and will become much more relevant elements for the conclusions of this study.

This historical lesson is precisely what will be presented below. After this explanation, we can then determine the position that metamodernity should take in the face of postmodernity, based on this lesson that will-consciousness has already learned. The historical changes that we are going to analyze now refer to modern warfare, social changes, the environmental crisis, and economic and financial crises.

Modern war [sub-context]

If we consider postmodernity as an instinctive reaction to the nuclear bomb of the 20th century, it is natural to focus on this area. The deployment of war throughout history

becomes fundamental to the study of postmodernity. By understanding this evolution of war, we can understand much more clearly the position that metamodernity should take. For war is something that is almost directly related to the obsession with life.

The rise of authentic metamodern ideas has one of its most fundamental origins in the new nature of modern warfare. If we recall the fundamental premise of postmodernity, it is life as an absolute, and this premise stems precisely from the terror of nuclear power. This, in turn, results in a heightened pacifism that postmodernity defends at all costs. This is especially true when it comes to interstate violence. However, this pacifism should not be interpreted as a rejection of war itself, but only of large-scale interstate war.

If we review the history of mankind in all its length and breadth, we can see that there are only two constants. The first is herd mentality, which was key to survival, but the second is war. Postmodernity knows that it is trying to separate itself uselessly from something intrinsic to human behavior. So what it seeks is not so much the total absence of war, but the absence of a new world war between states involving weapons of mass destruction.

This is what postmodernity seeks to avoid in terms of war. It does not care about isolated massacres or wars between non-nuclear states. This is of no importance to the postmodern will. War can even be seen as a business opportunity, which it in fact is. But this business must be large enough to be profitable, yet small enough not to get out of control. In this section, we will attempt to clarify the terms of how war has evolved from its postmodern beginnings to the present day.

War in the early postmodern era, and even long before postmodernity, was a war in which states had a monopoly on violence. That is, a formal war in which two centralized state powers confronted each other in a defined combat. Each side had a distinctive uniform that differentiated it from its adversaries. Armies had a defined hierarchy; they were massive and organized. These armies faced each other at a specific point in a region and fought directly on what is usually referred to as "the front line." On these fronts, the enemy was fought until defeated. By taking the positions of the defeated enemy, this development could then be considered a victory. The winning state then took control of the losing state, especially the capital of the losing state. And so the war ended.

Furthermore, at the state level, the civilian population was also well defined, as were the armies. They all remained within a well-established border, usually shared cultural elements with each other, and had some form of identification (citizenship, passport, etc.) that made them part of the state to which they belonged. Furthermore, it was rare for them to ever leave this state, as the interconnection between states and transportation were not fully developed enough to move around so easily. So if an enemy state decided to directly attack the civilian population of an enemy state, it knew exactly where to target.

Due to the nature of yesterday's wars, violence was always entirely in the centralized hands of the state. The bourgeois states proved to be superior to any other agent in this type of centralized warfare, so they took the initiative in virtually all modern conflicts. The states had a monopoly on violence.

Naturally, due to this centralized nature of past warfare, it was believed that World War III would follow the same course. It would be between two or three great state powers.

These would now have infinite military resources and the mutual capacity for mass destruction. The nuclear button would then be pressed without hesitation, sending the entire planet down the drain. That was the prediction about the war of the future that postmodernity had. A prediction that, as we will see shortly, is quite far from the current reality.

But before we get into this new type of war, we must first take one thing into account. Currently, the bourgeoisie has total control of states in almost every part of the world. This is especially true in "democratic" countries. This total domination of the bourgeoisie prevents a third world war at the state level for several reasons.

The main reason is that today's economy bases most of its profitability on services rather than products. In the past, a region's most important wealth used to be buried in the ground in the form of minerals. Or swimming in its waters in the form of seafood. Or in the fertility of its arable land. Today, the wealth of a region lies mainly in its human talent. This is impossible to conquer in the same way as land. Therefore, the bourgeois interests that once prospered from the conquest of new territories are now much reduced in terms of profits. The profits are still there, but no longer to the point of making a war for resources alone profitable. Unless there is some kind of extreme scarcity of a resource, such as water. But even then, that would not represent an attempt to appropriate capital, but rather to ensure the well-being of the population. This is something in which the bourgeoisie does not seem to be interested at present.

The second point to consider regarding bourgeois states is that their main desire is currently nothing more than the accumulation of capital. Bourgeois states are not necessarily enemies of other bourgeois states; in fact, it is often the same bourgeoisie that controls

several states at once. They have no ideology, no political soul, they are only after money. When it comes to governing, they are similar to prostitutes in many ways. The only thing that matters to the bourgeoisie today is the accumulation of capital. Accumulation and preservation of their capital. And this preservation of capital is not exactly conducive to a nuclear apocalypse. A third world war between state powers would end up being completely unprofitable for capital. What's more, such a war could even destabilize the currency system, which would be catastrophic for the bourgeoisie. The only war that could benefit the bourgeoisie is one in which their capital grows rather than shrinks. And that is precisely what has begun to emerge in recent decades. The only wars at the state level that have occurred are what are now called "capitalist wars."

This term often confuses some people. It does not refer to the appropriation of resources from the losing side. In fact, the appropriation of resources has been a constant throughout the history of war, from the wars of ancient Egypt to the Roman Empire to the most recent ones. However, there is one fundamental factor that distinguishes traditional warfare from capitalist warfare. In the past, in order to appropriate these resources, you had to win the war. So the end of the war was always victory. That was the goal, and it is precisely that goal that distinguishes traditional warfare from capitalist warfare.

In these capitalist wars, the end of war is no longer victory, but capital. Victory is no longer relevant, much less glory. For even without obtaining either, capital can still be obtained. Regardless of the outcome, war will cost money. In fact, sometimes the bourgeoisie ends up making more money from defeats than from victories. War is no longer seen as a means to victory, but as a means of accumulating capital through war itself. This

phenomenon will be explained shortly. For now, it is worth emphasizing the characteristics of these wars so that they can be identified.

Due to financial necessity, these wars tend to have specific characteristics. One of their characteristics is that these wars are usually asynchronous. That is, they occur between a great power and a much smaller and weaker state in terms of armaments. Preferably, the smaller state should not possess weapons of mass destruction. In this way, victory is not necessarily assured, but the conflict will not get out of proportion.

Another characteristic of these wars is that they never occur between two large state powers. This would be counterproductive for capital. Therefore, they are always between a strong state and a weak state, or directly between a state and a non-state actor. These wars are often fought without any direct involvement from states. Instead, they are fought between non-state third parties, and even with unmanned drones. These are the famous "proxy" wars. Mercenary groups and paramilitary groups are often the protagonists of this new type of warfare.

But the final characteristic of this type of war, and in fact the most fundamental, is that victory no longer represents the ultimate goal of the conflict. The primary objective of these wars is the appropriation of capital. This occurs both in the sale of weapons used in the war and in the appropriation of certain specific natural resources. This appropriation of capital does not necessarily end up in the hands of the winning side. In fact, in many cases, it is the losing side that ends up accumulating more capital. The worse the conflict, the more urgent the need to buy more weapons. This also applies to the appropriation of resources, as these can be extracted even if the war aims presented to the press have failed. Thus, the

nature of capitalist wars can be clearly seen. Their ultimate goal is not victory, but the accumulation of capital. The most regrettable thing about this is that this accumulation of capital does not end up in the hands of the general population of the winning side, but only in the hands of a few bourgeois individuals. These individuals are often found on both the losing and winning sides. Victory, then, is no longer relevant.

There are numerous examples of this type of capitalist war. The US invasion of Iraq is certainly a clear example. But so is Vietnam, where there is no real reason to be there other than to sell weapons to the bourgeoisie. Both the US state armies and the Vietnamese state that opposed the communist "Vietcong." These two wars were extremely profitable for the owners of the weapons. But they are not limited to these. An even more recent example is the series of conflicts that took place throughout the Middle East after the invasion of Iraq.

After Iraq, the Middle East was destabilized, as usual, by the emergence of armed paramilitary groups. Al Qaeda, Daesh (ISIS), and the Taliban are probably the most relevant. Then, the bourgeois states, both in the East and the West, decided to "fight" this new non-state enemy. But they do not fight them directly; instead, they hire non-state third parties to fight this war. State involvement is minimal, except for the small states in the region, which have no choice but to deploy their state soldiers. But the big bourgeois states do not take direct part in these wars. In fact, victory does not even seem to be important to them. Only the accumulation of capital matters. This is particularly evident when NATO weapons are found in the hands of their "enemies" in Daesh. Or when Russian and European weapons are found in the hands of other jihadist paramilitaries who considered them their "enemies." Or when states in turn buy oil and resources from "enemy" factions. In this war, what matters to the great states is no longer victory, but the accumulation of capital as an end in itself.

This same pattern would continue to occur concurrently in several subsequent wars. The war in Ukraine is a clear example of this, where third parties are fighting against drones amid piles of rubble where there is no longer even a population, as it has fled the country entirely. And both the Russian and Ukrainian states do not seem to be fighting for victory, but rather for the accumulation of capital for a few. The same could well be true of the growing interests of the US in Mexico and Venezuela. However, of all these examples, there is one that certainly takes the crown.

The First World War is the capitalist war par excellence. In it, states fought miles away from cities to prevent the destruction of factory capital, and they fought without any expansionist interests. This is evident in the fact that at the end of the war, the borders remained virtually the same as at the beginning. The political order also remained exactly the same. The only thing that changed was that a few bourgeois hands filled their pockets to the brim by selling weapons on an industrial scale. In that war, victory was not important, but rather the accumulation of capital. You wouldn't think that such a war could be fought simply to kill an archduke, would you?

World War I was premeditated, and the goal was never the expansion of will, but the sale of weapons. This is clearly evident in the illogical German surrender. Their army was on the verge of victory, only 60 km from Paris. But they ended up surrendering for no apparent reason, in view of bourgeois interests, which are more important than victory itself. After the war, everything remained exactly the same politically, economically, and in terms of borders. For the states that appeared to be enemies were in fact part of the same bourgeoisie. The only

thing that represented real change was the Treaty of Versailles, which would later lead to what would be a true war of wills.

However, despite the repulsiveness of capitalist war, it began to reach its limits in history. It began to decline as soon as postmodernity began, and would decline even further in the final stages of postmodernity. For despite the existence of many examples of capitalist wars in recent years, these, as will be explained shortly, have gradually lost their relevance and been superseded by the new paradigm of warfare.

Here, then, we can fully enter into what is today called "modern warfare"³⁷. This new concept began to take shape during and after World War II. This new type of warfare brings with it a new paradigm at the level of warfare, which not only ends up negating bourgeois warfare, but also ends up surpassing it. Next, we will seek to contrast this new type of war with bourgeois war, postmodern war, and the relevance of all this for the new metamodern paradigm.

Recalling the fundamental premise of postmodernity, the preservation of life. Fragmentation in modern warfare ends up being only a means to this end. With the intention of avoiding a third inter-state world war, confrontations within postmodernity are now mostly between states and non-state actors. Or directly between two equally non-state actors. Groups such as mercenaries, PMCs, paramilitaries, organized crime, insurgent groups, etc., are part of a new non-state element of warfare, which has practically taken away the monopoly of violence from states.

³⁷ This term is not entirely etymologically correct, but it nevertheless became popular after World War II and after the atomic bomb, to refer to all the new military strategies that evolved from it. This paradigm shift seems to have its origins in the Battle of Stalingrad, but also in the significance of the atomic bomb.

However, one thing must be clarified in this regard. This "fragmentation" in modern warfare is not actually fragmentation per se. Rather, it is an attempt at fragmentation, but one that ultimately ends up becoming something else. We will see this later on. For now, we must first understand what true fragmentation in war would look like. A war that is truly fragmented is one in which a series of totally disorganized individuals shoot at random. This is similar to the fragmented shootings that take place in schools in the United States. These shootings are true examples of fragmented violence. Disorganized crime is another clear example of this fragmented violence. This type of totally fragmented war is actually even more repulsive than capitalist war. Unlike capitalist war, it leads nowhere. It is simply senseless violence, which can even threaten extinction even more strongly than a centralized war.

Postmodernity realizes, then, that fragmented war, in its most authentically fragmented form, is too damaging to capital. And that even within postmodern nihilism, it leads nowhere. So the ridiculous idea of total fragmentation is abandoned, and war is pursued along "more moderate" paths of fragmentation.

This moderate fragmentation begins to manifest itself not only in individual stories, but also in "short stories," which bring a more moderate fragmentation. This is where asynchronous wars such as Vietnam, Korea, the Gulf, Iraq, Afghanistan-USSR, Afghanistan-US, Tibet-China, Nepal-China, Syria, Ukraine, Israel-Palestine, etc. appear. There are then small stories at the level of war. However, there is a huge problem with this for postmodernity. Ironically, the small stories at the war level, which were supposed to be the perfect tool for keeping postmodernity in power, become a double-edged sword. All these small stories, as the reader may have already realized, lead to extremely abusive warfare. And

it is precisely because of this kind of "bullying" that the actions of postmodernity spiral out of control. Like a black magician who does not know how to control the forces he has just summoned, postmodernity begins to be threatened by the very consequences of what it has created. It goes from being the abusive element to being the abused element.

It is from these abusive little stories, these asynchronous wars, that "guerrilla warfare" is born, which would end up being the military victory over postmodernity. This new type of warfare allows elements that are vastly inferior in number and weaponry to defeat giant states. War then ceases to be fragmentation and evolves into "decentralization." The word decentralization may not be entirely accurate, but for now, we will use it. This decentralization seems to be a synthesis that overcomes the fragmentation of postmodern violence and the centralization of modern violence.

This new guerrilla warfare is no longer a war defined by a specific point in a region. In it, there are no longer distinctive uniforms, nor is there a front line. Wars do not end with the capture of the capital, and they can last for decades. Here, the enemies of the state are almost always decentralized, non-state agents who are agile and independent enough to be called fragmentary, but organized enough to also be called totalizing. This mixture of opposites is what is known in military terms as the new guerrilla warfare. Or, as it will be called from now on, decentralized warfare.

The emergence of this new type of warfare is due to various reasons. But one of them, the most interesting from a philosophical point of view, is due to the very ideas of postmodern fragmentation. This new type of warfare is a direct product of abusive asynchronous wars. If we look back at history, this type of warfare always tends to appear

when asynchronous wars occur. When a larger and stronger enemy faces a smaller one, the smaller one has no choice but to stick to this type of warfare if it wants to win. The agility and discretion represented by guerrilla warfare is the only strategy that proves effective against a huge brontosaurus running to crush you. Trying to compete with a brontosaurus in terms of strength is useless, but competing in terms of agility is more effective. Thus, decentralized warfare began to develop much more in history, thanks precisely to the asynchronous wars generated by postmodern fragmentation. This was a reaction that denied but at the same time overcame postmodernism.

But this overcoming of postmodern war does not occur solely at the level of fragmentation. It must be remembered that the fundamental premise of postmodernity is not fragmentation, but the preservation of life. Even at the level of war, this preservation of life is present. Postmodernity ensures that conflicts are contained at the level of "small stories" in order to avoid nuclear war. However, this possibility of nuclear war, which threatens life, is also denied and overcome by the new decentralized war.

The modern battlefield is no longer fought between two state powers. Instead, it is fought between mostly non-state third parties, or between states against non-state groups. And here something emerges that is extremely relevant to all of this. These non-state actors, whether they are mercenaries, paramilitary groups, cartels, criminals, or whatever, in many cases emerge and find themselves living within the same civilian population of the state they are fighting against.

These non-state actors often use the state's civilians as human shields. At the same time, they fight the state's armed forces, often less than five blocks away. The result of this

strategy seems obvious. How could weapons of mass destruction be used if the enemy is less than five blocks away from your own troops and hidden among the state's own civilians? This same principle applies to any use of weapons with a high capacity for destruction, such as long-range missiles, large cannons, warplanes, helicopters, ships, and even heavy tanks.

All these heavy weapons, both those of mass destruction and those of considerable destruction, were created and designed for a war that no longer exists. They were created for a supposed third world war between the heavyweights of the states. That is, to protect the capital of those states. Capital such as oil wells, highways, ports, and so on. But are they of any use in conquering new human capital? Or in confronting an enemy that is more interested in people than in capital?

These weapons are becoming ineffective in the changing and agile modern battlefield. First, because of how close the enemy is to the state itself. But also because of the disproportionate cost of these devices compared to the cheap missile launchers used to destroy them. A clear example of this is the downing of the Black Hawk helicopter in Somalia in 1993. These helicopters, which cost almost \$20 million, were shot down by malnourished fighters armed with RPG-7s. These RPG-7s, if obtained second-hand, can cost as little as \$400. The same thing is happening now in the war in Ukraine, where legendary US Abrams tanks worth \$4 million are being destroyed by kamikaze drones costing between \$500 and \$1,000.

The growing inefficiency of state warfare not only threatens to surpass postmodernity, but also threatens to surpass modernity as a whole. For when the bourgeoisie loses its

monopoly and supremacy in warfare, much of its control over all other elements of reality comes to an end.

This new decentralized war ends up drastically negating and overcoming both postmodernity and modernity. The bourgeoisie's arms business is beginning to crumble. Capital still matters for war, but not in the same numbers as before. It seems that today, what determines the modern battlefield are small, agile special forces, along with disposable drones, rather than heavy, expensive war machines. And of course, nuclear and chemical weapons seem to have been completely removed from the equation.

Added to this is the loss of the monopoly on weapons. Many of the weapons used in guerrilla warfare are currently being manufactured in small workshops with the help of small milling machines, lathes, and skilled human hands. Handguns are actually very simple machines that are easy to manufacture. And thanks to the lower cost and portability of industrial machines, they can now be manufactured with reduced amounts of capital. This fact is extremely relevant because, as already mentioned, heavy war machines seem to have lost their relevance in decentralized warfare. Instead, it is now the small Kalashnikovs that seem to be the real weapons of mass destruction.

And speaking of weapons, it may be worth mentioning a new trend of ideas in this regard. The future of war is often envisioned as one in which the bourgeoisie no longer has to give orders to human beings, but simply owns a huge army of combat robots. These robots operate independently of human involvement, through artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence is therefore the main protagonist of modern warfare.

Perhaps to the relief of many, it is worth saying that this future is actually very unrealistic. For artificial intelligence, however powerful it may become, is simply incapable of having the consciousness required for such a task. AI is good for quick reactions in a specific environment that never changes. However, as a multipurpose tool in the ever-changing modern battlefield, it could well prove to be more of a disadvantage than an advantage. Its high costs could in fact far outweigh the meager benefits it could provide.

There is a whole reason why AI is not in fact as "intelligent" as some may believe. This is a problem that will be explored in more depth in the following chapters. For now, suffice it to say that it is highly unlikely that AI will become the protagonist on the battlefield. Something that may be more likely than that is a kind of cyborg, in which the human mind is combined with the capabilities of a machine. However, even such a cyborg is not actually very far from what a traditional battle tank represents today. Or from what a computerized telescopic sight represents. Or from what Kalashnikovs themselves represent.

The reality of the whole matter is that the traditional paradigm of war, whichever way you look at it, has changed. The situation on the battlefield is no longer the same as it was in World War II. Now the enemies are diffuse, changing, and everywhere. Along with the fact that the human and strategic element seems to far outweigh any heavy war machine.

All of this leads us to serious questions about the postmodern paradigm. First, the monopoly of state violence is being lost. The bourgeoisie's business with war is also being lost. All of this is beginning to manifest itself in symptoms of weakness. These symptoms can be seen not only in the development of the fighting itself, but also in the decisions of states. These states are now dedicating themselves to waging war only with countries close to their

borders, in order to save costs and ensure a decent return on their capitalist war. This is contrary to the past, when the great powers were able to profit from capitalist war even when fighting on the other side of the world.

Decentralized warfare has definitely changed the rules of the game. We can see how this new type of warfare is capable of imposing itself on both postmodernity and modernity. It ends up nullifying the nuclear threat of postmodernity, but it also ends up nullifying the concept of centralized warfare of modernity. This double nullification is also a double overcoming. All of this has enormous historical relevance.

This negation and overcoming on the battlefield is precisely one of the most crucial aspects preceding the metamodern paradigm. It allows for the rise of the new paradigm and largely puts an end to nuclear terror. However, this paradigm does not disappear completely. Despite having rendered nuclear weapons irrelevant, they still exist.

After all, there is always the possibility of nuclear war. Even if a button is pressed by accident. Or even if it is started just for fun. Extinction is always a possibility. Death is always a possibility. If you take a couple of wrong steps on the sidewalk, a car could easily run you over and kill you. Death is always just a step away. Therefore, decentralized warfare in itself does not deny life as an absolute, which postmodernity still does. Rather, the only thing it denies is postmodern pacifism.

Therefore, even with all that the new paradigm of war means, the metamodern warrior will always encounter the still latent obstacle of life as an absolute. If we really want to

evolve in terms of the new metamodern war, the³⁸ aristocracy must change the form and purpose of its struggle. No longer fighting for life, but for death. Not fighting for quantity, but for quality. As hard as it may be, the time seems to have come when Cro-Magnon man must once again put an end to Neanderthal man. White, black, red, yellow, and mixed; the sickle must not discriminate against anyone. Consciousness can afford to have barriers, but death is for everyone. Just as postmodern society allowed even the least noble of men to live, metamodern society must strive for the opposite. The massification of the human species is only acceptable as long as there is a regulating natural selection. Otherwise, the only thing that can lie ahead is involution.

The metamodern warrior must in turn accept the death of otherness as well as his own. Just as the law of justice demands. And just as the kamikaze spirit demands. Not only do others die, but he too will die, and he must be deeply aware of this.

We can only speak of historical change when death is accepted in its entirety. Not only in its individual aspect, but also in its universal aspect. And not only in its universal aspect, but also in its individual aspect. Even if that desire, in its conclusion, means the total extinction of the entire human species. The only option is evolution.

The decline of fragmentation at the social level [sub-context]

³⁸ Here, the word aristocracy is used from Nietzsche's point of view of what aristocracy was. That is, not as a defined social class, but as a philosophical-spiritual class.

Existentialist philosophies were the first to realize that the observation of society is key to understanding reality. For while there is great value in observing nature in its most pristine forms, human society possesses elements that would be difficult to find in nature. The development of human relationships can be much deeper than the relationship between a lion and its prey. Therefore, the study of human beings as a society is extremely helpful in understanding the validity of a philosophy. This is especially true when one considers that the principle of that philosophy must be rooted in the historical context of society as a whole.

The phenomena that have been occurring at the social level from 1945 to the date of this book's writing can help us understand the metamodern context. These events, of course, have been manifestations of the postmodern will. They have gradually shaped society, taking postmodern ethics as their foundation. The ethics of "escaping the matrix," of life as an absolute, and of enjoyment. These ethics lead society in its historical unfolding.

Although the postmodern social movement began as a more or less decent desire to preserve life, it began to rot as time went on. As is often the case with big lies, they always start out sweet but end up bitter. Postmodern society began its decline more or less in the 1970s and 1980s. This decline occurred especially in relation to its latest deconstructive ideas.

The most curious thing about this postmodern decline is that despite having tons of money supporting it, due to the clear interest of capital in it, its results end up being so mediocre that the world ends up turning its back on it. This rejection is perceived most of all in the recent proto-metamodern sentiment, and it will be felt even more in terms of authentic metamodernity. But before reaching this rejection, it is first necessary to understand how

postmodernity in society reached such a mediocre point. Below, we will seek to point out some specific phenomena within society that are symptoms of a postmodernity in decline. These phenomena are: multiculturalism, the pandemic of loneliness, the unpopularity of democracy, the loss of social faith in the free market, the crisis of couples, and the rejection of life.

The first phenomenon to be discussed is the failure of multiculturalism at the social level. This multiculturalist attitude stems entirely from postmodern ethics. There are two basic foundations to this multiculturalism. The first is that it is based on the idea of "freedom" and "equality," which postmodernity has been shouting about since the creation of human rights. In the eyes of postmodernity, all races, ethnicities, and peoples in general are exactly the same as each other. The elements that make up these peoples, such as their history, traditions, cultural content, blood identity, values, or level of consciousness, mean nothing to postmodernity. These elements are then thrown into the trash can by postmodernity and replaced with the idea that each individual is "a life." And as for one people and another, there are really no differences, since all the members of all peoples represent "one life." And between one life and another, there is no difference of superiority or inferiority. That is the postmodern premise that promotes multiculturalism. Or at least, that is what postmodernity claims in front of the press.

The second basic foundation of postmodernity that ends up shaping multiculturalism is pacifism. This pacifism is used as an argumentative crutch to avoid any kind of complaint against multiculturalism. Especially when these complaints come from the Aryan man. For he is accused of creating a terrible world of violence in the past. He is accused of oppressing innocent peoples and creating excessive violence. This accusation seems to be directed much

more forcefully toward white men than toward any other race. In short, this premise of "guilt," so to speak, created by pacifism encourages the acceptance of as many immigrants as possible within the borders of bourgeois states. This is especially true when it comes to immigrants of a different bloodline. And with regard to those who already live within these borders, it is almost imposed that this whole mixture of different bloodlines should coexist peacefully with one another. And if possible, that they should reproduce among themselves.

However, this imposition of multiculturalism driven by postmodern politics, despite bringing in unimaginable amounts of money to finance it, has finally begun to decline in the last twenty years. For once consciousness and will decide, no amount of money is enough to change their minds. The world is just as racist as it was before this attempt at blood fragmentation. In fact, it may now be even more racist than before, due to the imposition of this fact. The growing racial and cultural problems throughout the world, especially in Europe and America, are a clear reflection of this decline.

Despite all the efforts made by postmodernism to address this, despite all the rhetoric spouted by its theories, despite the billions of dollars invested in the media, consciousness simply does not listen. Consciousness has already drawn its own conclusions. And it feels a deep rejection of all the benefits that multiculturalism promised. These seem to be fading away in the clash of wills between different bloodlines.

In addition to multiculturalism, another manifestation of this postmodern decline at the social level can be found in the pandemic of loneliness. The growing loneliness worldwide is more than evident. It is becoming present even in regions that were supposedly alien to postmodern ideas, such as China and the Middle East. Postmodernity's obsession

with life ends up exalting harmless fragmentation to its most fragmented point, which is the self. This social narcissism inevitably ends up turning into loneliness. You can ask any psychologist who has treated a narcissist, and you will find that loneliness is a common trait among them. After all, who wants to be with someone who only thinks about themselves?

This loneliness begins as voluntary loneliness. Postmodern man wants to distance himself from the community. He seeks to find his "true self" (whatever that concept may be), and to achieve this, he nullifies all otherness. He then takes refuge on his desert island of deconstruction, where he can never again be conditioned by any oppressive external agent. But this "I" immediately begins to feel sick and realizes that there is no meaning without otherness. So this "I" tries to leave his island, but it is already very difficult. It realizes that all the other SELVES have adopted the same attitude and have created a whole society that promotes this attitude. So the SELF is no longer alone voluntarily, but involuntarily. It becomes a victim of the prison it created for itself.

At this point, postmodern consciousness recognizes that it was wrong. Not only did deconstruction fail and become a prison of loneliness, but this communal prison ends up becoming stronger than the individual desires of the self to return to what it was before. The superiority of the communal will over the individual and disorganized will becomes evident. Narcissistic deconstruction is no longer the solution; it has been a mistake. This deconstruction is not the true liberating object. This ends up greatly disappointing postmodernity. However, still demoralized by the absence of freedom, the postmodern consciousness still refuses to leave its island of narcissism completely. It proposes to play at running away, but it does not really run away. For although it feels miserably ill, the fear of death remains so great that it prevents it from leaving. So what falls into decline here is not

necessarily life, but only the concepts of deconstruction. The postmodern foundation does not fall, but one of its pillars does.

One can review any type of sociological study and realize that this is a real phenomenon throughout the world. One in three Americans feels lonely; in countries such as Greece and Hungary, one in two citizens is isolated. And in Europe in general, these figures seem to average 1 in 5 citizens, although this may increase depending on the region. In China, the exact same thing is happening, contrary to all expectations of pro-China advocates. And with regard to Latin America and the rest of the "third world," these figures end up following the same trend. Postmodern fragmentation evolves from desired loneliness to unwanted loneliness.

This loneliness brings with it a series of social problems that gradually disintegrate what we call civilization. Loneliness generates a decline in creativity. When the self is isolated, there is no longer that confrontation of opposites that gives way to a dynamic creation of reality. It could be said that there is no longer the dialectic that allows movement. What we get instead is social stagnation that begins to take its toll at various levels. Perhaps the most notable is the economic level, as this phenomenon manifests itself in a reduction in productivity. As a result, we see the rise of a non-productive economy, which inevitably leads to economic crises. The economic issue will be explored in more depth in the next section. For now, it is important to understand the important role that loneliness plays in economic decline. Since there is no longer communication between individuals, there is no productive "dialectic," and without that, there is no new economic production. This reduces GDP. In the end, a strong economy is key to maintaining civilization. And civilization, in turn, is the only

thing capable of keeping life alive in the long term. As usual, postmodernity ends up shooting itself in the foot.

Since we have touched on the economic issue, it is worth delving deeper into the subject. While some may consider economics to be separate from philosophy, others, more attentive, may realize that philosophy is directly related to human ideology, both at the collective and individual levels. This ideology inevitably ends up affecting the way the economy develops. For, as is evident, the economy has more to do with the social aspect of human relations than with rigid mathematical formulas. Therefore, the philosophical stance of a people inevitably ends up determining its economy. And exactly the same thing ends up happening with politics. For this reason, it is useful to delve into this economic and political matter now, as if it were a social problem.

In this regard, it is worth considering the decline of the ideologies of democracy and the free market as a manifestation of postmodern social decline. The benefits that liberal democracy and the free market had promised seem to be crumbling at the slightest change in the wind. These phenomena do not come from some evil algorithm that wants to deliberately destabilize society. Rather, they come from nothing less than the very reflection that consciousness makes about the results. This is then manifested in the form of pessimistic social symptoms.

This phenomenon has been clearly visible in recent years. Denying the decline of democracy is foolish today. Today, presidential elections are no longer 80% to 20%, or 70% to 30%, or even 60% to 40%. Presidents elected today tend to hover around 50% to 50%. There may be a winner, but at what cost? Half the population is dissatisfied with the result,

which causes a feeling of disaffection with democracy. Added to this is the growing sense that even if the candidate of their choice wins, they end up switching to the "other side." This betrays their supporters and aligns them with something different from what they were supposed to be. This ends up causing their supporters to feel that the candidates, although apparently opposed, are in fact all members of the same bourgeoisie with the same interests as always. When this is finally understood, it completely undermines faith in democracy.

This collapse of faith is vividly reflected in the highest voter absenteeism in history. In countries where voting is optional, individuals feel that this constitutional right is not even worth the cost of a bus ticket to get to the polling station. The latest sociological studies highlight that less than half of the last two generations (millennials and centennials) believe in democracy as something beneficial. Trust in democracy is going down the drain, as people are becoming increasingly aware that freedom is not about choosing from a menu of options. True freedom is about choosing the options that will be included on the menu.

This supposed freedom that democracy offers is nothing more than the freedom offered to a prisoner to walk around his cell. "You are free, but only within these options." People are then realizing that beyond the right or the left, those who claim to represent "politics" today are all part of the same bunch of incompetent clowns who are subservient to capital.

Something very similar ends up happening with the free market. All the promises and benefits made by neoliberalism and the free market in general seem to have crumbled over the last thirty years. This free market is not really a product of postmodernity, as it has been around for a long time. But it is also closely related, as mentioned above, to the plurality of

postmodern fragmentation. This free market as an absolute ends up invalidating itself in its historical unfolding. It is the free market itself that ends up creating a series of monopolies and structural conditions that ultimately rob it of its value as a fair regulator. Fragmentation, curiously, ends up becoming the totality that it once swore to destroy. The fundamental contradiction that postmodernity commits at the beginning of its knowledge, denying the logical principle of non-contradiction, ends up taking its toll by generating a series of infinite contradictions in its unfolding. The free market is no exception to this rule.

Having already addressed the economic issue in a simple way, we can now move on to another social problem which, despite being closely related to the others already mentioned, can be understood as something individual. The global crisis of couples is another symptom of postmodern decline in social terms. Fragmentation, specifically deconstruction, promulgated a liberation from the matrix in terms of gender. Therefore, both men and women must escape from this evil matrix that keeps them trapped in specific roles. The "I" of each gender must then free itself from conditioning and isolate itself on its desert island. The role of gender is just a vile imposition given by the circumstances of the matrix. Therefore, according to postmodernism, their true essence lies outside this imposition. It is only in escape that man finds his freedom, according to postmodernism. So, the idea is promoted that genders should escape their imposed roles and start behaving however they want, avoiding the tasks that were previously assigned to them.

So now women try to behave like men, and men want to behave like women. And sometimes, both men and women want to behave as if there were no distinction between them. The postmodern man, in his pathetic desire to stay alive, follows the postmodern bible to the letter. He then becomes a woman. And women, even more pathetically, try to be men.

What ends up resulting from all this is an obvious discord between couples. For each is incapable of fulfilling the role of the other with the same efficiency as the other did before. So they insist on blaming the other, but they also insist on blaming themselves. For, according to postmodern ideas, this attitude was supposed to be perfectly possible in practice. However, what can be seen at the social level is that these attempts only end up generating mutual misunderstanding between men and women. The fact that there are more divorces than marriages today, and that there are so many single people in the world, can be taken as a reflection of this.

It has already been determined that there is clearly a social decline in terms of postmodernism. Several social phenomena have already been analyzed, such as multiculturalism, loneliness, the economy, politics, and couple relationships. Finally, there is another element that can be analyzed in this regard. But rather than an individual element, or another item on this list, it is more of a condensation of all these problems into a general symptom. More than another element, it is a consequential conclusion of all this. This entire historical unfolding represents the progressive failure of the fragmentary. And this failure of the fragmentary, in turn, also ends up creating a decline in the very heart of postmodernity. Which is not fragmentation, but rather life as an absolute.

All this identity crisis that multiculturalism creates has consequences for the enjoyment of life. All this pandemic of loneliness has consequences for enjoyment. The crisis of couples also has consequences for enjoyment. The entire economic and political crisis has consequences for enjoyment. The enjoyment on which postmodernity so depends ends up fractured by the strong waves of history. And as this enjoyment is weakened, the fundamental premise of postmodernity begins to be undermined. This premise of life as absolute ends up

completely demoralized. And postmodern consciousness finds itself totally contradicted. Nothing is working as it should!

In the end, this demoralization leads to a rejection of the highest foundation of postmodernity. In other words, it ends in a rejection of life. Depression, suicide, violent crime, and drug addiction are the latest symptoms of postmodern failure in social practice.

The environmental challenge [sub-context]

What is life? Is human life the only thing that can be considered "life"? Haven't biology and history already proven that humans are no different from the natural world around them? The life of an animal, a plant, or even a microbe is just as representative as the life of a human being. They may be more insignificant in terms of creative capacity, but in unitary terms, they are the same living being. If one wants to talk about quality before quantity, that is another matter. But one thing that cannot be denied is that no matter how insignificant a life may be, it is still "life."

Therefore, if life is to be taken as absolute, it must include all life. Both human life and the life of other species. This is not only to avoid a logical contradiction, but also to appeal to the "equality" that postmodernity itself boasts so much about. If we are all equally "alive" as humans, then there should be no qualitative distinction between the lives of other species. This should be the case for postmodernity, although, as we have already seen, postmodernity often contradicts itself on a regular basis...

Life, life, life! Long live life, exclaims postmodernity. Enjoy life, long live consumerism! The accumulation of trash is irrelevant to the enjoyment of instant gratification. Moreover, consumerism is necessary for the party of capitalism to continue. Trash is therefore a good thing. Affirmation, affirmation, affirmation!

Postmodernity, in its infinite wisdom, enjoys life so much that it ends up destroying it. The attitude that was once considered key to avoiding extinction is precisely what is creating a scenario of possible extinction. The environmental crisis does not seem as serious as the even more terrible consequences that will be discussed in the following chapters. However, this environmental crisis is so significant that it simply could not be ignored in this study.

Postmodernity behaves as if it were just another animal in the face of this crisis. Just as small fish in the sea do not know what to do when they see a threatening oil slick in their area, postmodernity does not know what to do about the environmental crisis. To tackle it in its entirety, it is necessary to question the fundamental premise of life as an absolute. This is something that postmodernity does not want to do at all. Fear has paralyzed it; like a frightened animal, it takes refuge in mediocre attempts to confront it. Postmodernity then becomes vegan, it becomes "eco-friendly." Postmodernity then consumes electric cars, whose battery manufacturing pollutes even more than combustion engines themselves. For postmodernity knows very well that the crisis is a problem, but it is unable to break free from its obsession with life. So it tries to face the crisis, but without disobeying its bible. This obviously ends up in a solution that is completely inadequate and mediocre in relation to the problem.

Fragmented solutions are not enough to address a common problem. The climate crisis is a common problem. It doesn't matter if you recycle all your trash, use renewable energy, and are totally "green." If your neighbor doesn't feel like doing the same, he will pay the climate consequences in the future. But not only him, you will pay them too. Not to mention that both you and your neighbor are consumers of the same drinking water and electricity services, which cause pollution. Correcting these polluting behaviors must necessarily involve others, both in the solution and in its consequences. The climate of the entire planet depends on a delicate overall balance, and even the slightest disturbance creates a chain reaction that ends up affecting the entire planet. Therefore, "doing your bit" is utter stupidity in view of the global nature of the problem. A common problem cannot be solved by a fragmented idea. This creates an indispensable need to resort to community solutions rather than individual ones.

In addition, the culture of consumerism in general is closely linked to the postmodern enjoyment of life. This always ends up fostering a culture of instant gratification, where immediate satisfaction is prioritized over the long term. Therefore, littering the streets today is not a real problem for postmodernity. The consequences will not be felt today, but tomorrow. And tomorrow has no value for a culture that only wants to be distracted so it can forget about death. This results in the generation of garbage on a biblical scale.

But this problem of pollution is not limited to the instantaneous nature of the feeling of enjoyment. It also involves the very context of postmodernity. This is vividly reflected in the energy crisis. Many people are unaware of this, but at least 70% of greenhouse gases are generated not by waste, but by energy consumption. This is because 90% of the energy we

use today is still produced from oil, gas, or coal. If this energy problem were solved, it would represent a drastic reduction in global warming.

However, the postmodern premise does not allow this to be solved. From a postmodern point of view, life is threatened by anything with the adjective "nuclear" in it. Nuclear energy is by far the most effective option today for putting an end to greenhouse gas emissions. When it comes to energy production, there is nothing cleaner, more powerful, or more efficient. However, both nuclear plants in the US and Europe are shut down.

This rejection of nuclear energy is justified in the press by using the accidents in Japan and Chernobyl as an excuse. These accidents are actually unthinkable with today's technology and were not as fatal as reported in the news, especially in Japan. Not to mention the fact that they may not have been "accidents" and that special sabotage forces may have been involved... Furthermore, accidents resulting from oil extraction are actually much more disastrous than nuclear accidents. This fear is fueled by postmodern sentiment, which is still terrified by the events of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is unable to realize that this fear is unfounded and that the benefits far outweigh the risks. Nuclear energy is being forgotten due to the obsession with postmodern life.

Furthermore, today, with new nuclear fission, there is no longer any excuse regarding the dangers. However, even so, nuclear energy is rejected. For fear is great, but there is something that is perhaps even greater. In addition to postmodernism, there is another factor that hinders the advancement of nuclear energy. As already mentioned, postmodernism, like the contemporary era and modernity, is nothing more than a series of stages within the capitalist era. The dominance of the bourgeoisie makes it impossible to accept nuclear energy.

For that to happen, capital would have to be rejected. Can you imagine what would happen if every region had its own source of atomic energy? It would be the end of oil companies, natural gas producers, and coal exporters. Does anyone have any idea how much money is involved in these three resources? Nuclear energy, being free in terms of natural resources, becomes much more difficult to "appropriate." This energy is no longer the domain of capital, but of technocracy. It is simply impossible for bourgeois states to voluntarily cede their power in this way.

The same thing that happens between capitalism and energy happens between capitalism and consumerism. The two become inseparable. They currently need each other to stay alive. And in the same way, the consumerist system becomes impossible to abandon voluntarily by a bourgeoisie that will not voluntarily give up its power. Therefore, if metamodernity really feels the desire to solve the environmental problem. It must commit itself to rejecting not only postmodernity, but also modernity and bourgeois domination in general.

Denial is necessary. But not only denial, but also overcoming. For this attitude of "producing less" or "being poorer but greener" does not really represent a solution. It is perfectly possible to have a more prosperous economy while being respectful of the environment. Nuclear energy is an example of this. Not only is it cleaner, but it also ends up being cheaper. This is because it can be produced anywhere in the world. There is no need to pay commissions, tariffs, or transportation costs to bring it from another part of the world. With fossil fuels, this is not the case, as not all regions possess these resources.

So, metamodernity, faced with this problem, must reject postmodernity. Instead of renouncing and fearing nuclear power, it should use nuclear power to its advantage. It should stop trying to escape from this matrix and instead use it as a foundation on which to build a future. Furthermore, it would not only have to reject postmodernity in the process, but also modernity itself; that is, it would have to reject both. But it would also have to overcome both. Otherwise, the obsession with life and the domination of capital will be precisely what ends up leading the entire globe to inevitable extinction.

The economic problem [sub-context]

Sometimes it is doubtful whether economics can be called a "science." This is especially true when the world's most skilled mathematicians and statisticians spend months developing predictive theories, only to find that events turned out to be completely contrary to what they predicted. These predictions have even been attempted with state-of-the-art artificial intelligence, with the same results. Economics is a subject that can be incomprehensible from many points of view. And its ambiguity is precisely what calls into question its designation as a science.

However, the definition of science in this book, as already mentioned in the introduction, is not necessarily something related to numbers or complicated formulas. Rather, science is the idea that is capable of justifying itself. Science is simply a statement about something, which brings with it a gnoseology (theory of knowledge). This gnoseology is not limited to formal logic or mere numerical prediction. It can encompass a much broader reality of knowledge. It is capable of understanding even the will itself.

You may have noticed in your life experience that your instinct of will is always desiring something. Perhaps you want a new car, a better job, a college degree, a new partner, or some kind of recognition. But the moment this desire is finally satisfied, you are left with total dissatisfaction. For what you have conquered no longer produces the same desire that it did before. You then forget about that desire that has been fulfilled and immediately set out to find another desire. The reason why this happens is because that instinct within you does not actually desire any specific "object." Rather, what it desires is simply the act of desiring. You desire desire; the will desires itself. Or at least, those are the conclusions of Nietzsche and Hegel regarding the desiring will.³⁹ These conclusions are used as the basis for this study.

Understanding this is key, because it seems to be precisely the will, that desire that is never satisfied, that is the main driving force behind the economy. If there is a change in desire, then this change would also occur in the economy. If it is a decrease, then the economy should weaken; and if it is an increase in desire, then it should strengthen. Isn't this in fact how the economic level of a state is usually measured? Through GDP⁴⁰ ? Which measures the quantity of products and services created in a state.

The intention here is not to delve deeply into economic theory. In fact, what will be discussed in this section will probably be a rather inaccurate account in the eyes of an expert economist, both in terms of terminology and descriptions. However, if we take this economic description in its simplest terms, we can get a more or less clear idea of what is meant here.

³⁹ This concept of will that desires itself is very present in Hegelian and Nietzschean theories in particular.

⁴⁰ GDP, in simple economic terms, represents the percentage of new products and services that a state produces. If this production is negative, then GDP is a negative percentage; if this production is higher than in the previous period, then GDP is positive. GDP is usually taken as a central measure to verify the economic health of a state.

The aim is not to go into detail about economic science, but simply to highlight a change in trend. In other words, the main intention is to initiate a debate on this issue and highlight, as has been done with history in philosophy, the fact that will cannot be so drastically separated from the economic problem.

Will is crucial to understanding this section. It seems to impose itself as something more relevant than the structure itself in the economy. If this desire that is never satisfied did not exist, there would be no growing economy. Consumers would be eternally satisfied and would never allow the development of new products and services, thus decreasing GDP. But if consumers are eternally dissatisfied and always wanting new things, then that would allow for the development of new products and services, increasing GDP. Consumer needs are practically infinite, so in theory, the economy should always be growing. These desires can take extremely sophisticated forms, as demonstrated by Maslow's pyramid, for example. However, if the desire weakens, there is nothing that can be done at the economic level to solve this. In one way or another, then, this desire seems to be directly linked to economic growth. And it is precisely this desire that gives it its direction.

How can we forget when the USSR, which had supposedly reached its economic and historical ultimatum with the rise of the proletariat to power, ended up collapsing all its power simply because the will of the people grew weary. They grew tired of so much talk and so much communist fantasy that was not being fulfilled. Once the will grows tired of its material reality, for one reason or another, there is no obstacle it cannot overcome to escape that reality. Even in the case of a system such as that of the USSR, which is by far, along with communist China, one of the systems with the least freedom in all of history. Freedom, in the

sense of what freedom from death confers. However, today the USSR is, curiously, three meters underground.

For this reason, the economic analysis that will now be carried out on postmodernity will be done as if studying will, rather than a "logical" economy based on numbers or something similar. This economic study is crucial to understanding metamodernity at its core. It is precisely from this change in economic reality that all the other changes already discussed occur. Modern warfare, social decline, and the environmental crisis can all be understood as secondary manifestations of the primary change, which is found in the economy. Because of this, this study of will in the economy can be understood as one of the most fundamental factors driving the emergence of the new metamodernity.

First of all, it must be determined that the economic system in which postmodernity finds itself is obviously the capitalist system. And it is worth making an additional clarification regarding this term, as it seems that there are still individuals who confuse what the word "capitalism" really means. Capitalism has nothing to do with a free market, the trade of goods, or monetary interest in what is produced. As already explained, these elements have been present since the time of the ancient Greeks, long before the beginning of capitalism. What capitalism really means is a method of economic production in which capital is the most important factor of production compared to the other three factors.

It should be remembered that there are three main factors of production in the economy: capital, natural resources, and labor. However, in view of the paradigm shift that is taking place in the economy, more recent economic theories have proposed adding more factors of production to these three traditional ones. Now there is also talk of three other

factors, in addition to the first three, namely: technology, entrepreneurial capacity, and intangible resources. These last three factors are not accepted by all economic theories and are the subject of debate in this science.

For this reason, it is necessary to delve deeper into these last three factors. It is in them that we find the new economic innovation that is the focus of this study. It is in these new factors of production that true economic change is found. It is precisely in them that the "click" occurs, in which the balance of economic production ceases to tilt toward the capital factor and begins to tilt toward a new factor.

At first glance, one might think that this is an event that has no chance of happening. But the truth is that this shift in the economic balance has already occurred several times throughout history. The greater importance of capital in this era is largely due to the needs of the historical context. The bourgeoisie only rose to power because it was necessary for it to do so. Since the beginning of modernity, the enormous ships that conquered America were always expensive machines, but they were crucial to the logistics of the commercial revolution. And this capital, in turn, strengthened itself by receiving all the monetary gains from the conquest. And it manifested itself in the form of more ships.

Capital would then become the center of the narrative with even greater force as Europe industrialized. The heavy, large, and expensive first-generation industrial machines were the only option available to make mass production possible. This enormous production of physical products brought great economic progress. Despite all the social problems it also brought, the enormous production of those times cannot be denied. And all that production would never have been possible without the fundamental involvement of capital.

Here it is worth clarifying what is meant by "capital." This term, like the term "capitalism," still tends to cause confusion. Capital does not refer to "money." Capital, in purely economic terms, symbolizes a man-made good that is used as a means of production to create other goods. That is the purely economic definition of capital. Therefore, it is much more accurate to identify capital with an industrial weaving machine, for example, which produces clothing. Or with a locomotive, which provides a transportation service. Or with a modern ship, which provides a logistics service to transport goods from the American continent. Capital, then, has nothing to do with money. For what does money produce? Money is simply currency, a medium of exchange. It cannot simply reproduce itself and create more money; that is not possible. Money is only a medium of exchange that can take any form. Whether dollars, euros, pesos, rubles, bitcoin, gold, silver; even salt has been used in the past.

However, perhaps the main reason why money is associated with capital today is, first, the high cost of these large machines. But second, and more importantly, it is due to the "financial revolution" that capitalism has experienced in the last 50 years or so. This was not really a productive revolution of capitalism, but rather a revolution at the financial level only. Something very curious happened during this "revolution." For the first time in history, money, currency, ceased to be seen as simply a means of exchange, and postmodern thinking began to see it as a means of production in itself. In other words, a hundred-dollar bill is supposed to reproduce itself with another hundred-dollar bill and have a child, which would represent a profit. As stupid as this sounds, this is exactly what has happened in recent years. I will explain below.

The so-called financial revolution is based entirely on usury. This tactic consists of lending a certain amount of currency to another agent and then collecting it at a later date, but with an added value called "interest." Basically, this is what all banks in the world do, and it is basically what sustains the entire financial world today. This is one of the fundamental reasons why money is seen today as a new form of capital and is associated with it. This is due to the synthetic relationship that has developed between "producing" and currency. However, as we will see later, this is an extremely harmful practice and gives rise to what could be called a non-productive economy.

This practice of the financial revolution is not really something that can be called productive. However, thanks to the postmodern will, it has remained afloat for most of its existence. In its eagerness to preserve life. This reflects the nature of the economy, which is more linked to will than to logic. Taking into account this strange phenomenon, we can therefore consider in this study as capital all goods produced by man that are used to create other goods. This includes machinery, infrastructure, and also, reluctantly, it is necessary to include currency itself, since, by order of the postmodern will, it has mistakenly become part of capital. This is especially true when talking about large amounts of currency, such as a country's foreign debt, which is where large amounts of usury tend to occur.

So capital, at the level of machines alone, absolutely dominates the entire industrial era, until finally reaching the information age, where this predominance of capital begins to falter. It begins to falter in terms of production, but begins to flourish in terms of non-production, through usury. However, until that point, the supremacy of capital over other factors of production in the industrial era was abysmal. This supremacy far exceeded that of the poor factory worker. If the latter died as a result of poor working conditions, he could

easily be replaced by almost anyone else. And his cost represented almost nothing in terms of production. However, if one of these large industrial machines broke down, it was a direct blow to the heart of production, and the entire factory could go bankrupt as a result. From this perspective, capital is superior to labor.

This phenomenon of the supremacy of capital does not only occur in Western democracies, but is also present in Eastern communist systems. Even in a communist system, which was supposedly against all this, the supremacy of capital is explicit. The same industrialization that was taking place in the West was also taking place in the East. The fact that the profits from this production were subsequently distributed equitably does not change the fact that capital remained the most important factor of production. Both the USSR and communist China were part of this same capitalist industrial era, just like Western economies.

The fact that one factor of production prevails over others is not new. In fact, this has happened several times throughout history. This phenomenon also appears in the feudal economic system. The only difference is that the main factor of production was no longer capital, but land (natural resources). Since large machines did not exist, the economy was based simply on the sale of goods to meet food needs, along with other basic needs such as clothing and perhaps the occasional gadget. And as the reader will realize, all these goods came almost directly from the land. In the form of plantations, livestock, mineral mines, etc. Because of this, landowners were at the forefront of the economy.

However, feudalism was eventually swept away by the strong waves of history and finally replaced by capitalism. In capitalism, power no longer lies with the landowner, but with the bourgeoisie. And just as the bourgeoisie displaced land with capital, today there is a

new factor that is displacing capital with something else. The powerful waves of history are leading to the decline of capital's dominance and replacing it with a new economic truth.

Today, capital is being replaced by one of the three new factors discussed above: technology, entrepreneurship, and intangible resources. It is therefore worth delving into these three new factors to discover the truth about the new economic paradigm.

The truth about these three new factors is actually shrouded in a fog of confusion. Current economic theories cannot really agree on this. Therefore, a precise definition of what the new specific factor of production would be is a task that cannot be accomplished. This is especially true for this study, which is philosophical rather than economic. However, it may be possible to encompass these three new factors in a central idea that could contain all three. Of course, this central idea may well be vague to many. But despite this, it may also serve as a guide for identifying this change in trend.

These three factors of production: technology, entrepreneurial ability, and intangible resources. In reality, they can all be understood through what could be called "human capital." This term is being used by some economists to refer to a part of production that has to do with the intrinsic value that an individual can have from a productive point of view. If we look at this new idea from the perspective of the three traditional factors of production, it tentatively corresponds to the factor of labor more than anything else. However, when we talk about work, in the traditional economic perspective, we usually refer mainly to labor. But human capital goes far beyond that. This human capital could even be seen from a purely passive point of view, that is, from the consumer's point of view alone. Here, human capital, simply by directing its attention, is capable of becoming an economic factor of production. Of course, in addition to the passive element, there is also a much more active element of human

capital. This would include all the creative skills with which this human capital is capable of developing new products and services.

If we compare this human capital with the three new factors of production—technology, entrepreneurial capacity, and intangible resources—we can see a clear relationship between them. Technology, to begin with, is nothing more than a series of processes or methods that are used as a form of production thanks to the efficiency they represent. But isn't technology linked to human capital? Wasn't it human capital that created that technology in the first place? Human capital not only creates the method, but also applies it. This application is not always easy, as these methods can become so complicated that they require a great deal of effort on the part of the individual. This also raises the problem of teaching these processes correctly, which is also linked to human capital in one way or another.

Something similar happens with the new factor of entrepreneurial capacity. Ultimately, this speaks more than anything else to the "ability of individuals" to find business opportunities. But this ability is born only from human capital itself, which identifies these opportunities and exploits them through human capital. Furthermore, in these new businesses, the sales factor always seems to be the most important. And it is only through human attention that sales can be made in many cases. And make the business profitable.

As for intangible resources, which have a lot to do with companies' branding, their trademarks, their reputation, or even the data they own, the reader cannot help but find a connection between these resources and human capital. These resources "do not exist" without the intervention of human capital. What would a company's brand be without the fans

who approve of it? Or what would become of it without the human capital that designs it?

The same is true of data. Today, one of the world's most important databases is found on social networks such as TikTok, Instagram, and YouTube. However, although data alone may seem like a productive resource, it is nothing more than the result of the immediate behavior of human capital through that web of algorithms.

For all these reasons, these three new factors of production can perhaps be encompassed by the central idea of "human capital." From a traditional economic point of view, this is also an evolution of the traditional factor of labor. And although this idea may still seem very ambiguous, it is more than enough to understand, at least to some extent, where the trend is heading. Capital, in its most traditional forms, is no longer the main factor of production. It is now human capital that is at the center of the metamodern narrative. Although this human capital certainly goes hand in hand with technology, entrepreneurial capacity, and intangible resources.

Recently, there have been attempts to combat this idea by taking artificial intelligence as a counterpoint. Assuming that it is not human capital, but artificial intelligence, expressed by robots, that will become the new dominant force in all spheres of reality. This artificial intelligence is superior in terms of intelligence, reaction, knowledge, skills, and practically everything else. This is a valid idea that requires meditation. However, that reflection will not be undertaken in this chapter, but in the next. But it will be done, there is no doubt about that. For now, all that can be said is that artificial intelligence is not as "intelligent" as many believe, and it is incapable of replacing human capital as an economic factor of production, at least in its highest spheres.

The rise of this new factor of human capital is a fact. It can be felt in all spheres of reality, from the purely corporate to the military and energy sectors. It is completely displacing capital. And even more forcefully, as the global economy shifts from being product-based to service-based. The great capitalist machines are still present, but they no longer represent the most important part of the equation. As the new predominant factor in production, human capital is manifesting itself in what some are already calling the new domain of technocracy. Here, the "technique" of this human capital prevails over capital. However, it is necessary to clarify exactly what is meant by technocracy.

The concept is still extremely vague and cannot be fully explained. It could even cause confusion, given how similar it is to the term "technology factor." But as the reader already knows, this technology factor is not separate from human capital, but rather part of it. This new economic reality is certainly present, and its identification may be clearer if analyzed from the perspective of events occurring in modern warfare, environmental challenges, or the business world itself. However, a more or less decent conceptual definition of the term technocracy is still useful.

Technocracy, then, would be the rule of the technocrats. This rule is fundamental, as it is not limited to a single sphere, but ends up dominating all spheres of reality. Of course, at the head of this technocratic domination is always the technocratic aristocracy. However, we will not go into those details for now. What is important now is to define what is meant by "technical."

The word "technique" actually comes from the Greek *τέχνη*. In its time, it symbolized art, technique, or the skill one had to do something. This technique therefore certainly

represents the skill of human capital, but it also represents a set of rules to be followed. Just as an archer is able to hit the target after mastering the correct technique of archery, he must also abide by the rules that the technique provides. However, this technique is not something that appears out of nowhere, it is not something floating around in some divine place. Rather, it is something created by the noblest part of technocracy. This would be the technocratic aristocracy, that is, the superior human capital that creates it.

Ultimately, technocracy would be the domain of the most skilled. In technocracy, it is no longer the clumsy bourgeoisie, who came with their huge machines and heavy footsteps, who win the contest thanks to their enormous mass rather than their intelligence or skill. On the contrary, the technocrat wins not because of his strength, but because of his skill in the subject matter at hand. However, due to the ambiguity of this term in philosophy, it seems necessary to include a quote from Ferrater Mora's philosophical dictionary on the meaning of technique. This dictionary is considered by many to be the best dictionary of philosophy in existence.

TECHNIQUE

The distinction between technique and art is blurred when what we now call "technique" is underdeveloped. The Greeks used the term τέχνη (often translated as *ars*, 'art', and which is the etymological root of 'technique') to designate a skill by which something is done (generally, transforming a natural reality into an 'artificial' reality). *Téchne* is not, however, just any skill, but one that follows certain rules. That is why *téchne* also means "craft." In general, *téchne* is any set of rules by which something is achieved. That is why there is a *téchne* of navigation ("the art of navigation"), a *téchne* of hunting ("the art of hunting"), a *téchne* of government ("the art of governing"), etc.

Through Socrates, Plato refers very frequently to *téchne*. According to Aristotle, *téchne* is superior to experience but inferior to reasoning (in the sense of "pure thinking," even though thinking also requires rules). In the Middle Ages, the term *ars* was frequently used in the sense of the Greek τέχνη. But little by little, the so-called *ars mechanica* emerged as what would later become "technique" proper. According to Kant, the "technical mode" can be applied not only to art, but also to nature. Kant says

that the beauty of nature reveals a technique of nature as a system realized in accordance with laws. Kant distinguishes between a *technica intentionalis* and a *technica naturalis* and calls the causality proper to Nature in relation to the form of its products as ends "technique of Nature" (*Erste Einleitung in die Kritik der Urteilkraft*, in *Werke*, ed. E. Cassirer, vol. V, pp. 199-200). This technique of nature is opposed to the mechanics of nature, and for this reason it can be said that the faculty of judgment is "technical" in nature.

"Meditation on technique" in the current sense of "technique" is characteristic of the Modern Age, especially since the French *Encyclopédie* (see *Encyclopedia*) drew attention to all techniques, and particular attention to mechanical techniques, incorporating techniques into "knowledge" (science). This incorporation has been so complete that at a certain point it was considered not so much that technique is knowledge, but rather that knowledge is fundamentally technical. On the other hand, techniques—not only mechanical ones, but also "human techniques"—have developed to such an extent that the question has arisen as to how far man is capable of mastering the techniques he has created. This problem is related to what might be called "the alienation of man by technology"; many of the social doctrines advocated from the beginning of the last century to the present have had as one of their objectives to show how man can assimilate technology, that is, how technology can become "human."

The philosophical study of technology is still in its infancy. Although today's philosophers, especially in highly industrialized countries, live in a "technical world," the nature of their work often leads them to ignore (intellectually) that world. There is no reason, however, why technology (or technologies) cannot be analyzed philosophically with the same conceptual rigor with which the sciences have often been analyzed. What the philosophy of technology needs above all is a system of concepts within which the basic problems of all technology can be posed. These concepts may include those of work, application, transformation, and efficiency or performance.

For the time being, most "philosophies of technology" have been speculations about the latter. This is the case with Spengler when he defines technology as "the tactics of life." Spengler proposes this definition based on the idea of man as a "prey animal."

Some philosophers have sought to distinguish between various forms of technology or various stages in the evolution of technology. Thus, Ortega y Gasset indicates that three stages must be distinguished in the historical evolution of technology: the technology of chance, characteristic of primitive man, accessible to all members of the community and almost confused with the repertoire of natural acts; the technique of the craftsman, typical of Antiquity and the Middle Ages, the heritage of certain communities; and the technique of the technician, as it appears in the modern era, and especially in the Contemporary Age, with the importance acquired by the "machine" and the difference not only between the technician and the non-technician, but also between the technician, the craftsman, and the worker. In this last stage, technology itself predominates over special techniques. Techniques can also be classified into a technique for the production of goods, a technique for the various "arts," a technique of knowledge, etc.

In Gilbert Simondon's view, the idea that the machine is alien to man stems from a lack of knowledge of the machine and its potential rather than from the structure of the machine and mechanization. Certain authors have distinguished between technique and work, considering the latter to be more fundamental than the former, so that, as Simondon writes, "the technical object has been apprehended through human work, thought and judged as an instrument, aid, or product of work." In contrast, this author advocates the idea of a direct understanding of what is human in technology itself. Work can then be considered "an aspect of technical operation." The importance given to technique has been recognized by Pierre Ducassé, who went so far as to write that "an education in philosophical freedom is possible in the world—and through the world—of technicians," (op. cit. in bibliography, p. 2), which is why we must react against a *détachement spéculatif* that today would have neither foundation nor meaning (ibid., p. 136).

Heidegger's considerations on technology and the technical world are notoriously hostile to both. However, Heidegger expresses hostility towards technology only insofar as it "betrays," so to speak, its relationship with ἀλήθεια. Technology is a mode of ἀλήθεια of unveiling. But while technology as technical knowledge, ἐπιστήμη τέχνη, was, among the Greeks, the production of the true in the beautiful, so that technology was "poietic," in the modern era technology has been a "provocation" (Herausfordern). Modern technology does not arise from science, but from a "demand" on Nature to surrender its accumulated energy to man. Man questions (stellt) Nature through technology, provoking it. Heidegger calls this Gestell—a term that designates a useful object, but which Heidegger understands as "detention and searching" (and which is related to her-stellen, dar-stellen, etc.). The Gestell hides and masks the ἀλήθεια, and that is why, while the ancient ἐπιστήμη τέχνη was an unveiling that prostrated itself humbly and piously before the unveiling, modern technology forces it and, in doing so, hides it.⁴¹

Now that we have more or less clarified what the new technocratic paradigm in economics means, we can move on to pointing out what these changes represent. It is precisely this rise of the new technocracy to power where postmodern economic reality finds its economic decline. But not only postmodern reality, but also modern reality. For both are part of the same capitalist system. Thus, metamodernity's rejection of the economic system is a rejection of both, but it is also a transcendence of both. Below, we will explain how this change has been taking place throughout postmodern history and how it has paved the way for the emergence of the new metamodernity.

⁴¹ Ferrater Mora, José. "Technique." *Philosophical Dictionary*. Barcelona: Ariel, 1994. 1061-1062.

Postmodernity is not economically separate from modernity, as both belong to the same capitalist system. Postmodernity ends up being just one of the evolutions of original capitalism. And of these versions, perhaps the postmodern is the most obscene of all. Capitalism evolves from a system of production to a system of non-productive consumerism. The new postmodern emanations do not contradict the foundations of traditional modern capitalism, but they do weaken it. The non-production that enjoyment has generated is a symptom of an increasingly weak postmodern will. And an increasingly weak capitalist will as well. This weakness is exploited and gradually overcome by the dominance of technology.

Capitalism, the ultimate system of the bourgeoisie, reached its peak in the postwar period, around 1945 and 1970. It was responsible for rebuilding Europe, and together with the domination of space, the American commercial empire seemed unbeatable. Meanwhile, the USSR began to falter, further reinforcing this superiority. In addition, the third industrial revolution began, bringing with it information technology. Together with the domination of space, this promised to be the bright future of mankind. But this dream, which seemed so close, began to fade from the horizon after the 1970s.

This progressive decline of capitalism is due to many factors that cannot be fully explained. However, a few of the most important ones can be pointed out. One of them is undoubtedly the turning point when President Nixon renounced the Bretton Woods financial agreement, established after World War II, which would finally separate the dollar from the gold standard in 1971⁴². This is a fundamental change in global finance. Since the dollar is the world's preferred reserve currency, a change in its value affects all other currencies worldwide. This is because they derive their value from their dollar reserves. As problematic

⁴² This means that the value of the dollar is no longer based on the monetary value of the gold market, but is now based on itself. In other words, the dollar is based on the US economy rather than on the international price of gold. Other countries would later copy this same principle.

as the gold standard may have been, it had worked more or less well over time. The moment the dollar is taken off the gold standard, the situation changes. It is the equivalent of giving the keys to the pharmacy to a drug addict. If the keys had been given to someone responsible, this might not have been a problem, but if they are given to a drug addict, the consequences are obvious. This change ended up giving international banks the green light to print dollars at basically whatever level they wanted. Can you imagine what it means to have a money-printing machine and not be given any responsibility or consequences for using it?⁴³

Along with this important factor, there are also changes at the production level. Since the computer revolution, a much more unequal economy has begun to emerge. This is partly due to the excessive printing of money, as well as the exponential nature of the computer economy itself. This is further exacerbated in the following years with the fourth industrial revolution of digitalization. In this revolution, the debt system, excessive printing, and the exponential nature of digitization create a perfect storm of conditions that begin to destroy the middle class. Inequality begins to reach very high levels, and the economies of countries weaken. Only a strong middle class can keep them on the right track.

This inequality was further accentuated by the fall of the USSR in 1991. Capitalism emerged as the triumphant system of the planet. But although this may seem like an advantage, it actually became a malefactor. With no alternative, the debt system became even more irresponsible in its actions than before. Furthermore, if one studies the behavior of the will, one will notice that it tends to activate more strongly when it has an "otherness" to overcome. Or when that otherness represents a threat to it. In this sense, the will tends to like

⁴³ The Federal Reserve, and international banking in general, now have the ability and freedom to print unlimited amounts of money. Of course, this would naturally lead to inflation, but this consequence is not always taken into account.

competition. But when the will finds itself without a clear goal to conquer, it cannot properly express its desire and becomes more idle. This also weakens the economy.

Since the 1970s, wages have been stagnating worldwide, while inflation has made life increasingly expensive. This has caused a slight but persistent decline in real production. All this excessive printing of money not only creates inflation but also accumulates debt. Debt that began to show its first signs of leakage in the recessions of 1980, 1990, and 2008. The latter is the most serious of all, as it represents a credit accumulation.

All these recessions, and the overall economic decline, gradually weakened the once strong middle class around the world. The lack of state economic regulation, the irresponsible absolute dominance of international banking, and the new challenges of industrialization all came to a head in the 2008 crisis. At that point, the system seemed to finally collapse completely. However, the postmodern enjoyment of life saved the economy. Well, rather than saving it, what was done was simply to make the tragedy worse by postponing it...

An obscene amount of money was printed to save the economy, and to a certain extent this seemed to work for a long time. But despite providing instant gratification, this printing has long-term consequences. It begins to create the ultimate bubble. The "bubble of everything" inflates the prices of all productive goods, as well as non-productive goods. This is especially true for non-productive goods, because at that point, there is much more money in circulation than there is production. This phenomenon, which occurred in 2008, would then repeat itself exactly in subsequent recessions, and with even greater force in the latest COVID crisis, where more than 20% of the dollars in circulation today were printed. So the problem is not solved, but only accumulates for later.

Before proceeding to the final outcome of all this, it is worth clarifying how this non-productive economy, in which postmodern consumerism ends, works. With an excessive amount of money in circulation, this money ends up exceeding the actual amount of production. In other words, there is more capital than economic production. Therefore, the bourgeoisie, not knowing what to do with so much printed money, puts it back into the market. But as you can imagine, this reinvestment is done without thought or consideration. Since there is an extreme surplus of money, it is even possible to gamble with it. This is where the speculative market begins. Due to this excess of capital, goods are mistakenly perceived as more valuable than they really are and end up being overpriced. Furthermore, these goods are not purchased to be used productively; they are simply bought to be sold to some other bourgeois who is even more stupid than the one who first bought the good. In this trend, prices gradually rise, passing from hand to hand, from bourgeois to bourgeois, as each one hopes to sell at a higher price. This continues until the price becomes extremely excessive in relation to what the asset is really worth. This is because the asset ceased to be productive long ago. It does not generate any real utility (profit). The only profit it can generate is from being sold to another speculator. This is how financial bubbles are created.

Speculation itself is a topic of debate in economics. It does not seem to be entirely bad in terms of economic activity. However, when speculation is combined with excessive money printing, the obvious result is a price bubble. Today, the prices of real estate, stocks, bonds, and even cryptocurrencies are absurdly high. The "bubble of everything" has created a totally unproductive economy. Even the jobs of ordinary people have become unproductive activities. For this employment to exist, there must be a company that creates it. And many of today's companies are institutions that have never produced a single dollar in their entire

existence. They are totally mediocre companies that survive simply on massive debt. In other words, rather than productive entities, they are institutions totally sustained by money given to them by the state.

Today, there are many companies that should be six feet under. However, thanks to this system of systematic debt that keeps them afloat, they are able to be as inefficient as they want and still survive. Does this remind you of anything? Isn't it the same as with human rights? Giving even the most mediocre and useless of men the "right to life."

This non-production is naturally also expressed in non-productive jobs. "Bullshit jobs," or non-productive jobs, began to appear in the 1970s, curiously enough. These are jobs that really shouldn't exist in the economy, but they do. You have probably seen this type of job on more than one occasion. They are jobs that could easily be eliminated or replaced by a better method. Jobs such as gas station attendants, corporate lawyers, assistants to assistants, administrators of administrators, etc.

These unnecessary jobs are largely generated by the non-productive economy. However, the new challenges posed by process automation also play a role. Artificial intelligence threatens to eliminate many jobs, and in fact it is doing so. The logical thing would be to abandon these already automated jobs and create new ones. However, being in a non-productive economy that creates nothing new, this becomes impossible. Therefore, postmodern consumerism, instead of turning the page and accepting its own demise, insists on continuing with the same thing. This insistence ends up creating bullshit jobs. These are not the cause, but the symptom of a non-productive economy.

All this non-production is not something that simply occurs at the economic level. If you look at the nature of it from a philosophical standpoint, this non-production is the same as non-creation. And non-creation is the same as what ends up happening at the social level. In the analysis of the social decline of postmodern deconstruction, it was observed that the isolation of the selves only leads to a lack of creation. In other words, it leads to stagnation. This is the same thing that ends up happening in a non-productive economy. It is in this type of relationship that the true nature of the economy can be understood. It is closer to the desiring will than to rigid mathematical formulas. For it is precisely the desiring will of the deconstruction of the self, still present in postmodernity, that has created this entire non-productive economy.

In addition, this non-production also ends up affecting modern warfare. For the same thing happens in warfare as happens with the real estate bubble, for example. Large war machines, such as airplanes, aircraft carriers, ships, heavy tanks, and other elements, become extremely expensive in relation to their true productive value. These machines can be easily shot down by missile launchers worth a thousandth of their value. Or they can be destroyed directly by superior war strategies created by military human capital. However, these machines are still being produced and sold. This is because the capitalist war that still exists does not really see victory as its goal, but rather the mere buying and selling of these machines. Of course, all this inefficiency in the war economy ends up being exploited by new non-state agents who are betting on efficiency.

Having touched on that subject, it is now appropriate to continue with what would be the outcome of this entire non-productive economy. All this inefficiency not only represents the decline of postmodern consumerism. It also represents the decline of capitalism itself,

because inefficiency has reached such a point that it has become unsustainable under its own weight. Of all the nonsense Marx wrote, there is one thing he was really right about. Capital is becoming an obstacle to production. Today, capital and the weight it exerts are no longer synonymous with greater economic production, but rather with economic stagnation. Thanks to the financial dominance of the non-productive capitalist economy, capital prevents new products and services from being produced as they should be. And it is into this enormous hole of inefficiency that the new economic element enters. Technocracy is emerging as the new dominant element in the face of the growing inefficiency of the bourgeoisie.

Technicians, rather than winning by brute force, as the bourgeoisie did by throwing their huge bags of money on the table, do so through skill and intelligence. Rather than a huge brontosaurus, the technician is an agile velociraptor. More intelligent and precise, they use the right technique to win in their chosen field. Early examples of this are the big tech companies. Amazon, Apple, and Microsoft are examples of early technical elements. Today, they are associated with large bourgeois monopolies, but it should be emphasized that these companies actually started with very little capital. It was their mastery of technology that really positioned them as monopolistic platforms. It is the financial bubble, the lack of state regulation, and the entire capitalist structure in general that has given these companies their current status as evil bourgeois. However, in terms of their founding methods, these companies are manifestations of early technology. It should be remembered that starting with so little capital and creating a company of this size would have been totally impossible in the industrial age, when millions had to be spent just to buy a factory machine. Furthermore, the greatest value of these new companies does not come from the machines, but from the human capital that makes them up.

In any case, if these big tech companies want to forget their technocratic origins and start behaving like bourgeois, they will quickly be overtaken by new technocratic elements. They would then be overtaken by new companies with better proposals. Perhaps some candidates for this are Nvidia and Open Ai, which have demonstrated great efficiency in artificial intelligence. Technology is increasingly imposing itself on capital.

Another thing that should be clarified is that this technocracy is not limited to science. Although science plays a crucial role in it, technology can extend throughout the entire reality of our time. A clear example of this is the phenomenon already mentioned in modern warfare, where extremely expensive war machines are surpassed by the right military strategies. Technique in war is capable of overcoming heavyweight weaponry. Today, it seems that well-trained special forces are more efficient than the billion-dollar machines that states continue to produce.

The need for weapons is still obvious, but these weapons have evolved into cheaper, smaller, and more specialized items. The focus is on the technology of these weapons rather than how much they may cost. The fact that the most popular weapons of war today, assault rifles and rocket launchers, are being made in small workshops using lathes and milling machines, or even by hand, is an example of technocracy in action. These locally manufactured weapons are of the same or even higher quality than weapons produced by states. However, they are priced well below state-made weapons thanks to reduced import costs and other tariffs. In addition, the efficiency of new combat drones is another example. These new machines are sophisticated rather than expensive. They require a whole science behind them, which in turn requires the appropriate mechatronic technology to operate. But despite their sophistication, these drones are extremely cheap compared to heavy war

machines. This is to the point where they are becoming disposable drones, such as the new kamikaze drones.

This superiority of technocracy is beginning to make itself felt in all spheres of what we might call the economic and military. These are the two fundamental pillars for change on a historical scale. The only pillar that remains to be overcome is the social pillar, which will be discussed in the next section. For now, it is important to note that this new technocracy is surpassing the dominance of the bourgeoisie in all these areas. And as the days go by, this surpassing seems to be increasing. It is no longer an isolated phenomenon, but a genuine change in the current mode of production.

In conclusion, it is worth noting that the growing inefficiencies of postmodern consumerism, together with the general inefficiency of capitalism as a whole, are leading to a profound change in the production system. One in which the new technocracy is capable of imposing itself on bourgeois domination, taking advantage of its weak will. This domination of technocracy is not yet total. Despite this, its growth is so significant that it must be considered a new paradigm emerging from the deep roots of history. This new economic paradigm is unique to metamodernity and should not be thought of as something separate from it. For it ends up negating both modernity and postmodernity, overcoming both at the same time.

Chapter 6: Finding the point of metamodern context [context]

The strong waves of history are capable of polishing even the hardest of stones. Postmodern concepts are now hanging by such a thread that it seems they will finally give way at the slightest breath. All the pillars that supported postmodernity have already been torn down. All except the pillars of pleasure and life. But are these two pillars? Or is it just one pillar? The only thing that seems to keep postmodernity afloat now, it seems, is the addiction to pleasure. Like a shot of heroin, it is now a necessity for postmodernity, rather than a supporting pathos.

But things do not end until their time has come. The only thing that can effectively bring postmodernity to an end is a new point of context that possesses the same amount of force as the atomic bomb. Only then can the last pillar of pleasure and life be brought down. Otherwise, the point of context that the bomb represented would overshadow any other that wanted to take its place without being worthy yet, and would keep the pillar intact. This "force" of historical events is not always easily definable. However, in general terms, the level of force of a historical event can be more or less inferred when it is seen. Especially after seeing its subsequent historical consequences.

In order to say that a historical context point has the same "force" as another, it must be able to overcome the fundamental knowledge premise of the past context. Only by equaling and surpassing that knowledge is it capable of completely negating it. Otherwise,

what you have is an incomplete negation. Which would be the same as saying a weak affirmation of the new will. Which is what ended up happening with the 2008 crisis. So, in order to speak of a negation of an era, the most fundamental knowledge of that era must be surpassed by a new element that stands up to that knowledge. In the postmodern case, this would be a negation of life as an absolute.

Regarding the point of context that marks the end of postmodernity and the beginning of metamodernity, there are several possible candidates. One part of philosophy asserts that this point has already occurred, and that it represents the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11. Supposedly, because that event breaks with fragmentary inertia and once again makes room for a universal history with the new integration of Islam into Western history. However, as is already clear here, fragmentation is not really the ultimate foundation of postmodern knowledge. Rather, its foundation is life as an absolute.

The subsequent war that this event caused was a threat to the fundamental premise of life, but it was a small and not very significant threat. Especially after no weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq. In addition to this candidate, there have been a few others. The 2008 crisis and the Covid-19 crisis are also candidates. But as already mentioned, these events represent only an incomplete part of the negation, as the Federal Reserve quickly came to the aid of the economy and "saved" it from total collapse, at least temporarily. These events are therefore also incomplete and did not reach the level required to completely negate postmodernity.

The same is true of the fall of the Berlin Wall. This is probably the least convincing candidate of all. For it did not negate anything about postmodernity. In fact, it turned out to be the opposite. It marked the complete end of Marxist absolutism and the absolute domination of the fragmentary. The same is true of the most recent digitalization. As it is still at the service of postmodernity, it simply reaffirms the fragmentary and, therefore, life as absolute.

The truth of the matter is that this point in the context has not yet been reached. At the time of writing, we are still within the postmodern historical paradigm. However, the fragility of postmodernity is already so evident that it is impossible to continue to regard it as an element that will live forever in history. As has already been highlighted, this postmodernity is being denied and overcome in almost all areas. The modern battlefield and the new economy of technicians are the most important points of argument.

These two spheres of reality become the cornerstone of what would begin the postmodern decline. This decline explicitly means that the next movement, if it wishes to resolve postmodern problems, must necessarily deny the very postmodernity that caused them. And deny it at its core. In this way, metamodernity, if it is to be a stage that transcends history, will have to become a negation of negation. In other words, a negation of postmodernity. This would represent a fulfillment of the requirements of Hegelian dialectical order, which history needs in order to advance, if we look at it from that perspective alone. However, as already mentioned, this Hegelian dialectical order brings its own problems.

But even if we assume that there is no such thing as dialectical order, and we resort to the historical unfolding of will and consciousness, metamodernity would in fact also appear

to be an attempt at negation in the face of postmodernity. This negation is implicitly seen in the trend that has been developing in recent years of postmodernity. The denial of pacifism in relation to modern warfare, the denial of capitalism in the economy, the denial of fragmentation in relation to society, and the denial of the fragmentary in relation to the environmental crisis are explicit representations of a failed empiricism, which is immediately followed by a negating will and consciousness that now thirst for a new object. This denial did not arise immediately, but has been transformed little by little throughout history, with the help of a consciousness that sees the results of its unfolding and begins to partially correct its course.

However, despite the clear intention to deny, this will to deny is still partial. The denial is partial because the necessary historical turning point has not yet occurred, one with sufficient force to kill the premise of life as an absolute, which would be the last remaining one. The point of context is still incomplete for now. Despite this, the emergence of this point of context is already so close to today that it is extremely easy to predict. For consciousness, endings do not appear as something surprising, but as an obvious consequence that has been coming for a long time. We will now proceed to make a prediction regarding the identification of this historical point of context. It will then be possible to understand that this is, in reality, nothing more than a mere condensation of the entire failure of postmodern ideas.

The death of postmodernity must involve its implosion. What is the most forceful way to deny the premise of life as absolute? It is precisely this absolutism of life that will ultimately cause the death of its premise. When that happens, postmodernity will lose the only thing about itself that was not contradictory. It has been said, from the very beginning of this book, that postmodernity always tends to contradict itself. All of its

foundations—fragmentation, pacifism, "freedom," "equality"—all of them always end up contradicting themselves. However, there is one element of postmodernity that never contradicts itself, no matter what the others do. The cornerstone of postmodern knowledge has always been life as an absolute. This premise is always present, never as a contradiction, but always as an affirmation. However, the moment postmodernity finally contradicts itself at its deepest level. At the moment when its attitude toward life is precisely what is destroying life, at that moment, it is already incapable of supporting its own weight. The absolute contradiction in its knowledge ultimately causes it to collapse. For then, knowledge is no longer knowledge, but absolute ignorance, bringing about the death of postmodernity.

And it is important that this death be caused by implosion, that is, by an element that it itself created in the first place. If it is not by implosion, this "denial" will be perceived as an external attack, and will not be immanent to consciousness. This would only cause a momentary rejection. But if it is instead a self-destruction, then consciousness accepts this defeat as valid with much more force. So, in order to speak of an implosion of life as an absolute, we must speak of a catastrophic event that threatens life to such an extent that consciousness has no choice but to question the premise that led it to that point. And that this catastrophe is not caused by some external agent, but is ironically the very product of the path taken to avoid it.

There are several candidates for this catastrophic event. Obviously, a large-scale environmental disaster is always lurking in Hollywood fantasies. However, there seem to be other candidates that could well happen first and have equally catastrophic consequences. For example, an event that could perfectly represent this implosion is the takeover of an important state by a non-state agent created by the state itself. This happens regularly in

Africa, but the few relevant states there do not have sufficient historical importance. However, if this were to happen in an important state, it would be different. This, in fact, almost happened in Russia when the PMC Wagner group nearly took over the city of Moscow and almost dethroned Vladimir Putin. It was Putin's own government that "fed" this group with money, hiring them but also providing them with economic, human, and military resources. This same phenomenon could occur in any important state, anywhere in the world. Who knows, perhaps it will even be a company like Amazon that finally puts an end to US dominance. Any such act would represent a veritable implosion, in which the creations of the states themselves turn against them through a kind of technocratic revolution. This would negate and overcome the postmodernity that is determined to continue living. In that sense, the previous truth would be "killed." This phenomenon could also occur with any other type of confrontation that ends up destroying an important established power. The end of the UN, NATO, or the European Union could also be a trigger. This would largely nullify the premise of fragmentation and life as absolutes. Postmodernity would find itself in this situation, like a black magician who no longer knows how to control the magical beings he has summoned, and who end up controlling him.

The great reset [sub-context]

"Stun me!" cries life. Postmodern life wants to know nothing about death. So it takes refuge in instant gratification and intoxication. The alcoholic no longer wants to be separated from his bottle and now lives practically only for it. He has already given up his family, his dignity, and even his own brain cells. The only thing that gives meaning to his life now is the bottle. Enjoyment then becomes the last pillar supporting the premise of life as absolute.

Beyond it, there is nothing else. And if this enjoyment ever comes to an end, the alcoholic will now have to face withdrawal symptoms. This will cause him enormous internal torture, which will inevitably lead him to curse his addiction. But perhaps also to overcome it.

The overcoming that a non-state agent could well represent is something that could well happen in the near future, and perhaps much sooner than the climate disaster itself. However, there is another candidate that seems even more promising as a candidate for this catastrophe. At the time of writing, we are on the eve of what economists are already calling the "Great Reset."

The Great Reset would be the representation of the final implosion of all the financial debts that have been accumulating since the 1970s. In other words, the accumulation of all the "bailouts" that the US Federal Reserve has carried out since the beginning of postmodernity. The dot-com crisis, the 2008 crisis, and the COVID-19 crisis have all accumulated in the form of gigantic debt and totally irresponsible money printing. All this, added to the enormous problem of the non-productive economy. All of this ends up condensing into a Yellowstone volcano that no longer has room in its caldera and is ready to expel all the burning ash inside it. This debt crisis would almost inevitably end up leading to a global economic depression of totally catastrophic proportions. Probably equal to or worse than the depression of 1930. And this crisis, if it were to occur, would represent the authentic implosion of postmodernity in the economic system. This would finally end postmodern enjoyment and lead to its final culmination.

However, if we look closely, this crisis would not only threaten postmodernity, but also seriously threaten the end of bourgeois rule as such. Capitalism is not expected to end as

soon as this crisis begins, but it is very likely that bourgeois states will begin to lose much of their power and that other agents will begin to take their place. There is no talk of the end of capitalism yet, but if this crisis occurs, we could probably talk about the beginning of the end. For in addition to the crisis, bourgeois domination had already been faltering for some time, especially in terms of its defeats in modern warfare.


Today, the power of states seems to be increasingly irrelevant to ordinary citizens. The absence of formal employment, the worsening health situation, the lack of military relevance of many governments, and the general lack of respect for bourgeois states are being reflected in a growing number of "failed states." In these states, attitudes of inefficiency are quickly replaced by new and much more efficient decentralized non-state agents.

However, despite all this, the end of capitalism as such does not seem to be in sight. Most likely, we will simply move on to a new stage of capitalism, where it will no longer be a consumer economy, but an even more vulgar economy. This would probably be the last stage before the end of capitalism, and it is also likely to be its most repulsive stage. At this point, inequality would have reached such a point that the bourgeoisie would no longer produce anything, but would simply throw crumbs on the ground. And the proletariat would simply pick up the crumbs. Of course, for the "new left," this would not be humiliating, because they love crumbs.

However, there is also a large part of the consciousness that is not part of this "new left" and does not enjoy injustice and humiliation at all. At the onset of the crisis, this consciousness will finally realize that there is a clear structural problem and will awaken from the great illusion that kept it captive. At this point, the stupor that the inauthentic Dasein

used to forget about death finally becomes unsustainable, and now Dasein understands that no one can die for him.

The enjoyment of life is almost completely destroyed by this crisis. For, in terms of poverty and humiliation, there are not many things left to enjoy. The consumerist system of postmodernity has ceased to be a source of enjoyment. And this, at the same time, destroys the trust that was placed in postmodernity as a protector of life. Inequality, together with this loss of trust, will only end up causing a separation between the state and the general population. For the true state is now represented by an extremely small minority of obscenely wealthy individuals. They, in turn, control and constitute the state itself, while the rest of the population is moving in a completely opposite direction. This separation is what economists are calling "the big trench."



This difference only increases year after year, and seems to increase even more dramatically after each economic recession. During the great reset, this inequality will almost

certainly reach cosmic proportions. However, this inequality, which is sometimes interpreted as an even more absolute domination of the bourgeoisie, is not actually the case. All that can be seen here is a separation between the state and its inhabitants; there is no longer any kind of dominant or passive relationship, but simply a distancing.

The YOs then separate and retreat to their desert island, but without touching each other, simply separating. The bourgeoisie, in their extreme wealth, are no longer able to use that money to buy anything truly productive. There is much more money than there is production. This imbalance naturally creates a bubble at all financial levels, which is what we are seeing now. And that financial bubble is precisely one of the determining factors that ends up separating the people from the state.

To give an example of this phenomenon of separation between the bourgeoisie and the people, it seems appropriate to use real estate. The productive value of a house today is practically non-existent, as it is caught up in a financial bubble. Houses are extremely expensive today, not because they are worth much, but because bourgeois speculation keeps them at those prices. But in terms of their productive value, this is no longer there. There are many houses today that stand empty for years. No one uses them, because the price bubble drives rents sky-high, making it impossible for the increasingly weak middle class to pay the monthly bills. But even so, these houses continue to rise in price, despite being productively useless. This is a phenomenon that is occurring all over the world. Perhaps the Argentine case is the most notorious. It is impressive how in a city like Buenos Aires, there are thousands of empty apartments, but they maintain their exorbitant prices. While the poor only have enough capital to hold out for a couple of days, the wealthy bourgeoisie, on the other hand, have decades to spare before they even consider whether or not to lower the prices of their

properties. Even without being productive, these bourgeois are able to remain immobile for decades at these prices.

This phenomenon, rather than representing the dominance of the bourgeoisie, only serves to marginalize the poor. Everyone then separates themselves from the bourgeoisie, leaving them isolated in their bubble, which is no longer part of the real productive economy of the world. The bourgeoisie, in their infinite stupidity, seem to forget that real estate is not a basic human need. It is not something you need to live; it is actually a luxury. If it were a matter of pure necessity for housing, what would end up happening is the mere construction of what in Latin America is usually called "favelas," "villas," "cerros," or poor neighborhoods. These neighborhoods exist in every country in the world, and they always have the same characteristics. These neighborhoods are mostly squatter settlements, meaning that no one paid a penny of their own money to build on that land. Instead, they simply put up a few bricks, sticks, or whatever other materials they could find to build makeshift homes. This example essentially represents the separation between the bourgeois state and the real economy. What once seemed like bourgeois domination of real estate has now become completely useless, no longer a determining factor in economic production. Instead, it has become an isolated element, removed from the economic equation.

The same thing ends up happening with other phenomena occurring in the economic sphere. In addition, all this separation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat ends up generating another interesting phenomenon. All this ends up causing the proletariat to feel less and less respect for the bourgeoisie. And respect, believe it or not, is an extremely important element in a social science such as economics.

The lack of respect and the consequences of this unproductive and unequal economy end up creating a separation between the bourgeois states and the general population. There are many regions today where the state no longer has any influence on the economy. Formal jobs no longer exist in these regions; instead, informality and "every man for himself" reign supreme. The state is increasingly losing power over the population, and money, which for a long time had been the only motivation for the population to remain close to the state, is no longer as abundant as it once was. This creates instant rejection of the state and ends up marginalizing the bourgeoisie within the bubble it has created for itself. Today's Venezuela is a clear example of this.

Added to all this loss of power by the state is an even greater threat, which would be the rise of the new technocracy, which would be the beginning of the end of state capitalism. No matter how hard the bourgeoisie tries to cling to life with all its might, it is unable to stop history. In the end, history always ends up testing everything that once considered itself immortal, proving it wrong. The consumerist system of postmodernity, as we know it, is about to change completely. And that change is taking place at the very point in time that marks the end of postmodernity and the beginning of a new metamodernity. This point in time is what we will reflect on shortly.

What does the metamodern context mean? [sub-context]

All the reflection on events that has taken place previously can lead anyone to begin to question postmodern knowledge. Today, history finds itself in a turbulent storm of contradiction. Confusion abounds, and postmodern ideas seem to be slowly melting away as

if they were glaciers thawing. Slowly but surely. Changes are taking place in all spheres of reality. This naturally frightens the weakened postmodernity, causing it to cling desperately to its throne. Postmodern man clings to life as Paris clings to Hector's feet. This attitude becomes unsustainable under its own weight, ultimately causing postmodern life to implode.

This great failure of postmodernity in historical experience ends up generating a new point of context. This point of context is the great catastrophe that breaks with the premise of life and gives way to a new premise. And of all the possible candidates for this historical turning point, the great reset seems to be the most immediate of all. This point of context does not necessarily represent the end of capitalism. But it does represent the end of postmodernism and the beginning of metamodernism.

Due to the nature of this historical context, the new metamodernity must adhere to negation with respect to its predecessors. For it must "emanate" both from its sentiment and from that fundamental point of context. And what that point of context demands of metamodernity is that it must become a negation of postmodernity. But not only of postmodernity, but in many ways, it must also become a negation of modernity and of the entire bourgeois system of production in general. For although this metamodernity is not yet outside what we might call capitalism, it is becoming the beginning of its end.

So, first and foremost, metamodernity must deny postmodernity at its core. And how does it deny life? The answer seems obvious at this point. Metamodernity, as a foundation, must have death as its core principle. This concept of death must always be present in metamodern knowledge. Of course, there are topics that could be even more interesting than this one, such as epistemology, being, and language. However, given the demands of the

historical context, it is necessary to focus on developing knowledge about death before anything else. The problems that history presents must be satisfied by metamodernity. In the same way that a woman must be satisfied, almost as a moral obligation, when she deserves it.

But before entering into the subject of death itself, it is important to emphasize something important. That is, "the reason for denial." Why must metamodernity become a denial in the first place? This question, which seems obvious at this point, still requires a proper explanation. When we talk about philosophy as a science, it must try to justify every card it puts on the table. The fact of having to deny the postmodern premise in the first instance ends up being a necessity for the being of metamodernity. This metamodernity cannot exist unless it denies.

The origin of this need for denial lies in several elements. The first element that can be taken into consideration is the need for a dialectical order of history. Dialectics from the Hegelian point of view, of course. Where affirmation, the knowledge of modernity, is denied by the negation of affirmation, postmodernity. Therefore, to continue this same dialectical order, metamodernity should be the negation of negation, that is, the negation of postmodernity. Only by being the negation of negation can history move forward. And unless the bourgeoisie has bought a time machine, this history must always move forward. This is how metamodernity ends up being the dialectical synthesis (sublation, *aufheben*) referred to as the third moment in Hegelian dialectics. Therefore, by dialectical necessity, it would have to be a negation.

However, this dialectical perspective on history brings its own problems. For, as has already been explained, postmodernity is not necessarily a negation of modernity. Its main

premise is not fragmentation, but life. Was modernity alien to life? It seems that rather than a negation, it is more of an affirmation of life, but from another angle. In addition to this, it is well known that within postmodernity, the same bourgeois domination that existed in modernity is still present. Furthermore, the same aspiration for freedom that existed in modernity is also present. The only difference is that this aspiration is now much more evolved, but also more contested.

Furthermore, there are other problems with this dialectical order. One of them concerns the contemporary era. What happens to it? Is it left out of the equation? It is assumed that after the modern affirmation, a negation should follow, right? But the contemporary era does not deny modernity; on the contrary. It ends up basing itself on Hegel and the new capitalist system to give way to its development. This entire dialectical order is problematic not only for this reason, but for many others that cannot be fully explained here. Suffice it to say that the possibility of a dialectical order in history is highly doubtful from the perspective of metamodern consciousness. Therefore, it is not very convincing in terms of providing metamodernity with its negating foundation.

Therefore, in view of all these doubts raised by the dialectical order, it seems more appropriate to stick to a perspective that is much more latent in the new blood. It seems that will, together with consciousness, are the two primordial forces that drive history forward. The two beasts work together to dethrone the established order and rise as the two new queens of reality. It is this science of scarcity that drives the two beasts to overcome themselves. For one can only desire what one does not have, and when one has it, then that "something" no longer serves as a desire. Satisfied desire must be preserved, but it must also increase. It cannot remain still, but must always continue to conquer. Therefore, this desire is

directed only toward what has not yet been conquered. Because of this, these two beasts cannot throw themselves at any object in front of them. Instead, they must find an object of desire that has not yet been satisfied; this search is precisely the work of consciousness.

And in order to find this new object, it turns to the historical context that presents itself as a database. How could these beasts dethrone something? If they don't even know where the throne is? Or who is sitting on it...

Consciousness then seeks a new object to conquer, and the will conquers. And in this search, consciousness realizes a decisive truth. It realizes, at the very end of postmodernity, that its beloved will is in prison. The very tools that were intended to free it now hold it captive in a degrading stagnant pool. This will is then trapped by life, which immobilizes it and prevents it from desiring. Consciousness finally realizes that "life" is not the object that the will truly desires. Life as an end in itself then comes to an end as a premise. For metamodern consciousness, it is then unfeasible to simply live for the sake of living.

Consciousness is then obliged, in order to liberate the will, to find an alternative to the object of desire. This object must be something that simultaneously frees the will from its stagnation and represents a new conquest. Death, then, appears on a silver platter for the fulfillment of these two purposes. For as far as liberation from life is concerned, there is nothing more appropriate than liberating it with death.

Furthermore, death represents something even more important for desire. It represents a fresh object, one that has not yet been conquered. Throughout philosophy, the subject of death has never been addressed in its entirety, not even in its most "historical" spheres. The

subject of life has already been forcefully clarified in the past. Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Camus. Postmodernity, in addition, would reinforce these theories with life as an absolute. Life has already been conquered ad nauseam. And what remains now is the conquest of death.

Furthermore, death also represents a very interesting element for improving the situation of ideas. Since it ends up creating a dualism between life and death, it ultimately allows for the generation of a fair "metaxis" between these two elements. It is called a "fair" metaxis because throughout philosophy, the balance had always ended up tilting more to one side, as was the case with the mustachioed man, for example. This metaxis must now be balanced. That balance is one of the true missions of metamodernity. And, as far as possible, to manifest a third element that ends up being the synthesis of the previous two. Thus achieving a higher knowledge of these two opposites.

In addition, there is another reason why death should be the object of desire. This may have been mentioned before, but it is worth exploring further. Throughout the entire bourgeois capitalist system, freedom has always been a common aspiration. Beyond all the differences between totality and fragmentation, or between life and death; beyond all these differences, freedom always seems to have been a fundamental object of desire. And it still is, because even after the postmodern failure, it is still an object of desire, because it has not yet been fully conquered.

Of course, postmodernity, with its liberation from the fragmentary matrix, was also unable to achieve authentic freedom. Therefore, this task would still remain pending as far as

metamodernity is concerned. Metamodernity must therefore make every effort to achieve this absolute freedom.

This task must be central to metamodernity. Perhaps it should be even more central than it was for postmodernity. For, as has been argued throughout this chapter, the rule of the bourgeoisie is in the twilight of its life. Therefore, if metamodernity truly desires to achieve this authentic freedom, it must hurry. For if it does not find it as soon as possible, in the last breaths of capitalism, it will leave behind a permanent legacy of surrender. Death seems to be a good candidate for this final attempt. In fact, it is perhaps no coincidence that this last attempt is the definitive one.

To conclude this chapter, we have chosen to provide a brief summary of the entire historical development of postmodernity and the entire journey that inevitably led to the beginning of the metamodern era. The topics to be reviewed represent changes in warfare, failed social movements, politics, and economics.

First, the new paradigm of the current battlefield creates conditions in which the use of weapons of mass destruction is unlikely. This weakens the postmodern premise of pacifism as a way of preserving life. In fact, it becomes the opposite. It seems that the economy derived from war and crime represents a new form of sustenance for the new era of economic decline. This is true both economically and in terms of historical development. This factor not only nullifies postmodern pacifism, but also nullifies the rejection of totality. There is no longer any need to give a fragmentary meaning to conflicts, given the obsolescence of nuclear weapons. This weakens the pillar of fragmentation, but ends up almost completely destroying the postmodern pillar of pacifism.

Added to this failure of pacifism is the failure of fragmentation in society. This is especially true of deconstructive theories, which have broken down entire spheres of human relations, leading them toward a "non-productive" narcissism. In the last five years, these theories have begun to be rejected by proto-modernity. This rejection is still timid, but it is present and constant. This constancy inevitably leads to a decline in postmodern fragmentation in society, further weakening the postmodern pillar of fragmentation.

This pillar of fragmentation will ultimately be completely torn down by the environmental challenge. The environmental crisis, a product of consumerism and postmodern enjoyment, leads to a decisive crossroads where it is necessary to abandon once and for all the fragmentary conception of reality. For this fragmentation ultimately leads to the inevitable destruction of life. And as is already clear, life is the true foundation of postmodernity, not fragmentation. Therefore, one must be sacrificed for the other. This problem leads to the rejection of fragmentary ideas and to the retention of life alone as the last resort. This puts an end to the fragmentary pillar, leaving only the pillar of life as absolute.

This last pillar would finally be brought down by a great catastrophe. This great catastrophe could take different forms. However, one of the conditions for it to be considered a paradigm shift is that it must be an implosion of postmodernity. The most likely candidate for this is the "Great Reset." The economic crisis that finally brings down the already weakened pillar of the enjoyment of life. And this pillar, being directly related to that of life as an absolute, causes the latter to also be brought down. Then the crisis will come to knock down the last two pillars of postmodernism, enjoyment and life, which will be swept away by

the strong waves of history. This will bring about the end of what is usually called postmodernism.

The point of context that initiates metamodernity would then be the almost inevitable "Great Reset." An event of such magnitude that it will end up changing the economic system for the worse. Much worse. Over the course of a couple of months, this catastrophe will finally wipe out what little enjoyment remains, and in a couple more years, it will destroy the trust that had been placed in postmodernity as a protector of life. Thus ending its will and giving way to a new will.

In view of this new stage in history, consciousness must change its way of seeing reality. It can no longer be based on life as an absolute, for that would now represent a total contradiction. Consciousness, therefore, changes its object of knowledge. Now it is death and metaxis that are the objects to which metamodern knowledge is directed. And negation is its intentionality.

On the other hand, life also poses a problem for historical progress, as it ends up becoming a prison for the will. This phenomenon ultimately nullifies the longed-for freedom to which the capitalist paradigm has always aspired. In view of this, consciousness finds itself compelled to deny life. And it denies it with death.

This death not only becomes necessary to make a new attempt to achieve authentic freedom, but also becomes necessary in terms of the metaxis of knowledge that history requires. The metaxis between life and death, and metaxis in general, become essential elements for the renewed knowledge of metamodern philosophies.

Metamodernity, then, requires the negation of postmodernity in its entirety in order to exist. Seen from a dialectical point of view, it demands negation. Seen from the point of view of will and consciousness, it also demands negation. Seen from the emotional point of view of the earth, it also demands negation. Everyone wants postmodernity dead. Perhaps deep down, it wants it more than anyone else.

On the other hand, the end of capitalism is a much more complex issue than the postmodern problem. For a negation of capitalism requires a much stronger point of context than that which gave rise to metamodernity. This metamodernity can then be considered as another continuation of capitalism. But it can also be considered as the last of the capitalist phases. As the beginning of its end, for this metamodernity also represents the beginning of the negation of the bourgeoisie.

But as for postmodernity, it is definitively negated by metamodernity. Without this negation, it is not even possible to speak of authentic metamodernity. If it is not negated, the past truths of postmodernity will keep it forever dragging its chains.

Metamodernity must therefore free itself from these chains. And this attempt at liberation must be a priority for metamodernity. For this could well be the last attempt of all, given the decline of the bourgeois era and the rise of the new technocracy. Although perhaps it is no coincidence that it is precisely at the end of bourgeois rule that knowledge of absolute freedom finally emerges.

Chapter 7: Future prediction about metamodernity [context]

On the canvas of history, the future unfolds in the form of the next fabric emanating from the separating weave, symbolizing its evolution. This new fabric, despite being stained by experience, brings with it a renewed air of liberation. Philosophy, in its task of exploring the frontiers of thought, faces a horizon full of possibilities and mysteries. The future, that vast territory of dreams and challenges, always invites reflection on the nature of change, uncertainty, and the ability to shape the course of history. At the intersection of free will and cosmic forces, the emergence of new knowledge can be contemplated with wonder and curiosity. The future represents not only the inertia of the course that the days to come will follow, but also the possibility of being part of that transformation.

Although a breath of fresh air can generate enthusiasm, the future is always a complicated vision to perceive. For this reason, it should be clarified from the outset that this is not a mere analysis of the past, but a prediction of the future. Therefore, this will be done with the utmost caution, taking only the most general aspects of this prediction into account. At first glance, one might think that it is impossible to predict the future of history. And indeed, it is impossible, at least as far as we know, to make an accurate prediction. But while history does not repeat itself entirely, it does seem to follow certain patterns. History does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme.

The patterns of the past can provide a reliable guide for understanding future trends. Through previous historical patterns in terms of context, Hegelian dialectical theories, theories of the desire of the will, and new theories of the metamodern, it is possible, at least in general terms, to shape what metamodernity as a historical process might look like.

Perhaps we cannot yet provide answers to the problems of metamodernity, but we can begin to ask the right questions.

There are several such questions, but since this study focuses only on pointing out the most fundamental elements, it will limit itself for now to simply pointing out four issues. Death, of course, represents the most fundamental question that metamodernity must ask itself. But in addition to this, there is also the meaning of metaxis itself. And above all, this metaxis must involve an awareness of this duality of opposites. Especially between the duality of life and death, but also between the duality of totality and fragmentation. And in addition to all this metaxis, there is also the issue of authentic freedom, which has been dragging its chains for a long time and finally requires a concrete answer. Therefore, the fundamental questions of metamodernity would be these four. Death as absolute, the metaxis of life and death, the metaxis between the fragmentary and the total, and absolute freedom.

The future, then, holds freedom, but it also holds responsibility. For despite metamodernity's potential to create new knowledge, it must also abide by what its historical context represents. This new fabric of history must first fit into the contextual fabric, and only then can it unfold into the future. And that is precisely the great challenge of the metamodern: having to construct its reality from the ruins of the previous movement. For this previous movement, in its end, represents the creation of a picture of possible extinction. Which could well be even worse than the picture of extinction represented by the nuclear bomb.

The future at the conceptual level [sub-context]

When talking about the future in the current historical context, pessimism tends to be the order of the day. Even in the one-sidedness of current thinking, people tend to agree that tomorrow is bleak. And why wouldn't it be? History presents itself with enormous challenges. Problems that could only be solved by an enormous amount of energy on the part of humankind. But this man is sad, unmotivated, and lacking in energy. The new blood, in addition to not having the right tools to face these challenges, lacks something even more important. There are many people today who lack almost all self-esteem. The new blood does not love itself. How can we talk about a strong will when this will does not love itself?

This lack of self-esteem is one of the main reasons why the future looks so bleak. All problems could actually be overcome if one set one's mind to it. But if the necessary will to face these challenges does not exist, thanks to a lack of self-esteem, the struggle then becomes impossible. And the decline of the future becomes inevitable.

As for the future itself, there are usually two schools of thought that dominate the conversation. The first school of thought speaks of a future similar to that of George Orwell in his book "1984." One where all spheres of reality are monitored and controlled by a central state entity, down to the smallest detail. Making this central entity seem more like an evil God than anything else. Something similar to what we see today in China, but in a much more drastic and evil way. In this future, a tiny minority has all the power and wealth, while the vast majority of the population lives in abject poverty, but without ever rebelling. That is the first future, which is the candidate of this first trend.

On the other hand, there is a second trend, which, unlike the first, predicts a totally chaotic future. A kind of pre-apocalyptic scene where civilization begins to crumble in a

spiral of poverty, disease, senseless conflict, and above all, fragmentation of power, to the point of returning to a kind of new medieval era.

As you can see, both futures have strong dystopian connotations. And it is true that, at this point in history, we can no longer speak of false expectations. Technological developments do not seem at all sufficient to solve the problems posed by the social, political, and economic crisis. And no matter how much we try to see a new space race on the horizon, all we can see is decline.

Furthermore, it is clear that metamodernity finds its context in a catastrophe. Catastrophe, which in the most likely case will be the Great Reset. But whatever it is, it will definitely be like a bucket of cold water for the consciousness. For it will come unexpectedly and bring problems for which consciousness is unprepared. As already mentioned at the beginning, narcissistic tools are only useful in a narcissistic era. But when the rules of the game suddenly change, it is a big problem to find oneself immersed in a chaotic situation without the right tools to face the new challenge. This lack of preparation could well exacerbate the catastrophe, leading to a dark period in history that ends up converging on a pessimistic view of it.

In this sense, once the historical context has been established, metamodernity would then first find itself in a kind of emotional limbo. After the cold shower, it does not really know what to do. In other words, it does not yet possess the knowledge to which it can refer. All the knowledge it possesses has to do with life, with the philosophies of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. In addition to the fragmentary philosophies of postmodernity, which are completely obsolete in the face of this new bucket of cold water.

Therefore, metamodernity is left in a kind of limbo of indecision. It does not know what to do, but it does know that it has to do something. The coldness caused by the bucket is still present, but only as a feeling, not as knowledge. The metamodern will must therefore turn to consciousness for guidance. In such troubled historical periods, philosophy always becomes necessary again. Even Hegel would affirm this. Therefore, the fact that we have to philosophize deeply is not always good news.

Philosophy becomes relevant to history once again. However, consciousness cannot take impulsive action, as the will does. This consciousness must take its time to analyze and reflect. Only then can a response be given without falling into the error of hastiness. Therefore, this time in which consciousness takes to realize its reality is precisely the "limbo" that will manifest itself immediately upon the onset of metamodernity.

This will happen in the same way that postmodern knowledge was preceded by a kind of limbo, which was pure nuclear terror of extinction. However, as we already know, postmodernity quickly freed itself from this feeling and set out to rapidly create its knowledge, given the immediacy of its problems. Perhaps this will not be the case for metamodernity. The problems that arise in metamodernity are much deeper than those faced by postmodernity. These problems do not simply involve a simplistic negation, as was the case with postmodernity, but now involve a necessary metaxis. Metaxis is always more complicated than the simplistic negation of something. It also requires the production of its own knowledge, since theories of death are still largely non-existent. For all these reasons, it is likely that the metamodern limbo will last much longer than the postmodern limbo did.

Metamodernity thus begins its history in a storm of contradiction. It is told that it must "fight for life," but what is life today? Metamodern consciousness understands that it is not life that the will really desires. What it desires is something else. But what is that something else? Death? Being? Itself? In one way or another, it seems that the answer to this question involves a revolution of ideas. And this revolution cannot happen overnight.

If metamodernity wants to be, it has to deny. If it does not deny, then it is not, and what it is is still postmodernity. And to deny life, it must deny death. Only then can it see beyond both. But this is no easy task; it involves a clear unfolding of consciousness to levels that we could even call metaphysical.

Thanks to all these complications, it is highly likely that the beginning of the postmodern era will involve very turbulent historical periods. This period requires at least some general prediction. From here on, we will seek to make a more detailed prediction of what metamodern history as such will be like. We will leave aside for now the more conceptual issues in order to engage with history on a much more substantial level. However, it should be made clear that what we are talking about here is an almost purely speculative prediction of history. We will no longer be talking about general philosophical concepts, but rather about specific historical events. Therefore, we ask the reader to understand that these predictions may not be entirely accurate, as they may differ somewhat from reality.

The future on a more "material" level [sub-context]

The day of reckoning has finally arrived. The economy is collapsing, and the entire planet is heading straight for disaster. The "Great Reset" hits the global economy with an iron rod. Companies begin to go bankrupt, and unemployment rises worldwide. GDPs contract, and society begins to survive on humiliating crumbs, more than anything else. Toxic positivity finally gives way to total negativity. The economic depression deepens and seems to be here to stay.

Certainly, the impact of all the accumulated debt will be such that it will change the economic system forever. For this economy, being a non-productive economy, is not accustomed to functioning without this systematic absence of debt. The drug addict has finally had his drug taken away, and in his withdrawal symptoms, he begins to convulse on the floor. All these events ultimately put an end to the faith that had been placed in postmodernity. But the faith that had been placed in bourgeois capitalist states is also beginning to be questioned.

Added to this decline in faith in the theories of the past is the practical decline of the issue itself. The growing inability of states to meet the challenges posed by new decentralized powers becomes increasingly apparent after the crisis. These new decentralized powers, such as megacorporations, mega-wealthy individuals, organized crime, mercenary armies, and paramilitary groups, are gradually taking power. The increasingly weak states have proven unable to be the providers they claim to be. They are incapable of offering protection, incapable of offering employment, and incapable of offering a purpose in life. All they know how to do is collect taxes indiscriminately, which does not set them apart from the criminal groups they claim to fight. States are gradually being replaced in the equation; once respect is lost, there is nothing left to contain the decline.

Added to this is the lack of relevance of capital in this new era. The bourgeoisie no longer has the same power as before; it is still present, but much more concentrated in the hands of a few. Although this phenomenon may seem to be an advantage at first glance, it becomes a disadvantage for capitalism. It ends up causing a separation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Where inequality is such that now neither recognizes the other as their master or slave, but rather sees each other as unnecessary. This diminishes confidence in the currency, which is concentrated in a few hands, and does not provide recognition of otherness as truth. In addition, a large part of the population is beginning to feel much less respect for the bourgeoisie.

All these changes end up becoming the perfect storm, which inevitably leads us into a period of profound transition. The decentralization of power, guerrilla warfare, lack of resources, crime, new technologies, and overpopulation are all elements of this era. If we add to all this, as the icing on the cake, the issue of narcissism that still lingered in metamodernity due to its postmodern origins, it is likely that instead of a future like George Orwell's 1984, what we will get is a future with a fragmentation of power. Where everyone competes with each other, where each competitor assumes that they are "the chosen one" and that their truth is the ultimate truth. All this, rather than leading to total state control, as in China, ends up leading to a kind of medieval era, which many are already culturally referring to as "Cyberpunk." ⁴⁴

⁴⁴ The term "cyberpunk" began as simply the name of an artistic movement. However, due to the historical context, it ended up becoming a popular cultural phenomenon in this new historical period. Of course, it is not a name that has the seriousness and precision required to be used as the name of a new historical era. Despite this, it is a popular way of associating the whole new reality. And in the absence of a better name, the term is therefore used here.

That is the ultimate legacy of postmodern fragmentation. In the same way that modern ideas ended in the nuclear bomb, postmodern ideas end in the Cyberpunk era. Contrary to predictions of a "1984" type future, this phenomenon is closer to reality. A medieval era is much more likely as a result, thanks to how fragmented the previous will already was. A previous world where hyper-individualistic narcissism seemed to be the norm. And where states, instead of updating their strategies, continue to insist on the same obsolete strategies, which are extremely inefficient in the face of new technocratic agents.

In this new medieval era, unlike the previous one, Christianity will no longer be the narrative. Ideology will most likely take the place that religion once held in the past medieval era. Many believe that this ideology will be provided by social media, becoming the new inquisition of the Cyberpunk era. But that does not seem to be the case. We have commented that once consciousness and will decide, there is nothing and no one that can change their minds. An ideology imposed by social media that is not in line with metamodern consciousness is automatically rejected. The only thing this would cause is for consciousness to abandon social media, in the same way that the separation between the state and the people occurs on an economic level.

Social media will have to submit to the will of the people. Furthermore, it must be remembered that this new ideology imposed by social media now has more competition. Now there is a new philosophical proposal, new non-state actors, and general disorder. Furthermore, we must also consider the coming dominance of Islam as the most popular religion on the globe. According to the latest figures, the increase in conversions seems unstoppable. This is something to consider, because of all the major religions, this seems to be the only one capable of continuing to exist as a purely ideological entity.

Therefore, rather than a central ideology, what seems to exist is a struggle between different ideologies. The only difference is that in this struggle, there no longer seems to be an isolation of the selves in their little bubbles, but rather, as dictated by the nature of the will, it seeks to impose itself and conquer other selves. The element of war is once again becoming highly relevant. In the same way that feudal lords and kings of the medieval era fought each other to dominate more territories, what this new medieval era dictates is not the appropriation of territories, but of the wills of the "I's." In addition, the economy of war could well come to be seen as the only way to solve the economic problem, both by non-state actors and by state actors. We must not forget that it was World War II that brought an end to the Great Depression of 1930.

With regard to social order, at first, everything will be in total chaos. Due to the emotional limbo, neither the will nor the consciousness will know in which direction to direct their efforts. It will probably be similar to what happened with the Venezuelan crisis of 2013, at the height of its misery. Crime and hunger manifested themselves in a totally chaotic manner, without any particular order. This will be total chaos, where narcissism will abound and there will be no clear direction for as long as this limbo lasts. However, after some time has passed and many disappointments have been experienced, the will will understand its condition and turn to consciousness, which will begin to create new knowledge out of this need. The only problem is that this limbo can become so destructive that it ends up becoming a scenario of possible extinction before the new knowledge actually arrives. In that sense, the metamodern future really hangs by a thread.

So what would happen if consciousness, instead of denying postmodernity, reaffirmed it? Or what would happen if this negating knowledge never arrived in time? And what we have as a tool are the same postmodern concepts that caused this crisis in the first place. What would happen in that case? If that were to happen, what we would definitely get is total extinction.

If we do not move from fragmentation to decentralization, if we do not begin to fight for death and continue to fight for life, then there will be no negation of the previous era. Then we will continue to insist on pacifism, we will continue to insist on isolating narcissism, and we will continue to insist on the domination of the bourgeoisie, which already represents an obstacle to production today. All this reaffirmation of obsolete ideas will create a picture of definitive extinction.

The picture of possible extinction [sub-context]

This picture of possible extinction is somewhat complicated to explain. Perhaps the best way to illustrate it is through an example. To do so, we need to look at a rather curious experiment. It starts out as a simple scientific thesis, but ends up almost becoming a documentary about today's society. The "Universe 25" experiment perfectly represents what the future of the species would be if we continue to insist on the obsolete theories of postmodernity.

This experiment consists of a rodent shelter, where each rodent has been carefully selected for being healthy and strong. These rodents are placed in a "rodent paradise," where

all their basic needs are instantly met, and where they can mate and live comfortably. This paradise is a box measuring a couple of square meters, which may seem small to humans, but is quite spacious for rodents. The rodents then begin to live in paradise. In this land of milk and honey, there is no hunger or disease, and they can reproduce freely. The appropriate number of females have been placed with them.

So the rodents begin to reproduce. And they live happily for some time. However, as time goes by, things start to go wrong. The rodents have no reason to live, nothing to conquer. They have no need to search for food, because everything is served to them on a silver platter. They have no natural enemies, because they are in a paradise of safety. They cannot conquer new territories, because they are inside the box. All they can do is live and continue living through their offspring. The only thing mice can do is continue to reproduce.

As the population grows, the attitude of the rodents begins to change. This paradise begins to turn into an abomination. All the rodents do is wait for their mealtime. With no clear goal of conquest, and simply dedicated to living for the sake of living and reproducing for the sake of reproducing, they become empty beings. They cannot leave the confinement of the box in which the experiment takes place, so they have no new lands to explore or conquer. The spirit of expansion is non-existent in such a situation. But there is also no change in the spirit of the rodents, because by simply receiving food in their mouths, they are not compelled to evolve in any way and confine themselves to inactivity and immobility. Eternal life, eternal return, the wheel of samsara.

That is where the decline begins... The mice start to stop socializing with the other rodents and begin to show aggressive behavior towards each other, to the point that the scientist who created the experiment, John B. Calhoun, defined it as "behavioral drainage."

The mice begin to reproduce less and kill each other for no real reason. The females abandon their young or eat them. The males, seeing that they are increasingly rejected by the females, begin to exhibit homosexual behavior or kill each other. Fights become more common, and desperation takes hold of the rodents. The population then begins to decline dramatically after a few days, culminating in the total extinction of all rodents.

The most curious thing is that the result of this experiment does not seem to be simply due to overpopulation in the rodent area. Even at the height of the population, there was still room for further growth. Furthermore, the last rodents left alive at the end, after the catastrophe, could well have tried to rebuild the population again. Given that there was no longer any overpopulation of any kind. However, they did not do so. Even Calhoun finally decided to introduce several new rodents, which had not witnessed the entire catastrophe, to reproduce with the few that remained. However, the attitude of the old rodents spread to the new ones, and they did not reproduce either.

Thanks to this, Calhoun deduced that extinction actually occurs in two stages. First, the spirit dies out, and then the body dies out. Since the mice, by simply living for the sake of living, had given up their creative spirit, they no longer had any reason to live. And since life is not what they truly desire, it ends up dying out as a result. ⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Calhoun, John B. "Death squared: the explosive growth and demise of a mouse population." (1973): 80-88.

This experiment has sometimes been called sensationalist. It concludes that human beings are very different from rodents and would never fall into such behavioral decline. However, history seems to have shown countless times that humans are not really very different from animals. For despite possessing a higher level of consciousness than animals, humans still possess and are dominated by the same basic instincts that dominate animals. Man is therefore no stranger to this instinct. In fact, it may well be that this instinct is even greater than in animals themselves. Mass psychology clearly reflects this truth in human behavior.

So can this future lead to ultimate extinction? Of course it can. If one insists on postmodern theories, this kind of future seems almost inevitable. But even if one does not insist on postmodern theories, the possibility of extinction is always there. Death, after all, is the queen of possibilities. Perhaps what the future really holds, in either case, is definitive extinction. Perhaps that is in fact the true meaning of the philosophy of death. Perhaps that is the only option, regardless of the path taken. If we continue to resort to postmodernity, it is extinction. If we resort to metamodernity, it may also be extinction. And if nothing is done, it is also extinction. For the damage at the social level could well already be so great that there is no possibility of return. After all, death comes to us all someday. The human species is no stranger to this...

The only sad thing about that is having to die in such a stupid and vulgar way as in universe 25. The Aryan man deserves, at the very least, a more glorious end than his work. Dying like a rat, crying in some corner, seems to be disrespectful to the efforts of our ancestors. Even when dying, one must know how to die well. That, in fact, is one of the greatest lessons Socrates left to philosophy.

And as terrible as the idea of extinction may seem to humans, we must also recognize that this is not really the end of the story. For when one species becomes extinct, another immediately takes its place in the food chain. If humans prove unworthy of life, another species will replace them, just as happened with the dinosaurs.

The only thing the author of this book hopes is that cats will now take over as the dominant species on the planet. They are much prettier than humans, and they will fill the world with their gentleness. Many people don't know this, but the small and seemingly harmless black-footed cat is one of the most deadly and efficient hunters on the planet. It is much more lethal than the tiger, lion, or leopard. It is definitely at the top of the food chain. Cats are likely to take over as the new dominant species on the planet. In addition, domestic cats, their cousins, have already learned more or less the concept of language, thanks to their closeness to humans. And this is important, because language seems to be the only difference between humans and common animals.

Conclusions [context]

It seems that philosophy never tires of itself. Despite its constant stumbles and the countless obstacles it faces, it is always willing to try again. In fact, that is perhaps what makes a philosopher a philosopher. Where others claim to have already found the truth and remain immobile, the philosopher is always willing to search for more. The philosopher is not someone with a higher IQ, nor is he a more evolved soul. He is simply someone who continues where others stop. Philosophy, as a science, is precisely that: an unattainable desire to find a horizon that is always receding. And what motivates it is not the horizon itself, but the simple act of walking toward it.

Philosophy is always renewing itself through the ages. Even with all the pain that this may entail. Leaving things behind, things that once constituted man, can be as painful as the death of a family member. Death almost always hurts more for those left behind than for those who have died. However, death, in one form or another, must happen. Philosophy, even in spite of that pain, is able to see through its own disappointment and face tomorrow with a willing heart. And it does so even when that tomorrow seems to be full of discord.

If death is truly the future, philosophy must enter into it without hesitation. As the great Socrates demonstrated when he prepared to drink his hemlock in silence while his disciples wept for him.⁴⁶ He immediately corrected them and asked them to stop crying. Then he began his speech on the immortality of the soul and declared that a noble man must face his own death in silence. And never use death as an excuse to forget the principles he held in

⁴⁶ This refers to the death of Socrates in an Athens prison after being sentenced to death by the judges of the polis.

life. As he does when he remembers that "a cock is owed to Asclepius."⁴⁷ . The metamodern man must aspire to die in the same way as Socrates, without ever denying it, no matter how painful it may be.

In the end, the only thing certain in history is change. No matter how strongly a philosophy wants to cling to an object, in the end, the strong waves of history always end up overcoming all repetitive inertia. Whether by good means or by bad, they always end up yielding to the changing reality. The philosopher's job, then, is not to declare the end of history, but quite the opposite. Their job is to offer a temporary service aimed at improving the circumstances of their own bloodline within the historical context in which it finds itself. And preferably, to offer a path forward that goes beyond their philosophy, in order to make things easier for those who come after them.

The historical context in which the philosopher finds himself is precisely the reality to which he must adhere. Philosophy is not something alien to history; on the contrary, philosophy is, in reality, history. Knowledge can never be gained instantly, but only through a long and arduous journey. A journey full of thorns, ruptures, and disappointments, where all the mistakes that are made are not vain errors, but necessary mistakes that always end up bringing us closer to the truth.

The new philosophy that is being developed here, metamodern philosophy, is of course not free from errors. It will make many mistakes along the way, just like all those that preceded it. This is inevitable. But there is one thing that can be avoided. Not stumbling twice

⁴⁷ This is commonly attributed to Socrates as his last words before his death in prison in Athens.

over the same stone, learning from the mistakes of its predecessors, is a necessity for renewed philosophy. Therefore, it must finally renounce that vain desire to escape the matrix. But it must also forget to think that it is not biased, as was the case with the moderns. It must understand that bias, rather than a problem, is an opportunity. And that all its philosophy owes its nature to the historical context from which it comes. This context is not a pure reality floating somewhere sacred. Rather, it is something very real, the most earthly and palpable thing of all. It is the history that always determines man, but which is also determined by him. For while this historical basis is the beginning of his story, it is not necessarily the same place where it will end. For reality is not repetitive, but creative; changing, thanks to death.

And both the context and the metamodern sentiment point in only one direction. Metamodernity has no choice but to become a negation of postmodernity. The entire universe cries out for this negation; the whole world desires the death of postmodernity. Metamodernity must satisfy this desire that history demands. Negation becomes necessary for the advancement of history and for the existence of the metamodern. But this negation must not be partial, as some proto-metamodern elements timidly propose. Rather, it must be total, denying the very foundation of what postmodernity is.

The foundation of life as an absolute becomes obsolete. For consciousness finally realizes that it is not life that man really wants. Schopenhauer's concepts of the "will to live" become totally obsolete for metamodernity. Life is definitely a lofty object, but it is not what the will really desires. Now, in the twilight of postmodernity, we can see how contradictory this obsession with life is. It no longer seems to have the same shine it once had, and it is beginning to be questioned as an object of desire. Life is great, but metamodernity realizes that death is even greater than life.

In addition to the philosophy of death, the challenges of metamodernity go far beyond that. Metaxis becomes key to the development of metamodern knowledge. The eternal duality that ends up colliding at the heart of metamodernity reveals the need to clarify what dialectics really is. This clash of opposites between life and death, fragmentation and totality, right and left, rich and poor, West and Islam, heaven and earth, being and becoming, past and future, is precisely the problem that metamodernity must attempt to resolve.

And finally, perhaps as its supreme task, metamodernity must devote itself to seeking to end the quest for absolute freedom. For if the attempt is made, it could be the last. Extinction could be just around the corner. But even if this does not happen, the new technocracy may not consider freedom to be as fundamental as it was for the bourgeoisie. From the beginning of its history, the bourgeoisie's obsession was always to one day find that authentic freedom.

All these changes require enormous effort, but they also require prior planning. The metaxis facing the new metamodernity is quite complex, and it is by no means a simple walk in the park. All these issues require extensive work that goes far beyond the limits of this book. Of course, every effort has been made here to clarify part of the way forward, but there is still a long way to go. And there are still many more questions than answers.

Next, we will seek to conclude this book with a series of examples of the main metamodern metaxis. Of course, these examples are highly ambiguous and lack the development necessary to be called informed knowledge. However, simply pointing them out may serve as a guide to understanding, at least in general terms, the various metaxis faced by

metamodernity. And that may perhaps serve as a vague inspiration for the philosophies of tomorrow.

Metaxis between life and death [sub-context]

The first metaxis that metamodernity encounters is definitely the metaxis between life and death. Understanding the nature of this metaxis, or this dialectical work, can be extremely complicated. But perhaps exemplifying it through a historical event can provide some guidance. The Battle of Stalingrad in World War II seems to be a good example of this. It is a historical example, as is customary in this study, but it is also closely related to the context of the bomb.

It is in Stalingrad where life collides with death. One might always wonder, what happens when an unstoppable force collides with an immovable object? The answer may lie in Stalingrad. This city was the site of the bloodiest battle of World War II and also the bloodiest in all of history. Here, the unstoppable force of the Third Reich, driven by Nietzschean theories of life, ends up colliding with the will of the Russian people. At first, this people turns to Marxist theories. However, these are completely crushed by the unstoppable force of the Wehrmacht. But finally, the Russians set aside Marxist theories as a motivating force and turned to the solid narratives of "the war for the fatherland." Then the unstoppable force of life, which is incapable of change, was gradually overcome by death, which had created a new type of war. The modern war that was discussed in previous chapters, which ended up surpassing the old one.

In Stalingrad, a memory is triggered, a deep memory found in ancient blood, and the instinct that nature once taught is finally activated. Just as the tree feeds on the earth and the sun, taking energy from other trees for its own sustenance; and just as the lion hunts the zebra, taking energy from the other through its flesh for its own sustenance; and just as man himself hunts and sows, feeding on others for his own sustenance; so blood remembers the true concept of what it means to be alive. So this is how life, which believed itself to be independent, finally realizes that... life... in order to continue being life... must kill. Animal, vegetable, or mineral, life must kill in order to continue being life. So it is not death that is in life, but life that is in death, being totally conditioned by it.

Metaxis between fragmentation and totality [sub-context]

Another important metaxis that concerns metamodernity is that of fragmentation and totality. Perhaps the example that best represents this clash of opposites is the concept of the "network," which has been brought about by the digital revolution. Of all these networks, the most striking example is the new blockchain networks. The Bitcoin financial system is the most notable of these networks. The Bitcoin network is a financial system that is neither fragmented nor centralized. In fact, it is both.

Bitcoin is not a currency, but rather a complete financial system that allows transactions to be made. It is the same as traditional banking systems, but with one fundamental difference. In the Bitcoin system, these transactions are not controlled by any central institution, but are self-regulated by the network itself. In this sense, the power to allow or deny a transaction does not lie with a single person. Instead, it is distributed across

thousands and thousands of miners who enable the network to function. Therefore, there is a clear fragmentation of power in Bitcoin. This fragmentation not only distributes power, but also provides security to the network against hacking and fraud. To hack the Bitcoin system, you would have to hack every single computer on the planet, separately. This would be practically impossible to do.

But in addition to fragmentation, Bitcoin also features totalization. Despite being a system distributed across millions of fragments, Bitcoin also represents a system that totalizes all of those fragments. This is because they are all directly related to each other, and a change in any one of them ends up affecting all the others. In this sense, these fragments could be seen as the small pieces of a huge clock. Despite being individual objects, they create, in their process, the totalization of the clock's mechanical movement.

But this fragmentation and totalization do not necessarily seem to be reconciled in the Bitcoin system. Rather than being two reconciled objects, they are two elements that remain separate, despite working together. The only reason they work in harmony is because of a series of higher rules, which would be the initial lines of code that created the Bitcoin system. This example can therefore serve as a guide when reflecting on the metaxis between fragmentation and totalization.

Metaxis between the West and Islam [sub-context]

Added to this metaxis are other metaxis that are not necessarily the main ones to which metamodernity must adhere, but which are equally important for historical

development and worth mentioning. The metaxis between Islam and the West is one that is beginning to be felt strongly. This is due both to armed conflicts and to the growing conversions of the Aryan element throughout the world.

It has been said before that religion is taking a back seat and being displaced by ideology. This is happening to virtually all religions in the world. However, Islam seems to be the only exception to this rule, as it appears to be the only religion capable of manifesting itself in the form of ideology, in addition to religion. The elements it possesses in terms of jurisprudence, economic perspectives, military concepts, and the soundness of its knowledge in general allow it to manifest itself as if it were an ideology, even if the esoteric part of religion is left aside. This purely ideological element is what Muslims call *fiqh*.⁴⁸

This is not to say that taking only Islamic *fiqh* and leaving aside the other two aspects of religion is optimal from an Islamic point of view. However, this is something that happens in history. And on many occasions, Islam is no longer seen as a religion, but only as an ideological tool to combat Western theories. This is especially true in the fight against deconstructive theories or Western military imperialism.

But regardless of the direction Islam takes, this religion always seems to be clashing with the West in this period of history. Not only does it clash with moribund postmodernity, but it may also end up clashing with the metamodernity that comes after it. And from that point on, one can already perceive the strangeness of this metaxis. For despite having metamodernity, a very different point of view from the latest Islamic scholastics.⁴⁹ It is also

⁴⁸ *Fiqh*, together with *ihsan* and *aqidah*, is one of the three expressions of the religion of Islam. It represents the "external practices." This makes it almost directly related to Islamic jurisprudence and Sharia (Islamic law) in general.

⁴⁹ Scholastics are the current leaders of Islam as a religion and ideology.

inevitable not to feel great amazement at the historical origins of this religion and all that the actions of its prophet meant.

This perhaps causes even greater astonishment in the metamodern consciousness than in the postmodern consciousness. For at the point where metamodernity finds itself, it has already completely abandoned Christianity. Christianity lies completely on the ground, dead, and no one has any intention of resurrecting it; even the most conservative are beginning to renounce it. But in addition to that, metamodernity has the same intention of negating postmodernity as Islam does. The methods may be different, but the intention is the same. Not to mention that, based on the historical knowledge from which metamodernity stems, it is impossible for it to turn a blind eye to a historical figure of such stature as the prophet of this religion.

What figure in history has turned desert villagers into one of the greatest forces in history? Western historians often do not like to touch on this subject. The equivalent of what the prophet of Islam did in the Arabian Peninsula is proportional to what would happen if, today, the Eskimos of Siberia suddenly decided to organize themselves, create a new religion, and conquer superpowers such as Russia and Europe through the expansion of that religion.

What figure in history is not only capable of creating the theory behind such a movement, but also of successfully leading it in practice? This man became the prophet of the religion, but at the same time he became an earthly leader. A leader of political, moral, and legal character, and a great friend to all those around him. Not to mention that he was able to unify the disorganized tribes of the Middle East, had twelve wives, and started one of the

most prosperous empires of the medieval era. An empire where the arts, sciences, and commerce were cultivated.

Western historians certainly find it difficult to study this. And so does the author of this book; for although an attempt was made to find a similar character who was part of the same bloodline to use as an example, it has not been possible. There are undoubtedly Western candidates of great stature, but it has not really been possible to find one of the same historical stature as the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him. Without a doubt, both the prophet and his companions are the best representation in history of what it means to be an aristocrat.

Of course, he does not want to consider the prophet as a kind of God, following Christian errors. But the magnitude of what this man became is truly astonishing. Perhaps it is even more appealing than the Koran itself. For when Western consciousness encounters Islam, the ideas of monotheism in the Koran are not so surprising. After all, two thousand years of Christianity have already done the work in that regard. Therefore, at times, Westerners may perceive more wisdom in the Sunnah,⁵⁰ than in the Quran itself. This is probably a mistake, but that is how things appear to the Western consciousness.

But in any case, with regard to metaxis, it undoubtedly exists. Both in the face of postmodernity and in the face of metamodernity. The clash with Islam ends up representing a kind of metaxis in both cases. Perhaps the best example of this can be found in the refugee crisis in Europe. Where immigrants who supposedly come as refugees from their own Muslim countries bring their religion with them to Europe. This causes the whole of Europe

⁵⁰ A series of stories describing the history of the prophet of Islam and his companions.

to be filled with mosques and Islamic expressions. The clash between Islamic expressions and Western Europe is the secondary metaxis to which metamodernity must adhere.

Metaxis between artificial intelligence (AI) and organic intelligence (humans).

[sub-context]

Another metaxis that may be useful for metamodernity is one that has actually been dragging on for several chapters. The metaxis between artificial intelligence and organic intelligence is also of utmost importance. The wet dream of some bourgeois is certainly to have an army of robots and machines to serve as slaves and allow them to conquer the world without ever having to leave their little bubble of narcissism. Artificial intelligence is often offered as an alternative to dominate the population without having to be respected by the otherness. This problem would arise if the bourgeoisie decided to hire armed men to help them with their conquest. But with robots and artificial intelligence, the aim is to remove that otherness from the equation and leave only the bourgeoisie's ego.

Perhaps it is a joy for many to declare that artificial intelligence is simply incapable of surpassing organic intelligence. Artificial intelligence is not really as "intelligent" as many believe. Even in its most advanced forms, such as machine learning and deep learning, or even with the help of new quantum supercomputers, these machines are simply incapable of creating knowledge in the same way that organic intelligence does. The problem is not really one of power, but rather the very foundation of artificial intelligence.

It is sometimes forgotten that artificial intelligence is always subject to something. AI is not something floating somewhere in cosmic space. No! Artificial intelligence is nothing more than software that lives inside a computer system. No matter how powerful AI is, it always remains within a computer system. And the nature of these computers translates directly into the nature of any AI created on them. And it is precisely this computational basis that prevents AI from truly creating knowledge. Since it is only capable of speaking in 0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,1. The computer is only capable of affirming something, it is not capable of denying it. The computer is like postmodernity in many ways. Affirmation, affirmation, affirmation; always as far away from death as possible. Perhaps another example would be useful to explain this better.

The example of metaxis between artificial and organic intelligence can perhaps be better represented by a conceptual example rather than a historical one. The difference between logic and dialectics may be helpful in differentiating between these two types of intelligence. Artificial intelligence is only capable of logical reasoning. In other words, it simply repeats what it already knows. But it becomes incapable of creating new knowledge. In this sense, syllogism is the best way to understand this principle. AI works in the same way as logical syllogism. At first glance, it appears to create new knowledge, but in reality, all it is doing is simply repeating what was already known. This always happens in AI, even in its most advanced manifestations of neural learning networks (machine learning). The machine only repeats what it already knows. It repeats the gnoseological method that the programmer installed at the beginning. No matter how fast it repeats it, this process is always a repetition. It is capable of using the parameters that the programmer installed, but it is simply incapable of deviating from those parameters. In other words, it is incapable of reflecting on its own knowledge. If it wants to change, the human programmer must intervene

again and make the change. This applies not only to AI, but to everything that lives inside a computer.

On the contrary, organic intelligence is capable of going beyond simple logical repetition. It is capable of creating knowledge through dialectics. In other words, it is capable of seeing beyond contradiction through the dialectical act. It is truly capable of transforming reality at its very foundations; it is capable of dying. And then being reborn. Dialectics is the true creative element of knowledge, beyond formal logic.

This example may perhaps raise some conceptual complications, but it can nevertheless serve as a guide to understanding this point. Finally, it is worth mentioning that AI is therefore incapable of replacing human capital as the primary source of economic progress. After all, GDP is nothing more than pure creation. Repetition does not belong in economic progress. Nor, for that matter, does it belong in the ever-changing battlefield. The only place where repetition is necessary is in the lowest spheres of the economy. All those bullshit jobs, those repetitive and boring jobs, will certainly be replaced by AI. But when it comes to creation, it is impossible for AI to compete with organic intelligence. And if the latter causes fear due to unemployment, it is always possible to resort to other options, such as universal basic income or other solutions.

Metaxis between "right" and "left." [sub-context]

Finally, another metaxis that may shed light on metamodernity lies in the metaxis between the "right" and the "left" in politics. It is clear that postmodern narcissism and the

cognitive biases produced by social media algorithms are fueling this increasingly forceful rejection between these two supposedly opposing sides. However, it sometimes seems pointless to talk about a metaxis in relation to these two issues.

After all, what do we mean by right and left today? Progressive and conservative? But what does that mean, because in the end, the progressive left actually ends up being even more conservative than the conservatives themselves, as they always end up happily picking up the crumbs that the prevailing system throws them. What progress are they talking about? Furthermore, this confrontation between left and right in politics has been so denigrated, thanks to popular democracy, that it has become nothing more than a circus of clowns who have nothing to lose but their own dignity.

Perhaps the best example that can be given of this type of metaxis is that there is actually no metaxis of any kind. And while these poor idiots fight among themselves, based on left or right, the metamodern consciousness sees the very end of states and the rise of the new technocracy to power.

Final summary [sub-context]

All these metaxis, which have been exemplified above in one way or another, are somewhat clarifying in terms of the new metamodern paradigm. This new paradigm will undoubtedly bring great challenges, which may not always be achieved, but which should always at least be attempted. There are no answers to these challenges, but we can begin to ask the right questions about them.

As for the theories of knowledge used in this study, they should not be taken as a serious statement of a gnoseological method. Rather, they are simply used as a practical and simple means of emphasizing the importance of history in philosophy and how it can be used to develop a more or less decent knowledge of the reality surrounding the philosopher.

In conclusion, then, the nature of history remains a mystery. However, by focusing solely on pointing out events, one can acquire a basic knowledge of it, which is necessary to start a new philosophy from it. In short, what metamodernity really means in its concept, for now, revolves not so much around its answers, but around its questions. These main questions are: questions about death, questions about the metaxis of life and death, the metaxis between fragmentation and totality, and absolute freedom.

These new philosophical questions are as challenging as they are exciting. And even though only discord can be seen in the future, it also provides those ever-memorable sensations that only occur when one is in the midst of a storm.

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